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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 Research context 
 
 
1.1.1 Background 
 
Global losses due to illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing are estimat-
ed to be between 9 billion USD and 24 billion USD annually, representing be-
tween 10 and 22 per cent of total fisheries production.1 In the history of the devel-
opment of international fisheries law, “combating IUU fishing” is a newly 
emerging topic. IUU fishing was first formally mentioned during a meeting of the 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR)2 in 1997. It was explicitly addressed in the Secretary-General’s Re-
port to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on Oceans and the Law of 
the Sea in 1999,3 and followed by the UNGA Resolution 54/32 in 1999,4 which 
called upon States to deal with the problem of IUU fishing.5 The 2001 Internation-
                                                          
     1  Mohammed EY (2014) Fisheries and the post-2015 development agenda. 
Available via International Institute for Environment and Development. 
http://pubs.iied.org/17203IIED.html. Accessed 18 February 2014. 
2 The CCAMLR was established in 1982 with the objective of conserving Ant-
arctic marine life under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources, which was concluded at Canberra on 20 May 1980, UNTS 
1329, p. 47. 
3 UNGA Report A/54/429 of the Secretary-General regarding oceans and the 
Law of the Sea, distributed on 30 September 1999. Available via UN Oceans & 
Law of the Sea. 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/general_assembly/general_assembly_reports.htm. 
Accessed on 22 October 2013, para. 98.  
4 UNGA Resolution 54/32 regarding Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 Decem-
ber 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, distributed on 19 January 2000, para. 9. 
5 OECD (2013) Short history of international actions and initiatives against 
IUU fishing activities. http://www.oecd.org. Accessed 18 January 2013. 
2  
al Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregu-
lated Fishing (IPOA-IUU)6 first specifically defined the term of IUU fishing: 
 
“ 3.1 Illegal fishing refers to activities: 
3.1.1 conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the ju-
risdiction of a State, without the permission of that State, or in contra-
vention of its laws and regulations; 
3.1.2 conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to 
a relevant regional fisheries management organization but operate in 
contravention of the conservation and management measures adopted 
by that organization and by which the States are bound, or relevant pro-
visions of the applicable international law; or 
3.1.3 in violation of national laws or international obligations, in-
cluding those undertaken by cooperating States to a relevant regional 
fisheries management organization. 
3.2 Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities: 
3.2.1 which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the 
relevant national authority, in contravention of national laws and regu-
lations; or 
3.2.2 undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional 
fisheries management organization which have not been reported or 
have been misreported, in contravention of the reporting procedures of 
that organization. 
3.3 Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities: 
3.3.1 in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries man-
agement organization that are conducted by vessels without nationality, 
or by those flying the flag of a State not party to that organization, or by 
a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with or contravenes 
the conservation and management measures of that organization; or 
3.3.2 in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no ap-
plicable conservation or management measures and where such fishing 
activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with State responsi-
bilities for the conservation of living marine resources under interna-
tional law. 
3.4 Notwithstanding paragraph 3.3, certain unregulated fishing may 
take place in a manner which is not in violation of applicable interna-
                                                          
6 The IPOA-IUU was adopted by consensus at the 24
th
 Session of Committee 
on Fisheries (COFI) in Rome on 2 March 2001 and endorsed by the 120
th
 Session 
of the FAO Council on 23 June 2001. Available via FAO Fisheries and Aquacul-
ture. http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.HTM. Accessed 22 Octo-
ber 2013. 
3 
tional law, and may not require the application of measures envisaged 
under the International Plan of Action (IPOA).” 7 
 
Although IUU fishing is universally called illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing, both unreported and unregulated fishing are subcategories of illegal fish-
ing.8 This well explains why measures provided by the IPOA-IUU deal with IUU 
fishing as a whole instead of illegal, unreported and unregulated separately. The 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008, establishing a 
Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregu-
lated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and 
(EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 
1447/1999 (IUU Regulation) 9 mainly adopts this definition except for the omis-
sion of paragraph 3.4 of the IPOA-IUU. Paragraph 3.4 of the IPOA-IUU actually 
creates confusion as to the definition of unregulated fishing. In the context of par-
agraph 3.3, most unregulated fishing is actually considered illegal. However, par-
agraph 3.4 excludes fishing activities that are not illegal from the IPOA-IUU’s 
“line of fire” and thereby from the definition of IUU fishing.10 According to recital 
41 of the EU IUU Regulation, IUU fishing refers to a violation of applicable laws, 
rules or regulations of particular gravity. In China’s national legislation, the term 
“IUU fishing” indeed refers to “illegal fishing” too. Therefore, this thesis only fo-
cuses on the illegality of IUU fishing and applicable measures. 
IUU fishing has adverse effects on the marine ecosystem and economy. It ag-
gravates overfishing and usually leads to an underestimation of fisheries resources 
during stock assessments.11 IUU fishing is also a destructive competition, which is 
unfair to those who fish in compliance with relevant conservation and manage-
                                                          
7 The IPOA-IUU, para. 3. 
8 Detailed analysis see: Theilen JT (2013) What’s in a name? The illegality of 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. The International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 28 (3): 533-550. 
9 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a 
Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregu-
lated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and 
(EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 
1447/1999; OJ L286 of 29 October 2008, pp. 1-36. 
10 Theilen (2013), p. 542. 
11 Doulman DJ (2000) A general overview of some aspects of illegal, unreport-
ed and unregulated fishing. Available via FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y3274e/y3274e04.htm. Accessed 15 February 
2014; Agnew DJ (2000) The illegal and unregulated fishery for toothfish in the 
Southern Ocean, and the CCAMLR catch documentation scheme. Marine Policy, 
24 (5): 361-374; Forrest R, Pitcher TJ, Watson R et al (2002) Estimating illegal 
and unreported catches from marine ecosystems: a basis for change. Fish and 
Fisheries 3(4): 317-339. 
4  
ment measures. Therefore, IUU fishing discourages the effectiveness of such 
measures adopted nationally and internationally to secure fish stocks for the fu-
ture.12 IUU fishing has become an urgent issue in recent years due to the depletion 
of marine fisheries resources and increased fish demand. Low costs and high prof-
its also encourage infringements of management and conservation measures.  
Together with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)13, the Food and Aquaculture Organization (FAO) has adopted a num-
ber of instruments pertaining to combating IUU fishing. Despite the comprehen-
sive framework of legal instruments available, implementation of such instruments 
remains an open question. Whether current international law is adequate to combat 
IUU fishing is equally still unknown. In particular, certain States have legislation 
in place in the field. An assessment of the quality of such legislation and the effec-
tiveness of its enforcement is still lacking. A further question concerns the types of 
enforcement depending on different attitudes towards international law. 
 
 
 
1.1.2 Aim and scope of thesis 
 
This research is a legal comparative study into the practice of the EU and China to 
combat IUU fishing. By comparing the law and its implementation by the EU and 
China, this thesis aims to evaluate of the adequacy of the international legal re-
gime for combating IUU fishing. The Member States of the EU and China are 
both major fishing States and fish markets. They also represent developed and de-
veloping States respectively. The EU-China comparison further shows the imple-
mentation of international fisheries law at different levels of development based 
on the corresponding interests of the EU and China. Their success and challenge 
can be an important source of inspiration for the development in combating IUU 
fishing as well. 
    The scope of this thesis is the combat of IUU fishing. Issues such as overfishing 
or overcapacity in fisheries are beyond the scope of this thesis. As the focus of this 
research is on State measures against IUU fishing, measures by regional fisheries 
management organizations and arrangements (RFMOs) will only be referred to in 
cases where State measures are related to measures of RFMOs in which the EU 
or/and China participate.  
 
 
                                                          
12 OECD (2004) Using trade measures in the fight against IUU fishing: oppor-
tunities and challenges. http://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/fisheries/34227035.pdf. 
Accessed 15 February 2014, p. 2. 
13 The UNCLOS was concluded at Montego Bay, Jamaica on 10 December 
1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994, UNTS 1833, p. 3. 
5 
1.1.3 Significance of the EU-China comparison 
 
The comparison of the EU and China provides an opportunity to study the imple-
mentation of international law in respect of combating IUU fishing. As the EU and 
China represent major fishing States and fish markets, the conclusions therefore 
provide an insight into whether current international fisheries law is effective to 
address IUU fishing. Moreover, the EU and China represent developed and devel-
oping States respectively. Therefore, the comparison also takes into account the 
different levels of implementation due to the development. 
Although the EU is an association of sovereign States,14 it has exclusive compe-
tence in areas of “the conservation of marine biological resources under the com-
mon fisheries policy”. Additionally, the EU has shared competence with Member 
States concerning fisheries with the exception of the conservation of marine bio-
logical resources. In practice, the EU has concluded many international, regional 
and bilateral fisheries agreements to the exclusion of its Member States. In the 
field of combating IUU fishing, the EU’s legal acts are mainly adopted in the form 
of regulations. In fighting against IUU fishing, most of the EU’s legal acts are 
binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Therefore, 
the comparison between the EU and China is more or less similar to that between 
sovereign States.  
The conservation of fisheries resources and resolving fisheries conflicts are sig-
nificant for both the EU and China. Given the implementation of the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP), the EU fishing fleet capacity has been reduced in both 
tonnage and engine power during the last two decades, which has contributed to 
an increasing domestic demand for fish and fisheries products. On the one hand, 
the EU actively develops distant water fisheries through fisheries partnership 
agreements and northern agreements.15 On the other hand, the EU greatly relies on 
imports of fish and fisheries products. The EU has not only become the largest 
fish market, it also attracted over 1.1 billion EUR illegal catches annually before 
2010, which represent almost 16 per cent of the EU’s imports of fish.16 Such ille-
gal catches have gained a competitive price advantage in the EU market, which is 
                                                          
14  Schorkopf F (2009) The European Union as an association of sovereign 
States: Karlsruhe’s ruling on the Treaty of Lisbon. German Law Journal 10 (8), p. 
1219. 
15 The EU has two types of fishing agreements with non-EU countries. Fisher-
ies partnership agreements allow the EU to give financial and technical support in 
exchange for fishing rights, while the northern agreements are established with 
Norway, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands to manage jointly shared stocks. 
16 Damanaki M (2011) Zero tolerance on illegal fishing. Speech presented at 
the 6
th
 International Forum on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, 
Chatham House, London, 13-14 January 2011. 
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believed to undermine conservation measures and discourage law-abiding fisher-
men.17 Therefore, the EU has dedicated itself to combating IUU fishing.  
The most outstanding endeavour of the EU was the adoption and implementa-
tion of the IUU Regulation. The IUU Regulation deals with IUU fishing mainly 
through port State measures and trade-market measures. Since the IUU regulation 
entered into force, the European Commission (Commission) has adopted a set of 
implementing instruments. By doing this, the EU has established its own legal 
framework for combating IUU fishing. Furthermore, the EU actively encourages 
and cooperates with its fish trade partners, such as the US, Japan and China, in or-
der to broaden the influence of the Community law. 
Due to the depletion of marine fisheries resources in Chinese waters, China 
adopted a marine fishing vessel reduction plan for 2003-2010, which did achieve a 
reduction by 2008 close to the target, but after that both the number of vessels and 
the total combined power have started to increase again.18 The resource shortage 
has intensified along with the implementation of the UNCLOS and the establish-
ment of the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) by China and its 
neighbouring countries. This has resulted in fisheries conflicts between China and 
its neighbouring States and many incidents of IUU fishing. In order to alleviate the 
scarcity of resources, China started to promote the development of its distant wa-
ter fisheries in 1985. Now China has the largest number of distant-water-fishing 
vessels in the world, yet its production capacity and industrial scale are much 
smaller than those of developed countries.19 China is the world’s largest fish pro-
cessor and exporter too. China contributed almost 12 per cent to the world’s ex-
ports of fish and fisheries products that were worth about 13.3 billion USD in 
2010 and increased further to 17.1 billion USD in 2011.20 Additionally, China be-
came the third-largest importer of fish and fisheries products in the world in 
2011.21 Therefore, China plays a significant role in combating IUU fishing as a 
fish market. 
China has acceded to the UNCLOS but not the other FAO agreements for com-
bating IUU fishing. However, this does not infer that China has not complied with 
these agreements. Together with the Fisheries Law of the PRC,22 a series of im-
                                                          
17 Damanaki M (2011) Zero tolerance on illegal fishing.. 
18 FAO (2012) The state of world fisheries and aquaculture 2012. FAO, Rome, 
p. 11. 
19 Research group on “Supporting and strengthening distant water fisheries” 
(2010) Supporting distant water fisheries as a strategic industry (in Chinese). 
Available via National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjshujia/zggqgl/t20101018_402676860.htm. Accessed 18 
October 2010. 
20 FAO (2012), p. 70. 
21 FAO (2012), p. 16. 
22 Adopted at the 14
th
 Meeting of the Standing Committee of the NPC and 
promulgated by Decree No 34 of the President of the PRC on 20 January 1986, 
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plementing rules have been adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture in order to im-
plement and enforce China’s duties. In 2013, China’s State Council promulgated 
Several Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Sustainable and Healthy 
Development of Marine Fisheries, which expressly indicates that China shall 
strictly combat IUU fishing to ensure the conservation of fishery resources.23 
 
 
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
The objective of this research is to study the implementation of international law 
pertaining to combating IUU fishing through a legal comparison between the EU 
and China. The following research questions will be addressed: 
 
• Does international law address the problem of IUU fishing adequately and 
how? 
• What are the respective attitudes of the EU and China towards the develop-
ment of international IUU fisheries laws, hard law as well as soft law? If there 
is a different attitude, what are the reasons therefore?  
• What are the different fisheries competences between the EU and its Member 
States? Is this division of competences in the EU comparable to the relation-
ship between China and its local governments? 
• How active have the EU and China been in implementing multilateral and bi-
lateral agreements and political instruments? What is their implementation 
practice? 
• What State measures (coastal, flag and port State measures and trade-related 
measures) are chosen by the EU and China respectively and why? Are State 
measures taken so far by the EU and China effective to combat IUU fishing? 
• What lessons can be learned from the EU and Chinese fisheries policy for the 
further development of international law regarding IUU fishing? 
 
                                                                                                                                     
revised by Decree No 38 of the President of the PRC on 31 October 2000, by De-
cree No 25 of the President of the PRC on 28 August 2004, by Decree No 18 of 
the President of the PRC on 28 August 2009 and by Decree No 8 of the President 
of the PRC on 28 December 2013 respectively. All amendments are available via 
Pkulaw.cn. http://en.pkulaw.cn.eproxy1.lib.hku.hk/. Accessed 10 April 2014. 
23 Several Opinions of the State Council on Promoting Sustainable and Healthy 
Development of Marine Fisheries was promulgated by the State Council on 8 
March 2013. Available via the Central Peoples’ Government of the People’s Re-
public of China. http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-06/25/content_2433577.htm. Ac-
cessed 3 December 2013. 
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1.3 Methodology 
 
A comparison between the EU and China as to their combat of IUU fishing is em-
bedded in the international context. The study is based on a combined approach of 
desk-top and empirical research. The desk-top research includes the examination 
of international treaties, regional agreements, national legislation, international 
and national judicial decisions, governmental documents, books, journal articles, 
internet materials, conference proceedings, working papers and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) records.  
Due to the pace of development and breadth of the research, a truly comprehen-
sive review is probably impossible, and certainly beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The international legal and policy framework to combat IUU fishing has been 
comprehensively introduced by Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William 
Edeson.24 The EU’s Common Fisheries Policy and relevant legislation and case 
law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) before 2010 have been thoroughly as-
sessed by Robin Churchill and Daniel Owen.25 Guifang Xue has conducted excel-
lent work in her PhD thesis, which elaborates on China’s legislative harmonization 
and policy adjustment in response to certain international fisheries instruments.26  
Most information concerning the EU’s combat of IUU fishing can be found on 
the website of the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG 
Mare) or the Official Journal of the EU, including legislation and documents, fish-
eries agreements and protocols, activities of the Commissioner as well as meetings 
and events. In China’s case, there is no official website that publishes all fisheries 
legislation and implementation. The Chinese government does not publish the 
texts of fisheries partnership agreements between China and other States. The lack 
of transparency in the implementation gives outsiders the impression that China’s 
fisheries are not well documented or reported. 
The empirical research is comprised of face-to-face interviews as well as phone 
and email communication. The author interviewed Mr. He Cui, Vice Executive 
President and Secretary-General of the China Aquatic Products Processing and 
Marketing Alliance at the 10
th
 International Seafood Summit organized by Sea-
Web in Hong Kong in September 2012. The author also interviewed Ms. Gorez 
Beatrice, Coordinator at Coalition for Fair Fisheries Arrangements in Belgium at 
the film screening: Sandgrains in Brussels on 26 November 2012. Then the author 
interviewed Mr. Simon Funge-Smith, a Senior Fishery Officer of FAO Regional 
                                                          
24 Palma MA, Tsamenyi M, Edeson WR (2010) Promoting sustainable fisher-
ies: the international legal and policy framework to combat illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden. 
25 Churchill R, Owen D (2010) The EU Common Fisheries Policy. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
26 Xue G (2004) China’s response to international fisheries law and policy: na-
tional action and regional cooperation. Dissertation, University of Wollongong. 
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Office for Asia and the Pacific; Mr. Stylianos Mitolidis from the Directorate Gen-
eral for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of the European Commission; Mr. Henry 
DeBey, a Program Coordination Officer of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration of the United States Department of Commerce; Ms. Sophie 
Nodzenski, a Campaigns Assistant of the Environmental Justice Foundation at the 
8
th
 International Forum on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in London 
in February 2013. Two months later, the author interviewed Mr. Blaise 
Kuemlangan, the Chief of the Development Law Service of FAO and Mr. Damien 
Desquiens, a Policy Officer of the Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries of the European Commission at the round-table on Current International 
Legal Issues in the Field of Fisheries in Louvain-la-Neuve. In addition, the author 
has got important information through email and/or phone communication from 
Mr. Shuxian Sun, the Chief Engineer of China’s National Oceanic Administration; 
Assoc Prof. Dr. Dan Liu of Shanghai University of International Business and 
Economics; Mr. Baoshan Huang, Vice President of the China Distant Water Fish-
eries Association; and Mr. Suk Kyoon Kim, the Korea Coast Guard Commissioner 
General. The internship at the Legal Department of the ITLOS provides great op-
portunities for the author to obtain documents and access key persons for inter-
views, which has been beneficial for the thesis. 
 
 
 
1.4 Chapter outline 
 
This book consists of five chapters. The first chapter is the introduction that pro-
vides the research context, research questions and methodology of this study. 
Chapter 2 introduces the international legal framework for combating IUU fish-
ing. It does not specifically refer to all relevant international instruments as this 
has already been done by other scholars (e.g. Mary Ann Palma et al). Instead, fo-
cus is on international instruments introducing specific State duties and measures 
against IUU fishing. Those instruments are divided into legally binding laws and 
non-legally binding instruments in order to provide a background for the discus-
sion of the different attitudes of the EU and China in implementing international 
law. The different regimes among flag State, coastal State, port State and market 
State and implementation at the international level also provide a background for 
the discussion on implementation in subsequent chapters. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the implementation of the EU. The general legal frame-
work of the EU for the combat of IUU fishing is discussed, including the EU’s 
competence in the field of fisheries and the EU’s external and internal responses 
to international law. This research mainly mentions legislation since the adoption 
of the IUU Regulation instead of previous legislation which has been discussed by 
Robin Churchill and Daniel Owen. Then the chapter comprehensively assesses the 
10  
EU’s external (port State and trade-market measures) and internal implementation 
(flag and coastal State measures).  
Chapter 4 provides a thorough study of China’s legal practice in combating IUU 
fishing rather than focusing on resources management and bilateral cooperation, 
because the latter has been done by Guifang Xue. First, the legal framework per-
taining to combating IUU fishing is provided. China’s participation in internation-
al law as well as the reasons why China has not accepted certain international in-
struments are discussed. China’s implementation of international instruments 
through its domestic legal system is analysed as well. An assessment is given of 
China’s practice as flag, coastal, port and market State. The challenges China has 
faced are also discussed. 
Chapter 5 concludes with a comparison between the European and Chinese 
practice to combat IUU fishing under international law. It highlights the successes 
and challenges of implementation. Suggestions for the further development of in-
ternational law are provided as well. This concluding chapter also identifies the 
limitations of the present research and provides recommendations for future re-
search.  
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Chapter 2 International Legal Framework for Combat-
ing IUU Fishing  
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
IUU fishing related issues are scattered in the legal framework of responsible and 
sustainable fisheries. This framework is based on the 1982 United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),27 resolutions of the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) in this respect and several post-UNCLOS internation-
al instruments. Three international agreements were adopted for sustainable fisher-
ies, viz. the 1993 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 
(FAO Compliance Agreement),28 the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Im-
plementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement)29 and the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Code of 
Conduct).30 The 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU)31 is the first internation-
al fisheries instrument that systematically provides for a variety of measures ad-
dressing IUU fishing, followed by the 2005 FAO Model Scheme on Port State 
                                                          
27 The UNCLOS was concluded at Montego Bay, Jamaica on 10 December 
1982 and entered into force on 16 November 1994, UNTS 1833, p. 3. 
28 The FAO Compliance Agreement was adopted at Rome on 24 November 
1993 and came into force on 24 April 2003, UNTS 2221, p. 91. 
29 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement was concluded at New York on 4 August 
1995 and entered into force on 11 December 2001, UNTS 2167, p. 88. 
30 The Code of Conduct was unanimously adopted by the Conference of the 
FAO in Rome on 31 October 1995. Available via FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM. Accessed on 22 October 
2013. 
31 The IPOA-IUU was adopted by consensus at the 24
th
 Session of Committee 
on Fisheries (COFI) in Rome on 2 March 2001 and endorsed by the 120
th
 Session 
of the FAO Council on 23 June 2001. Available via FAO Fisheries and Aquacul-
ture. http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.HTM. Accessed 22 Octo-
ber 2013. 
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Measures to Combat IUU Fishing (FAO Model Scheme),32 The 2005 FAO Rome 
Declaration on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (The FAO Rome Dec-
laration on IUU Fishing)33 and the 2009 FAO Agreement on Port State Measures 
to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
(FAO Port State Measures Agreement)34 were adopted especially to deal with IUU 
fishing. 
   After introducing the international legal framework to combat IUU fishing, this 
chapter will further deal with different State duties and measures against IUU fish-
ing. 
 
 
 
2.2 International legal framework for combating IUU fishing 
 
The international legal framework for combating IUU fishing is divided up into 
legally binding laws and non-legally binding instruments. 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Legally binding laws 
 
2.2.1.1 The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
 
The UNCLOS is the cornerstone of modern international fisheries law. The 
UNCLOS was adopted in 1982 and received wide recognition by 166 States Par-
                                                          
32 The FAO Model Scheme was endorsed by the 26
th
 Session of the FAO COFI 
in Rome in 2005. Available via FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0985t/a0985t00.HTM. Accessed 22 October 
2013. 
33 The FAO Rome Declaration on IUU Fishing was adopted by the FAO Minis-
terial Meeting on Fisheries in Rome on 12 March 2005. Available via FAO Fish-
eries and Aquaculture. http://www.fao.org/fishery/ipoa-iuu/publications/en. Ac-
cessed 22 October 2013. 
34 The FAO Port State Measures Agreement was adopted by the FAO Confer-
ence at its 36
th
 Session in Rome on 22 November 2009. Available via FAO. 
www.fao.org fileadmin user upload legal docs 2 03 t-e.pdf . Accessed 22 Octo-
ber 2013. 
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ties to the Convention, including the European Union.35 Thirty years after the 
Convention was adopted, the main provisions of the UNCLOS may be considered 
as customary international law. For example, the US, which is not a party to the 
UNCLOS, publicly acknowledges this.36 The Convention does not directly refer to 
“IUU fishing”, but it provides general principles that profoundly affect the subse-
quent development of international fisheries law. The UNCLOS establishes an 
overall framework for the management and conservation of marine living re-
sources. Key contributions of the UNCLOS include authorizing coastal States 
sovereignty37 in their territorial area up to 12 nautical miles and sovereign rights38 
in their exclusive economic zones (EEZ) as well as codifying the freedom to fish 
on the high seas39 and the duties of States to conserve and manage living resources 
of the high seas.40 The UNCLOS also provides general requirements for the con-
servation and utilization of the living resources in coastal State’s EEZ41 and of 
transboundary stocks, straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species.42 These 
provisions have formed the basis for fisheries management and conservation in 
EEZs and on the high seas. 
In order to combat IUU fishing, the cooperation and coordination between 
coastal States and flag States is imperative; the UNCLOS only provides general 
principles in Articles 63, 64, 87, and 116 to 119, leaving specific issues to subse-
quent international negotiations and national implementation. The UNCLOS re-
gime provides various possibilities of implementing for complicated problems of 
boundary delimitation of the territorial seas and the EEZs, which have an effect on 
the issue of illegal fishing. Examples can be seen in the area around the Spratly Is-
lands.  Fisheries conflicts still exist among China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia 
and Brunei. In order to get the acceptance of the majority, the UNCLOS uses 
vague language which leads States to interpret it differently.43 Because effective 
management and conservation of living resources in the EEZ cannot be separated 
                                                          
     35 Ocean & Law of the Sea (2014) Table recapitulating the status of the Con-
vention and of the related Agreements. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf. Accessed 26 Febru-
ary 2014. 
36 Freestone D ( 2012) The Law of the Sea Convention at 30: successes, chal-
lenges and new agendas. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 27, 
p. 677. 
37 The UNCLOS, Arts. 2 and 3. 
38 The UNCLOS, Art. 56 (1). 
39 The UNCLOS, Arts. 87 and 116. 
40 The UNCLOS, Arts. 117 and 118. 
41 The UNCLOS, Arts. 61 and 62. 
42 The UNCLOS, Arts. 63 and 64. 
43 Liu Z (2008) The negative influence of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (in Chinese), Foreign Affairs Review (Shanghai) 103: 
82. 
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from agreed boundary delimitations, the difficulty to achieve the boundary delimi-
tation creates many obstacles for responsible fisheries.  
Additionally, the EEZ regime under the framework of the UNCLOS has made 
many traditional fishing grounds of some foreign fishermen become EEZs of 
coastal States. Limited foreign access turns some fishing efforts into illegal fishing 
activities. In addition, with the expanding EEZs, huge fishing efforts have been 
excluded from EEZs. Therefore, unregulated fishing has been aggravated on the 
high seas. 
Part XV of the UNCLOS provides the settlement of disputes. Section 1 of Part 
XV calls upon States to settle a dispute concerning the interpretation or applica-
tion of the UNCLOS through negotiations or by conciliation. Disputes that cannot 
be settled may be submitted to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under sec-
tion 2 of Part XV, which is a compulsory procedure entailing binding decisions. A 
State Party to the UNCLOS is required to make a declaration under Article 287 of 
the UNCLOS to choose the means for the settlement of disputes concerning the 
interpretation or application of the Convention. Applicable means include: (a) the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS); (b) the International Court 
of Justice; (c) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VII; (d) a 
special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for fisheries.44  
As of 25 March 2014, thirty six of the 166 State Parties to the UNCLOS have 
chosen the ITLOS as (one of) their means of dispute settlement. The ITLOS is 
most preferred among the means of dispute settlement. Among the thirty six 
States, thirteen are EU Member States.45 Except for the EU Member States, only 
twenty three other States have selected the ITLOS as a preferred mean of dispute 
settlement. China has not made any declaration to choose the means mentioned. 
According to Article 287 (3) of the UNCLOS, China is deemed to accept arbitra-
tion in accordance with Annex VII. In addition, if the Parties to a dispute have not 
accepted the same procedure for the dispute settlement, the dispute may only be 
submitted to arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.46 Even though Parties to a 
dispute cannot reach an agreement on the means of dispute settlement, Section 2 
of Part XV of the UNCLOS confers on the ITLOS compulsory jurisdiction in re-
spect of two issues, viz. provisional measures in Article 290 of the UNCLOS and 
the prompt release of vessels and crew in Article 292 of the UNCLOS, which are 
detailed in Sections 2.3.2.3 and 2.3.3.2 respectively.47 The ITLOS has compulsory 
jurisdiction over provisional measures and the prompt release of vessels and crew 
                                                          
44 The UNCLOS, Art. 287 (1). 
     45  Oceans & Law of the Sea (2014) Settlement of disputes mechanism. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/settlement_of_disputes/choice_procedure.htm. Ac-
cessed 25 March 2014. 
46 The UNCLOS, Art. 287 (4). 
47 Tuerk H (2007-2008) The contribution of the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea to International Law. Penn State International Law Review 26 (2), 
p. 292. 
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because they are expeditious issues, which require to be resolved by a pre-
established body.48 
In the field of fisheries, Article 297 (3) of the UNCLOS provides exceptions to 
the application of compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions.  
 
“(a)Disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the pro-
visions of this Convention with regard to fisheries shall be settled in ac-
cordance with section 2, except that the coastal State shall not be 
obliged to accept the submission to such settlement of any dispute relat-
ing to its sovereign rights with respect to the living resources in the ex-
clusive economic zone or their exercise, including its discretionary pow-
ers for determining the allowable catch, its harvesting capacity, the 
allocation of surpluses to other States and the terms and conditions es-
tablished in its conservation and management laws and regulations.  
(b) Where no settlement has been reached by recourse to section 1 of 
this Part, a dispute shall be submitted to conciliation under Annex V, 
section 2, at the request of any party to the dispute, when it is alleged 
that:  
(i) a coastal State has manifestly failed to comply with its obligations 
to ensure through proper conservation and management measures that 
the maintenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone 
is not seriously endangered; 
(ii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to determine, at the request 
of another State, the allowable catch and its capacity to harvest living 
resources with respect to stocks which that other State is interested in 
fishing; or 
(iii) a coastal State has arbitrarily refused to allocate to any State, 
under Articles 62, 69 and 70 and under the terms and conditions estab-
lished by the coastal State consistent with this Convention, the whole or 
part of the surplus it has declared to exist.” 
 
These exceptions also apply to straddling stocks and highly migratory species 
that migrate between EEZs and the high seas. Article 32 of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement expressly confirms the application of Article 297 (3) to the Agreement. 
However, Article 297 (3) of the UNCLOS does not apply to straddling stocks or 
highly migratory species on the high seas. This means that a coastal State may be 
excluded from compulsory dispute settlement for a dispute concerning its man-
agement of straddling stocks and highly migratory species in its own EEZ. How-
                                                          
48 Escher AK (2004) Release of vessels and crews before the International Tri-
bunal for the Law of the Sea. The Law and Practice of International Courts and 
Tribunals 3, p. 239. 
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ever, a dispute as to the management of such stocks and species on the high seas 
may not be excluded according to Article 297 (3).49   
Additionally, Article 298 (1) (a) (b) and (c) of the UNCLOS stipulates that a 
State may be excluded from compulsory dispute settlement of Section 2 of Part 
XV by making a declaration in cases of disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of Article 15, 74 and 83, viz. sea boundary delimitations, disputes con-
cerning historic bays or titles, disputes that necessarily involve the concurrent con-
sideration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over 
continental or insular land territory, military activities, law enforcement activities 
in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction excluded from the ju-
risdiction of a court or tribunal under Article 297 (2) or (3), and disputes in respect 
of which the Security Council of the United Nations is exercising the functions as-
signed to it by the Charter of the United Nations. In the field of fisheries, disputes 
concerning law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign rights 
or jurisdiction excluded from the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal under Article 
297 (2) or (3) will not be excluded from compulsory dispute automatically, while 
such disputes may only be excluded from compulsory dispute settlement through 
making a declaration by a coastal State. The enforcement measures of a coastal 
State may include boarding, inspecting, arresting and detaining a vessel, hot pur-
suit and other measures.  
As of 25 March 2014, thirty four States Parties to the UNCLOS have made dec-
larations to indicate that they do not accept any one or more of the compulsory 
procedures entailing binding decisions with respect to one or more of the catego-
ries of disputes provided by Article 298.50 Twenty one of these States Parties have 
explicitly declared that their disputes concerning law enforcement activities in re-
gard to the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction are excluded from one or 
more of the compulsory procedures of a court or tribunal under Article 297 (2) or 
(3).51 However, although the detention of a foreign vessel in the EEZ of a coastal 
State belongs to law enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of sovereign 
rights, the exclusion from compulsory dispute settlement by making a declaration 
should be subject to the limitation of Article 292 of the UNCLOS for the prompt 
release, which is discussed in Section 2.3.3.2.  
 
 
 
                                                          
49 Churchill R (2007) The jurisprudence of the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea relating to fisheries: is there much in the net? The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 22, p. 390. 
50 Oceans & Law of the Sea (2014) Settlement of disputes mechanism. 
51 Oceans & Law of the Sea (2014) Settlement of disputes mechanism. 
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2.2.1.2 Background of the FAO Compliance Agreement and the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement 
 
Due to the expansion of high seas fishing in the early 1990s and the demand for 
more effective management, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 requires sustainable utiliza-
tion and conservation of marine living resources, both on the high seas and in are-
as under States’ national jurisdiction. 52 Paragraph 17.45 of Agenda 21 emphasizes 
that monitoring and enforcement of high seas fisheries are inadequate, which re-
sults in many problems such as unregulated fishing, vessel reflagging to escape 
controls, unreliable databases and lack of sufficient cooperation between States. 
Therefore, paragraph 17.49 urges States to take effective action at the regional and 
global level to ensure that high seas fisheries are managed in accordance with the 
UNCLOS. Paragraph 17.50 further calls upon States to convene an intergovern-
mental conference to promote the effective implementation of the UNCLOS for 
the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and high migratory 
species. 
The issue of high seas fishing has also been discussed in other international fo-
rums, such as the Conference on Responsible Fishing convened by the FAO in 
Cancun, Mexico on 6-8 May 1992. During this meeting, the Declaration of Can-
cun was adopted on 8 May 1992. The Declaration calls upon States to draft an In-
ternational Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing and it also demands conven-
ing an intergovernmental conference on high seas fisheries.53  
In response to the call of Agenda 21 and the Declaration of Cancun, the FAO 
adopted the 1993 FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 Code of Conduct.54 
The FAO Compliance Agreement is an integral part and also the only legally 
binding part of the Code of Conduct.55 In December 1992, UNGA Resolution No 
                                                          
52 Agenda 21 is an action plan of the UN related to sustainable development. It 
is also an outcome of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992. Available via United 
Nations Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform. 
http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?page=view&nr=23&type=400&
menu=35. Accessed 28 October 2013. 
53  Declaration of International Conference on Responsible Fishing, Cancun, 
Mexico, 8 May 1992, paras. I and IV. Available via FAO Fisheries and Aquacul-
ture. http://www.fao.org/fishery/about/programme/agreements/en. Accessed 28 
October 2013. 
54 Balton DA, Zbicz DC (2004) Managing deep-sea fisheries: some threshold 
questions. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 19: 247-258. 
55 Balton DA (2004) Chapter 4: dealing with the "bad actors" of ocean fisheries. 
In OECD (ed) Fish piracy: combating illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. 
OECD, Paris, p. 60. 
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47/192 was adopted to convene a conference on straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory species.56  
 
 
 
 
2.2.1.3 The FAO Compliance Agreement 
 
The FAO Compliance Agreement was adopted on 24 November 1993 and came 
into force on 24 April 2003. Although this Agreement was formulated to deal with 
the issue of reflagging,  it finally became a fisheries agreement that includes the 
main duties of flag Parties.57 Flag Parties’ duties are mainly provided in Article III 
of the FAO Compliance Agreement. Additionally, this Agreement also addresses 
other issues, such as records of fishing vessels,58 exchange of information59 and in-
ternational cooperation.60 Significantly, the FAO Compliance Agreement is the 
first international binding legal instrument that applies port State control to irre-
sponsible fishing.61 
   It should be pointed out that, unlike the UNCLOS and the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement, the FAO Compliance Agreement focuses on parties instead of States, 
indicating that the provisions of the FAO Compliance Agreement can only create 
obligations for States bound by the Agreement.62 The FAO Compliance Agree-
ment has only 39 parties, including the European Union, which cannot ensure ef-
fective enforcement.63  
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2.2.1.4 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
 
The UNCLOS provides general principles for the management and conservation 
of fish species; while, the purpose of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is to specify 
the principles as well as substantive obligations on the conservation and manage-
ment of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species.  
    After several years of negotiation and compromise, the UN Fish Stocks Agree-
ment was adopted on 4 August 1995 and entered into force on 11 December 2001. 
Later in May 2006 and May 2010, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement was reviewed 
by States respectively. The 2006 Review Conference, convened pursuant to Arti-
cle 36 of the Agreement, was held in New York, from 22 to 26 May 2006, in ac-
cordance with GA Resolution 59/25 of 17 November 2004 and Resolution 60/31 
of 29 November 2005. The 2010 Review Conference, convened pursuant to Arti-
cle 36 of the Agreement, was held in New York, from 24 to 28 May 2010, in ac-
cordance with GA Resolution resumed 63/112 of 5 December 2008 and Resolu-
tion 64/72 of 4 December 2009, with a view to assessing the effectiveness of the 
Agreement in securing the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks 
and highly migratory fish stocks.64 The 2010 UN Fish Stock Agreement Review 
Conference was held with a view to assessing the effectiveness of the Agreement 
in securing the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks. By September 2013, there were 81 parties to the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement,65 including most of the major flag States and the major mar-
kets for fish.66 However, several major fishing States are still not parties to the 
Agreement, including China and many Latin American and African countries. The 
main reasons of non-participation include: objections to certain provisions that are 
believed to have amended certain significant principles of the UNCLOS; the obli-
gations of participation in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement outweigh the benefits; 
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20  
lack of capacity and resources to implement the Agreement; lack of awareness and 
misconceptions; and lack of direct interest.67 
Regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements (RFMOs) have 
been recognized as the principal cooperation mechanism to conserve and manage 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species in the 2010 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement Review Conference.68 Article 10 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
spells out the functions of RFMOs in regard to high seas fishing: (a) agree and 
comply with conservation and management measures to ensure the long-term sus-
tainability of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species; (b) agree on par-
ticipatory rights such as allocations of allowable catch or levels of fishing effort; 
(c) adopt and apply any generally recommended international minimum standards 
for the responsible conduct of fishing operations; and (d) establish appropriate co-
operative mechanisms for effective Monitoring, Control and Surveillance and en-
forcement. 
The overarching RFMO mechanism proposed by the UN Fish Stocks Agree-
ment to manage high seas fishing is that the freedom of fishing on the high seas 
must comply with the management and conservation measures adopted by rele-
vant RFMOs. Article 8(4) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement states that “only 
those States which are members of such an organisation or participants in such an 
arrangement, or which agree to apply the conservation and management 
measures established by such organisation or arrangement, shall have access to 
the fishery resources to which those measures apply.” According to this provision, 
non-compliant vessels flying the flag of non-members of a RFMO concerned, 
which conduct fishing activities on the high seas covered by this RFMO, are con-
sidered as unregulated fishing vessels. Members of this RFMO are required to 
take measures to prevent activities of such vessels from undermining the measures 
of the RFMO.69 There is a risk that such vessels might be contained in the IUU 
vessel lists of relevant RFMOs. Under certain conditions, flag States of such ves-
sels may even be restricted by trade measures.70 Those measures intend to force 
distant fishing States to take duties under regional pressure.  
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement codifies the most controversial issue - the high 
seas enforcement by non-flag States, which has been recognized as an exception 
to the exclusive flag State jurisdiction.71 Article 21 (1) provides that: 
                                                          
67 Molenaar EJ (2011) Non-participation in the Fish Stocks Agreement: status 
and reasons. The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 26, pp. 200-
213. 
68 Outcome of the 2010 UN Fish Stocks Agreement Review Conference, pre-
amble 2, in the Report of the 2010 UN Fish Stocks Agreement Review Confer-
ence, p. 40. 
69 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 17(4). 
70 Molenaar (2011), p. 233. 
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“In any high seas area covered by a sub regional or regional fisheries man-
agement organization or arrangement, a State Party which is a member of such 
organization or a participant in such arrangement may, through its duly author-
ized inspectors, board and inspect, …, fishing vessels flying the flag of another 
State Party to this Agreement, whether or not such State Party is also a member of 
the organization or a participant in the arrangement, for the purpose of ensuring 
compliance with conservation and management measures for straddling fish 
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks established by that organization or ar-
rangement.”72 
 
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement is not the first agreement that has adopted high 
seas enforcement by non-flag States. In fact, several treaties contain provisions 
concerning such measures, such as the 1978 Convention on Future Multilateral 
Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries73 and the 1994 Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of Pollack Resources in the Central Bering Sea.74 
However, provisions of enforcement by non-flag States in those treaties are gener-
ally bilateral or regional rather than global. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement is the 
first international fisheries agreement that allows non-flag States to board and in-
spect fishing vessels of other State Parties on the high seas.75 The influence of 
high seas enforcement on non-flag States is like two sides of a coin. On the one 
hand, it attracts State Parties that intend to be entitled to exercise non-flag State 
high seas enforcement. On the other hand, it discourages those that do not want to 
be subjected to this obligation. Articles 21 and 22 are the major reasons for non-
participation in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. However, the high seas enforce-
ment by non-flag States is not absolute. Members of RFMOs can limit the applica-
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tion of this enforcement to themselves if they adopt an alternative mechanism that 
can also effectively discharge the obligation. 76  
Although the UN Fish Stocks Agreement authorizes non-flag States to investi-
gate vessels involved in IUU fishing, Article 21 (12) of this Agreement also pro-
vides that flag States may take action to fulfil their duties at any time. When the 
flag State requests, the inspecting State is obliged to release the vessel to the flag 
State, together with all information on the progress and outcome of its investiga-
tion. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement also requires specific flag State duties and 
port State measures in managing and conserving such stocks.77  
 
 
 
 
2.2.1.5 The FAO Port State Measures Agreement 
 
The most recent fisheries agreement negotiated by the FAO is the FAO Port State 
Measures Agreement, which was adopted in November 2009.  As in the 2003 
FAO Compliance Agreement and the 2005 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, port State 
measures are considered another track to deal with irresponsible fishing. Later in 
the 2001 IPOA-IUU, port State control is explicitly called upon to prevent, deter 
and eliminate IUU fishing. The 2005 FAO Model Scheme is the first international 
political instrument to address certain activities recognized as IUU fishing by the 
2001 IPOA-IUU. Based on the previous instruments, the FAO Port State 
Measures Agreement is the first legally binding universal agreement that compre-
hensively apply port states measures to address IUU fishing. 
    This Agreement is aimed at the inspection of fishing vessels entering the ports 
of parties and the verification of whether they have been engaged in IUU fishing.78 
Through uniform port State measures, IUU catches are supposed to be prohibited 
from national and international markets, thereby removing the financial incentives 
for fishing operators to engage in IUU fishing.79 Although IUU fishing vessels can 
use ports of their flag States if the legislation of their flag States allows, “doing so 
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is not always economically viable”.80 The FAO Port State Measures Agreement 
only provides the minimum standards for port States measures, including the entry 
into ports, 81 the use of ports, 82 the inspections83 and the corresponding flag States’ 
role.84 Parties to this Agreement can also adopt more stringent port State measures 
in accordance with international law.85  
    The FAO Port State Measures Agreement will enter into force thirty days after 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession of the 25th instrument. 86  This 
Agreement has not yet entered into force. However, many States have developed 
and implemented port State measures. As of October of 2013, 51 States have pro-
vided port State measures to the FAO Database on Port State Measures (Port-
Lex), including the EU.87  
Additionally, several RFMOs have coordinated their port State measures with 
the FAO Port State Measures Agreement. An example can be seen in the 2010 
Resolution of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), which is wholly based 
on the FAO Port State Measures Agreement.88 RFMOs started to adjust their port 
State measures based on the provisions of the FAO Port State Measures Agree-
ment in order to harmonize and strengthen port State control worldwide. Addi-
tionally, RFMOs encourage members to participate in the FAO Port State 
Measures Agreement, which can also accelerate ratification of the Agreement. 
Thus, port States measures are expected to be binding measures to combat IUU 
fishing once the FAO Port State Measures Agreement comes into force. 
   Although the FAO Port State Measures Agreement is aimed at contracting par-
ties rather than all States, port State measures provided by this Agreement are ap-
plicable to all vessels, no matter whether the vessel flies the flag of a Party.89 Ad-
ditionally, it has adopted procedures for dispute settlement similar to those of the 
UNCLOS. Thus, the effective implementation of this Agreement will not only 
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promote the harmony of port State control across the globe90 but also effectively 
combat IUU fishing.  
 
 
 
2.2.2 Non-legally binding instruments 
 
In addition to those legally binding agreements discussed above, a set of non-
legally binding fisheries instruments demonstrate the implementation and devel-
opment of those fisheries agreements, as well as a potential development trend of 
future international fisheries law. Therefore, the legal framework of the interna-
tional fisheries law to combat IUU fishing also comprises those non-legally bind-
ing fisheries instruments. 
 
 
 
2.2.2.1 The Code of Conduct 
 
As mentioned previously, with the increasing concern of responsible fisheries, the 
Code of Conduct was unanimously adopted by the Conference of the FAO on 31 
October 1995. The Code of Conduct is strongly related to the FAO Compliance 
Agreement and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Because the Code of Conduct was 
negotiated at almost the same time and by many of the same delegates involved in 
the drafting of those two agreements, a number of provisions and concepts are 
overlapping.91 It reiterates the provisions of the UNCLOS as well as generalizes 
the important requirements of the FAO Compliance Agreement and the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement, both which have not received enough recognition to function 
effectively.92 The common provisions dealing with IUU fishing include: establish-
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ing effective mechanisms for fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance;93 au-
thorization of vessels;94 ensuring sufficiently severe sanctions;95 participating in 
RFMOs and implementing laws to address non-compliance;96 and other applicable 
provisions. In particular, the FAO Compliance Agreement constitutes an integral 
part of the Code of Conduct. Thus, the provisions with respect to fishing opera-
tions of the Code of Conduct, including duties of all States and flag States, are 
overlapping with the FAO Compliance Agreement. Therefore, although the Code 
of Conduct is not legally binding, provisions of the Code of Conduct that are 
based on such legally binding agreements can have a legally binding effect.97   
   The Code of Conduct is not merely a supplementary instrument. In contrast, it is 
the most comprehensive instrument that intends to establish principles and criteria 
for the elaboration of national and international policies for responsible fisheries 
in the field of international fisheries regulation.98 On the one hand, it has a broad 
scope that contains conservation and management issues for all fisheries, includ-
ing capture, processing and trade of fish.99 On the other hand, it applies to mem-
bers and non-members of FAO, fishing entities, sub regional, regional and global 
organizations, as well as all persons concerned.100 
The main body responsible for the implementation of the Code of Conduct is 
the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI). FAO has submitted biennial progress 
reports on the Code of Conduct to the COFI since 1999. Those reports analyse the 
implementation by Members, regional fishery bodies (RFBs) and non-
governmental organizations (NGO) and the Secretariat. Such monitoring is based 
on responses to self-assessment questionnaires that have been sent to countries 
and RFMOs.101 
During the 29
th
 session of the COFI in 2011, a progress report on the imple-
mentation of the Code of Conduct and relevant instruments was summarized.102 
There were 36 per cent of FAO Members, 55 per cent of RFBs and 34 per cent of 
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NGOs that had responded to the questionnaires. The situation of a large number of 
FAO Members is still unknown, specifically African and Asian countries. Of 
those who had replied to the questionnaires, 66 per cent of the FAO Members had 
national policies and legislation entirely or partially conforming to the Code of 
Conduct.103 The Code of Conduct is not globally implemented, particularly in Af-
rican and Asian regions where IUU fishing is more serious. This situation mainly 
results from financial constraints, human resources and institutional weakness-
es.104 
 
 
 
2.2.2.2 The International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Elimi-
nate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
 
The 23
rd
 Session of the COFI in 1999, together with the subsequent FAO Ministe-
rial Meeting on Fisheries, requested FAO to develop a voluntary international plan 
of action to combat IUU fishing within the framework of the Code of Conduct.105 
After a series of consultations, the IPOA-IUU was adopted by consensus by the 
COFI on 2 March 2001. 
   Comparing to the UNCLOS, the FAO Compliance Agreement, the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement and the Code of Conduct, the IPOA-IUU is the most compre-
hensive international instrument that specifically deals with IUU fishing. Also, the 
IPOA-IUU is generally consistent with previous fisheries instruments as well as 
provisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO).106 The objective of the IPOA-
IUU is “to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing by providing all States with 
comprehensive, effective and transparent measures by which to act, including 
through appropriate regional fisheries management organizations established in 
accordance with international law”.107 The IPOA-IUU reaffirms many substantive 
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provisions that have been found in the previous instruments, 108 such as flag State 
duties, coastal State measures, measures of RFMOs, and duties of non-member 
States of RFMOs. Moreover, it further specifies certain measures, in particular 
port State control and trade-market measures.109 However, it is not necessary to 
apply all the tools in any situation.110 Similar to the Code of Conduct, the IPOA-
IUU is voluntary and applies to a wide scope of stakeholders.111    
In order to implement the Code of Conduct and the IPOA-IUU, the FAO has 
developed a set of technical guidelines for responsible fisheries,112 including the 
Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Deter, Prevent and Elimi-
nate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU Implementation 
Guidelines) with focus on IUU fishing. 
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   States are also called upon to develop and adopt national plans and/or improve 
their legal framework to deal with IUU fishing. On the one hand, States should 
develop and implement national plans of action (NPOA) to “further achieve the 
objectives of the IPOA and give full effect to its provisions as an integral part of 
their fisheries management programmes and budgets”.113 Individual countries can 
include NPOA in their fisheries policies. Canada, New Zealand, Spain, the US and 
certain other States have developed and implemented NPOAs-IUU and strategies. 
On the other hand, States are encouraged to address in an effective manner all as-
pects of IUU fishing in their national legislation.114 Some FAO Members, such as 
the EU, Kuwait, Oman, Senegal, Spain, Suriname and the US, have established 
domestic legislation for combating IUU fishing.115 It should be pointed out that 
States can adopt both national plans and establish domestic legislation. For in-
stance, Article 69 of Law 3/2001 on maritime fisheries of Spain provides port in-
spection and control; while, Spain adopted a national plan of action against IUU 
fishing in November 2002.116 
 
 
 
2.2.2.3 The FAO Model Scheme 
 
The FAO Model Scheme was endorsed by the COFI of FAO in 2005, which is 
based on the IPOA-IUU and contributes to the FAO Port State Measures Agree-
ment. It provides voluntary minimum principles and guidelines for port States 
measures, including the designating of ports,117 the refusal of access or use,118 in-
spections,119 actions taken towards IUU fishing activities120 and information re-
quirements for vessels.121 The annexes contain details on required information to 
be provided by foreign fishing vessels, port State inspection procedures of foreign 
fishing vessels, results of port State inspections, training of port State inspectors 
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and information systems on port State inspections. As the FAO Port State 
Measures Agreement has not entered into force, the FAO Model Scheme plays an 
important role in promoting the development of port State measures against IUU 
fishing. 
    
 
 
2.2.2.4 The FAO Rome Declaration on IUU Fishing  
 
The 2005 FAO Rome Declaration on IUU Fishing aims to call upon States to im-
plement fully all the international instruments for the sustainable use of marine 
living resources.122 It also reiterates the requirements to implement the IPOA-IUU, 
such as to develop and implement national and regional plans of action, as well as 
relevant national legislation and regulations to combat IUU fishing.123 The Decla-
ration emphasizes the duties of flag States, port States and coastal States under in-
ternational law in combating IUU fishing and the function of internationally 
agreed market-related measures. It furthermore suggests several new actions, for 
example, the identification, reduction and ultimate elimination of the economic in-
centives that lead to IUU fishing or fleet overcapacity, as well as the development 
of a comprehensive global record of fishing vessels within FAO.124 The compre-
hensive global record of fishing vessels “contains authoritative information to fa-
cilitate verification of data in traceability schemes, assist Monitoring, Control and 
Surveillance, enhance monitoring of flag State performance and deter corruption 
and other illegal practices”.125 After an Expert Consultation in 2008 and a Tech-
nical Consultation in 2010, COFI 2011 concluded that FAO should pursue its de-
velopment in the form of a voluntary initiative and cooperate with partners such as 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and RFMOs.126  
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2.2.2.5 UN Resolutions 
 
The UNGA plays a major role in reviewing the implementation of international 
fisheries provisions.127 The UNGA resolutions on fisheries issues reflect both the 
implementation and the potential development of international fisheries law. 
 
 
 
2.2.2.5.1 UNGA Resolutions on driftnet fishing 
 
With the widespread expansion of large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing (LSPDF), 
the negative influence of driftnet fishing on either target or non-target species of 
marine living resources has caused international concern.128 In September 1991, 
the UNGA adopted Resolution 46/215, which requires a global moratorium on 
LSPDF on the high seas.129 The aim of the Resolution is to reduce fishing effort of 
LSPDF by 50 per cent and ensure that the areas of operation of LSPDF are not ex-
panded.130 Moreover, the Resolution encourages States to take measures, individu-
ally and collectively, to prevent LSPDF operations on the high seas, including en-
closed seas and semi-enclosed seas.131 Later, the subject of LSPDF, together with 
unauthorized fishing within national jurisdiction and on the high seas132 as well as 
the issues of by-catch and discards,133 was reiterated in subsequent UNGA resolu-
                                                          
127 Elferink AO (2004) Chapter 15 Reviewing the implementation of the LOS 
Convention: the role of the United Nations General Assembly and the meeting of 
States Parties. In: Elferink AO and Rothwell DR (eds) Oceans Management in the 
21st Century Institutional Frameworks and Responses, Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers: Leiden and Boston, 295-312, p. 295. 
128 UNGA resolutions on large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing (LSPDF) and its 
impact on the living marine resources of the world's oceans and seas, 
A/RES/44/225, adopted on 22 December 1989, A/RES/45/197, adopted on 21 De-
cember 1990. 
129 UNGA Resolution on LSPDF and its impact on the living marine resources 
of the world's oceans and seas, A/RES/46/215, adopted on 20 December 1991.  
130 A/RES/46/215, paras. 3(a)(b). 
131 A/RES/46/215, para. 4. 
132 UNGA Resolution on unauthorized fishing in zones of national jurisdiction 
and its impact on the living marine resources of the world’s oceans and seas, 
A/RES/49/116, adopted on 19 December 1994. 
133 UNGA Resolution on fisheries by-catch and discards and their impact on the 
sustainable use of the world’s living marine resources, A/RES/49/118, adopted on 
19 December 1994. 
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tions.134 Those resolutions encourage all States to implement the measures rec-
ommended consistently with the UNGA Resolution 46/215. According to the 
UNGA Resolution 58/14 of 2004, the incidence of reported LSPDF activities in 
most oceans and seas has continued to be low, which has reached a satisfactory 
level.135  
Since the UNGA Resolution 54/32 of 1999 explicitly calls upon States to deal 
with the IUU fishing, the problem of IUU fishing is now formally put on the inter-
national fisheries calendar. In 2002, the UNGA Resolution 57/142 encourages 
States to develop and implement national and regional plans of action in order to 
put into effect the IPOA-IUU by 2004.136 This Resolution also suggests establish-
ing effective monitoring, reporting and enforcement, as well as to control fishing 
vessels and eliminate subsidies that result in IUU fishing.137 Thus, although the 
IPOA-IUU is a non-binding instrument, it gains the support of the UNGA. 
 
 
 
2.2.2.5.2 UNGA Resolutions on sustainable fisheries 
 
Since 2003, the UNGA has adopted a set of resolutions on sustainable fisheries 
that also include the issues mentioned above. In particular, the resolutions on sus-
tainable fisheries contain a part specifically related to IUU fishing.138 These reso-
lutions welcome the application of the FAO Rome Declaration on IUU Fishing. 
They also recognize that the Code of Conduct and its associated international 
                                                          
134 UNGA resolutions on LSPDF and its impact on the living marine resources 
of the world’s oceans and seas; unauthorized fishing in zones of national jurisdic-
tion and its impact on the living marine resources of the world’s oceans and seas; 
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135 UNGA Resolution on sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement and related instruments, A/RES/58/14, adopted on 24 No-
vember 2003, preamble. 
136 A/RES/57/142, para. 14. 
137 A/RES/57/142, para. 14 and 20. 
138 UNGA resolutions on sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement and related instruments, A/RES/58/14, adopted on 24 No-
vember 2003, para. 19-29, the A/RES/59/25, paras. 26-38, A/RES/60/31, paras. 
33-46, A/RES/61/105, paras. 33-46, A/RES/62/177, paras. 37-55, A/RES/63/ 112, 
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plans of action, particularly the IPOA-IUU, have established principles and global 
standards for conservation of fisheries resources and the management and devel-
opment of fisheries.139  
The resolutions reiterate measures adopted under relevant international fisher-
ies law, such as calling upon States to control their nationals and vessels flying 
their flag not to engage in IUU fishing; to strengthen the international legal 
framework for intergovernmental cooperation; to become members of the Interna-
tional Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Network for Fisheries-Related Activi-
ties; to develop and implement Vessel Monitoring Systems and trade monitoring 
schemes; to develop national and regional plans of action to implement the IPOA-
IUU; to compile a record of vessels in RFMOs; to eliminate subsidies that cause 
IUU fishing; to organize intergovernmental technical consultation on IUU fishing 
and implement port State controls at regional level. The IMO and other relevant 
competent international organizations are invited to examine the ‘genuine link’ re-
lated to the flag states duties, while flag and port States  are called upon to take 
measures to combat IUU fishing.140 
 Except for these common measures, UNGA Resolution 59/25 of 2004 recog-
nizes the importance of monitoring and controlling of transhipments on the high 
seas.141 UNGA Resolutions 60/31 of 2005 requests States and relevant internation-
al organizations to develop measures to trace fish caught in a manner that under-
mines international conservation and management measures.142 It also encourages 
the development of a comprehensive global record of fishing vessels, including re-
frigerated transport vessels and supply vessels within the FAO.143 This Resolution 
further urges States individually or through RFMOs to adopt and to implement in-
ternational market-related measures, which have been reiterated in resolutions 
adopted in 2006, 2007 and 2008.144 The UNGA resolutions adopted in 2006, 2007, 
and 2008 also encourage States to initiate a legally binding instrument on mini-
mum standards for port State measures that then contribute to the establishment of 
the FAO Port State Measures Agreement.145 Additionally, those resolutions adopt-
ed from 2006 to 2010 call upon flag States and port States to share data on land-
ings and catch quotas, as well as encourage RFMOs to develop open databases in-
                                                          
139  A/RES/58/14, Preamble; A/RES/59/25, Preamble and para. 26; 
A/RES/60/31, Preamble and para. 33; A/RES/61/105, Preamble and para. 33; and 
A/RES/62/177, Preamble and para. 37. 
140 A/RES/58/14, paras. 19-29; A/RES/59/25, paras. 27-38; A/RES/60/31, pa-
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141 A/RES/59/25, para. 34. 
142 A/RES/60/31, para. 40. 
143 A/RES/60/31, para. 45. 
144 A/RES/60/31, para. 46; A/RES/61/105, para. 46; A/RES/62/177, para. 55; 
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cluding such data in order to enhance the effectiveness of fisheries management.146 
In addition to these provisions, UNGA Resolution 62/177 of 2007 encourages 
RFMOs to establish a common list of vessels identified as engaged in IUU fishing 
and to recognize mutually the IUU fishing vessel lists, and welcomes the denial of 
port access to vessels appearing in these lists.147 With the negotiation of the FAO 
Port State Measures Agreement, UNGA Resolution 64/72 of 2009 and UNGA 
Resolution 65/38 of 2010 both encourage States to adopt this Agreement.148 They 
also call upon information-sharing concerning emerging markets and trade related 
measures.149 Additionally, the connections between international organized crime 
and illegal fishing are a concern.150 
    Moreover, the UNGA addresses the problem of deep-sea bottom fishing in 
UNGA Resolution 59/25, UNGA Resolution 61/105 151  and UNGA Resolution 
64/72152 in order to protect deep-sea species and ecosystems beyond national ju-
risdiction from the destructive impacts of bottom fishing. High seas bottom fishing 
States include, among others, Australia, China, France, Iceland, Japan, New Zea-
land, Portugal, Spain, the Russian Federation and South Korea.153 However, de-
spite the progress made, UNGA Resolution 66/68 concludes that the urgent ac-
tions called for by resolutions 61/105 and 64/72 have not been fully implemented 
in all cases.154 UNGA Resolution 66/68 also emphasizes the need for full imple-
mentation by all States and RFMOs of their commitments in this respect.155  
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2.3 Measures and State duties against IUU fishing provided by 
international fisheries law 
 
In Section 2.2, an overview of the framework of international fisheries law that 
can be applied to deal with IUU fishing has been given. In the current Section, the 
discussion mainly focuses on specific measures against IUU fishing provided by 
those instruments, including flag State duties and measures over nationals, coastal 
State measures, port State measures, trade-related measures and other measures. 
 
 
 
2.3.1 Flag State duties and measures over nationals 
 
2.3.1.1 Freedom of fishing on the high seas and its constraints 
 
In the list of freedom of the high seas provided in Article 87 of the UNCLOS, only 
“fishing” is explicitly subjected to certain conditions provided in Articles 116-119, 
which refers that freedom of fishing, which is indeed a right to fish, is not abso-
lute.156 According to Article 116 of the UNCLOS, “All States have the right for 
their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas subject to: (a) their treaty ob-
ligations; (b) the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States provid-
ed for, inter alia, in Article 63, paragraph 2, and Articles 64 to 67; and (c) the 
provisions of the section.”157 It can be seen that high seas fishing is subject to three 
aspects. The first one is treaty obligations by which the high seas fishing State is 
bound. The second aspect is the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal 
States provided for in rules for the conservation and management of transbounda-
ry stocks, straddling fish stocks, highly migratory species, anadromous stocks and 
catadromous species under the UNCLOS. The third aspect provides for conserva-
tion and management of the living resources of the high seas under the UNCLOS.  
Article 117 of the UNCLOS provides that taking or cooperating with other 
States in taking measures for its nationals as may be necessary for the conserva-
tion of the living resources in the areas of the high seas is a State’s duty. Article 
118 of the UNCLOS further requires that “States shall cooperate with each other 
in the conservation and management of living resources in the areas of the high 
seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living resources, or different living 
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on States not Party to Regional Fisheries Management Organizations. Ocean De-
velopment & International Law 40, p. 91. 
157 The UNCLOS, Art. 116. 
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resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with a view to taking the 
measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources concerned. They 
shall as appropriate, cooperate to establish sub regional or regional fisheries or-
ganizations to this end.” The UNCLOS does not allow a coastal State to enforce 
unilaterally jurisdiction over a fishing vessel flying the flag of another State on the 
high seas. However, measures of RFMOs are the expansion of the jurisdiction of 
coastal States based on multilateral cooperation among States.158 In fact, major 
State Parties of a RFMO are usually coastal States that surround a particular sea 
area. Thus, through multilateral cooperation, measures of RFMOs on overfishing 
on the high seas can avoid direct conflicts between a particular coastal state and a 
particular flag State. Under the UNCLOS regime, the cooperation is also a States’ 
duty. States can directly cooperate through negotiations or even establish sub re-
gional or regional fisheries organizations. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement even 
stipulates that only if States are participants in a RFMO or cooperating non-Parties 
to such RFMO, they can access fisheries resources in regulatory waters of the 
RFMO. According to the cooperating obligation of Article 117 of the UNCLOS, 
the third State indeed has the obligation to “respect” or “take into account” the 
conservation and management measures of a RFMO or to ensure that vessels fly-
ing its flag are not involved in activities that undermine the effectiveness of such 
measures.159 The IPOA-IUU particularly provides port State measures against the 
non-compliance with management and conservation measures of RFMOs by non-
Contracting Parities that may be prohibited from landing or transhipping catches 
in Contracting Parties waters, unless those vessels can demonstrate that their 
catches were harvested in ways consistent with the RFMO measures.160  
In practice, RFMOs, such as the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR),161 have implemented measures against ves-
sels of non-Contracting Parties, for example, the non-Contracting Party IUU Ves-
sel List. 162  Additionally, RFMOs also implemented measures against all non-
compliance activities in areas where their conservation and management measures 
are applicable. Two significant measures should be introduced. One is the devel-
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159 Henriksen T (2009), p. 91; Joyner CC, Aylesworth L (2008) Managing IUU 
fishing in the Southern Ocean: rethinking the plight of the Patagonian toothfish. 
In: Chircop A et al (eds) Ocean Yearbook 22, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, p. 260. 
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opment and maintenance of records of vessels fishing in RFMOs areas, including 
black and white lists. On the one hand, certain RFMOs, such as the CCAMLR, the 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT),163 the 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC),164 the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission (IOTC),165 the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO),166 
the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC),167 the South East Atlan-
tic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO)168  as well as the Western and central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)169, maintain or share lists of vessels that have 
been found engaged in or supporting IUU fishing within their own or adjacent 
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convention areas. On the other hand, vessels that are authorized to fish in a RFMO 
regulatory area by its Contracting Parties or Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties 
are put on the RFMO’s whitelist, such as the lists of ICCAT, CCAMLR, WCPFC 
and NEAFC. 
Another particular measure of RFMOs aims at States that fail to exercise flag 
State duties against IUU fishing or fail to ensure their nationals do not engage in 
IUU fishing activities. According to paragraph 84 of the IPOA-IUU: 
 
“When a State fails to ensure that fishing vessels entitled to fly its 
flag, or, to the greatest extent possible, its nationals, do not engage in 
IUU fishing activities that affect the fish stocks covered by a relevant 
[RFMO], the member States, acting through the organization, should 
draw the problem to the attention of that State. If the problem is not rec-
tified, members of the organization may agree to adopt appropriate 
measures, through agreed procedures, in accordance with international 
law.” 
 
In that case, market-related measures are commonly used by RFMOs member 
States. For example, the ICCAT adopted recommendations to prohibit the imports 
of Atlantic bluefin tuna, Atlantic bigeye and their products from Equatorial Guin-
ea in 1999 and 2000.170 In order to lift the trade restrictions, Equatorial Guinea did 
not allow those vessels involved in IUU fishing to be licensed or flagged by Equa-
torial Guinea, and took some other corresponding legal actions.171 Thus, in 2004, 
the ICCAT lifted the import prohibition that was imposed on Equatorial Guinea 
and recommended to provide technical assistance for the implementation of a sta-
tistical-fishing data system.172     
It should be pointed out that there are still gaps in geographic coverage of 
RFMOs. According to the UNGA Report A/59/298 of in 2004, there are sea areas 
where no RFMO exists or the relevant RFMOs are competent only to manage spe-
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cific stocks. 173  Since the report, conservation and management measures have 
been adopted in the SEAFO and the WCPFC. In addition, a new RFMO that is the 
South West Indian Ocean Fisheries Commission (SWIOFC)174 was established 
and the South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) was adopted.175 How-
ever, unregulated fishing still exists in the following areas: the South-East Pacific 
for all fish stocks; and the Caribbean, part of the Indian Ocean, the South-West 
Atlantic and South-East Pacific for straddling fish stocks and discrete high seas 
fish stocks.176 Thus, flag State duties and measures taken by coastal and port States 
as well as trade-markets are essential complements to the global endeavour to 
combat IUU fishing. 
 
 
 
2.3.1.2 Flag State duties 
 
Except for the general flag State duties provided by the UNCLOS, the FAO Com-
pliance Agreement and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement both stipulate the major 
flag States duties for high seas fishing or fishing for straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory species. The IPOA-IUU also suggests a set of flag State 
measures for all fishing. The main difference between the IPOA-IUU and previous 
international fisheries agreements is that the IPOA-IUU is applicable to all IUU 
fishing activities, no matter where those activities happen or which species con-
cerned. 
    According to Article 94 of the UNCLOS, a flag State is required to “exercise its 
jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships 
                                                          
173 United Nations (2004) Report of the Secretary-General A/59/298 on sustain-
able fisheries, including through the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, and related in-
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flying its flag” on the high seas.177 Management measures include maintaining a 
register of vessels as well as assuming jurisdiction over vessels flying their flags, 
masters and crew.178 Although the UNCLOS does not specify the flag State duties 
for high seas fishing, this provision is considered as the principle of exclusive flag 
State jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas. In practice, some flag States are 
unable or unwilling to regulate their fishing vessels on the high seas. They even 
deny other States to take action against their vessels in the name of the principle of 
exclusive flag State jurisdiction.179 This phenomenon is called “flags of conven-
ience” (FOCs). Although there is no worldwide accepted definition of the term, 
the FOC or open registry vessels are “vessels flying the flag of a country other 
than the country of (beneficial) ownership”.180 The FOC is one of the major rea-
sons of IUU fishing, but a fishing vessel flying an FOC does not mean that the 
vessel is IUU fishing.181  
     A “genuine link” between a flag State and a vessel flying its flag was required 
to deal with the FOC during the preparations for the 1958 UN Conference on the 
Law of the Sea in Geneva. In the 1977 United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development’s Report on the Economic Consequences of the Existence or Lack 
of a Genuine Link between Vessels and Flag of Registry, it is concluded that an 
internationally acceptable and agreed definition of what constitutes a genuine link 
should be adopted. 182 The Conference also concluded that a genuine link was re-
flected in an economic connection between the shipping industry and the national 
economy of the flag State.183 In 1986, the United Nations Convention on Condi-
tions for Registration of Ships was adopted under the auspices of the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development.184 The UN Convention on Condi-
tions for Registration of Ships requires strengthening the genuine link between the 
State and ships flying its flag. It also requests a flag State to exercise effectively its 
jurisdiction over its ships, the identification and accountability of ship owners and 
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operators, as well as administrative, technical, economic and social matters.185 
However, the United Nations Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships 
has not entered into force, which shows it has failed to eliminate FOC by estab-
lishing a legally binding concept of an economic genuine link as a prerequisite for 
registration of ships.186 During the negotiations of the 1982 UNCLOS, it seemed 
also far-fetched to build an international consensus to specify the precise standard 
of a genuine link.187 Therefore, the UNCLOS does not address the issue of identi-
fication of a genuine link.  
    In fact, “flags of non-compliance”, which comprises States that do not comply 
with legally binding conservation and management measures, causes more IUU 
fishing.188 Although the UNCLOS requires a genuine link between a flag State and 
the ship flying its flag, the Convention, together with subsequent international 
fisheries laws, prefers to provide flag State duties rather than to describe a genuine 
link.189 The ITLOS states in its Judgment in the M/V “Saiga” (No.2) Case that: 
“…the purpose of the provisions of the Convention on the need for a genuine link 
between a ship and its flag State is to secure more effective implementation of the 
duties of the flag State, and not to establish criteria by reference to which the va-
lidity of the registration of ships in a flag State may be challenged by other 
States”.190 Thus, rather than a precondition for registration, the requirement of a 
genuine link indeed needs a flag State to excise its jurisdiction and effectively 
control over its flagged vessels. 
The FAO Compliance Agreement specifies the exclusive jurisdiction of flag 
States on the high seas, without modifying the jurisdictional foundation that has 
been established in the UNCLOS. 191  Article III (1) of the FAO Compliance 
Agreement sets out the fundamental flag State responsibility - each Party should 
take necessary measures to ensure fishing vessels entitled to fly its flag do not en-
gage in activities that undermine the effectiveness of international conservation 
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and management measures. This requirement is also reiterated by the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement, 192 the Code of Conduct193 and the IPOA-IUU.194 
 
 
 
2.3.1.2.1 Fishing authorization 
 
The FAO Compliance Agreement pays much attention to fishing authorization on 
the high seas by flag States. It provides, “no Party shall allow any fishing vessel 
entitled to fly its flag to be used for fishing on the high seas unless it has been au-
thorized to be so used by the appropriate authority or authorities of that Party”.195  
In addition, it requires that a Party shall not authorize any fishing vessel entitled to 
fly its flag to be used for fishing on the high seas unless the Party is satisfied that it 
can exercise effectively its duties under this Agreement in respect of that fishing 
vessel.196 Similar provisions can also be found in the UN Fish Stocks Agree-
ment.197  
Article 18 (3) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement further lays down specific 
measures referring to fishing licences, authorizations or permits. In order to im-
plement these measures, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement requires States to estab-
lish applicable regulations:  
 
“(i) to apply terms and conditions to the licence, authorization or 
permit sufficient to fulfil any sub regional, regional, or global obliga-
tions of the flag State; (ii) to prohibit fishing on the high seas by vessels 
which are not duly licensed or authorized to fish, or fishing on the high 
seas by vessels otherwise than in accordance with the terms and condi-
tions of a licence, authorization or permit; (iii) to require vessels fishing 
on the high seas to carry the licence, authorization or permit on board 
at all times and to produce it on demand for inspection by a duly author-
ized person; and (iv) to ensure that vessels flying its flag do not conduct 
unauthorized fishing within areas under the national jurisdiction of oth-
er States”.198  
 
The last clause of this provision particularly points out the flag State duties 
when fishing within national jurisdiction of other States. This is because the UN 
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Fish Stocks Agreement regulates fishing activities not only on the high seas, but 
also within EEZs where certain straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species 
exit. 
Additionally, Article III (4) of the FAO Compliance Agreement also provides 
that the authorization to fish on the high seas will be cancelled if a Party ceases to 
entitle a vessel to fly its flag. This provision can be considered as a link between 
fishing vessel registration and fishing authorization.199 
Article III (5) of the FAO Compliance Agreement deals with the issue of 
reflagging. In principle, “no Party shall authorize any fishing vessel previously 
registered in the territory of another Party that has undermined the effectiveness 
of international conservation and management measures to be used for fishing on 
the high seas”. There are three exceptions to this provision. First, the Party is sat-
isfied that “any period of suspension by another Party of an authorization for such 
fishing vessel to be used for fishing on the high seas has expired; and no authori-
zation for such fishing vessel to be used for fishing on the high seas has been 
withdrawn by another Party within the last three years”. The second exception is 
that when the ownership of the fishing vessel has subsequently changed, the new 
owner shall provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the previous owner 
has no further legal, beneficial or financial interest in the fishing vessel. Lastly, a 
Party may authorize a fishing vessel to fish on the high seas after taking into ac-
count all relevant facts and decide that granting an authorization would not un-
dermine the objective of this Agreement. Unlike the first two exceptions, the last 
exception is more general and subjective, which may lead to a greater chance of 
reflagging.  
    The FAO Compliance Agreement already provides the conditions for granting, 
cancelling, forbidding, refusing, suspending and withdrawing the authorization to 
fish on the high seas. Requirements for the authorization to fish are also laid down 
in paragraph 44 to paragraph 50 of the IPOA-IUU. 
Paragraph 46 of the IPOA-IUU specifically provides certain information that is 
required to be included in an authorization, including: 
 
“46.1 the name of the vessel, the natural or legal person authorized 
to fish; and 
46.2 the area, scope and duration of the authorization to fish;  
46.3 the species, fishing gear authorized, and where appropriate, 
other applicable management measures”.  
 
Additionally, paragraph 47 of the IPOA-IUU allows flag States and coastal 
States to add conditions to the authorization to fish. These requirements include 
Vessel Monitoring Systems, catch report conditions (such as time series of catch, 
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effort statistics by vessel, discard statistics and so on), transhipment reports, ob-
server coverage, maintenance of fishing and related log books, navigational 
equipment, marking of fishing vessels and gear, and unique international identifi-
cation number. 
 
 
 
2.3.1.2.2 Fishing vessel registration 
 
In the field of international fisheries law, authorization of fishing is emphasized 
more than fishing vessel registration. The different functions of fishing vessel reg-
istration and that of authorization are not clarified. The IPOA-IUU particularly 
elaborates the fishing vessel registration, filling up the gap left by the previous in-
ternational agreements. First, paragraph 34 of the IPOA-IUU calls upon States to 
ensure fishing vessels flying their flag do not engage in or support IUU fishing. 
Thus, before registering a fishing vessel, the flag State should ensure it can exer-
cise its responsibility to avoid the vessel engaging in IUU fishing.200  
The IPOA-IUU also requires flag States to avoid the registration of vessels that 
have a history of non-compliance. There are two exceptions to this provision. The 
first one is that the ownership of the vessel has subsequently changed and the new 
owner has provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the previous owner or 
operator has no further legal, beneficial or financial interest in the vessel. 201 The 
second exception is that all relevant facts have been taken into account to indicate 
that flagging the vessel would not result in IUU fishing.202 These requirements are 
similar to Article III (5) of the FAO Compliance Agreement. However, the FAO 
Compliance Agreement focuses on fishing authorization; while, paragraph 36 of 
the IPOA-IUU pays attention to the registration of a vessel. In order to discourage 
vessel owners who use reflagging for non-compliance with conservation and man-
agement measures adopted at the national, regional or global level, the IPOA-IUU 
also suggests flag States to take uniform actions and standards.203 
In cases where the functions of the registration of a vessel and issuing an au-
thorization to fish are separated, registered vessels without fishing authorization 
may engage in IUU fishing easily.204 Therefore, paragraph 40 of the IPOA-IUU 
requires flag States to ensure that each function gives appropriate consideration to 
the other. In addition, flag States are required to ensure appropriate links between 
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the operation of their vessel registries and the records those States keep for their 
fishing vessels. Once different agencies undertake such functions, States should 
ensure adequate cooperation and information sharing between the agencies re-
sponsible for those functions. To coordinate further the functions between fishing 
vessel registration and fishing authorization, paragraph 41 of the IPOA-IUU ad-
vises flag States to register a fishing vessel in the condition that it is ready to pro-
vide an authorization to the vessel to fish within their jurisdictional waters, or on 
the high seas, or an authorization issued by a coastal State. 
 
 
 
2.3.1.2.3 Enforcement measures and sanctions 
 
Flag States are required to take measures to ensure their fishing, transport and 
support vessels do not engage in or support IUU fishing.205 Article 18 (3) of the 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement specifies enforcement measures of flag States with re-
gard to fishing vessels, such as requirements for marking of fishing vessels and 
fishing gear; requirements for recording and timely reporting of vessel position, 
catch of target and non-target species, fishing effort and other relevant fisheries 
data in accordance with sub regional, regional and global standards; regulation of 
transhipment on the high seas; record of fishing vessels; and Monitoring, Control 
and Surveillance of fishing vessels. The latter two enforcement measures are spe-
cifically discussed in following sections due to their significance in combating 
IUU fishing.  
    Additionally, flag States should ensure that their vessels do not re-supply fish-
ing vessels engaged in IUU fishing activities or tranship fish to or from those ves-
sels. In order to control the activities of transhipment at sea, paragraph 49 of the 
IPOA-IUU requires flag States to ensure their fishing, transport and support ves-
sels involved in transhipment at sea have a prior authorization to tranship issued 
by the flag State. In addition to this requirement, such vessels should report to the 
national fisheries administration or other designated institution the following in-
formation: (a) the date and location of all of their transhipments; (b) the weight by 
species and catch area of the catch transhipped; (c) the name, registration, flag and 
other information related to the identification of the vessels involved in the tran-
shipment; and (d) the port of landing of the transhipped catch. Furthermore, para-
graph 50 of the IPOA-IUU also requires flag States to make catch and tranship-
ment reports available to relevant national, regional and international 
organizations, including FAO, under applicable confidentiality requirements. Par-
agraph 37 of the IPOA-IUU encourages all States involved in a chartering ar-
rangement, including flag States and other States that accept such an arrangement, 
to take measures to ensure that chartered vessels do not engage in IUU fishing.  
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    Article III (8) of the FAO Compliance Agreement obliges each Party to take en-
forcement measures against its fishing vessels that contravene the provisions of 
the FAO Compliance Agreement. In cases where contravention happens, sanctions 
are required to be sufficiently serious, including depriving offenders of the bene-
fits producing in their illegal activities. For serious offences, flag States must re-
fuse, suspend or withdraw the authorization to fish on the high seas.  
Additionally, Article 19 (1) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement requires States to 
ensure that fishing vessels flying their flag comply with conservation and man-
agement measures established by RFMOs. This Article also requires flag States to 
investigate immediately any alleged violation and promptly report to the State al-
leging the violation and the relevant RFMO on the progress and outcome of the 
investigation. Fishing vessels are required to inform the investigating authority 
vessel position, catches, fishing gear, fishing operations and related activities in 
the area of an alleged violation. If there is sufficient evidence, the investigating 
authority should refer the case to its authorities to institute proceedings according 
to its laws and, where appropriate, detain the vessel concerned. When it has been 
proven that a vessel has committed a violation, the vessel cannot continue fishing 
on the high seas until it complies with all sanctions imposed by the flag States. 
Article 19 (2) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement not only requires adequately 
severe sanctions in respect of violations, but also provides measures applicable in 
respect of masters and other officers of fishing vessels, including the refusal, 
withdrawal or suspension of authorizations to serve as masters or officers on such 
vessels. In this respect, sanctions under the UN Fish Stocks Agreement are broad-
er and stricter than those under the FAO Compliance Agreement; for example, the 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement specifically addresses the individuals who are respon-
sible for irresponsible fishing. Additionally, States are suggested to codify the in-
volvement of IUU fishing as not only an administrative offence but also a criminal 
offence. Sanctions against nationals in this respect may include monetary fines, 
confiscation of fishing vessels and fishing gear and denial of future fishing licens-
es, as well as imprisonment.206 States, such as Australia, New Zealand, Norway, 
South Africa, Spain and the US, have already established national legislation with 
respect to individual’s compliance with conservation and management measures 
inside or outside their national waters.207  
States are called upon to adopt domestic legislation to prohibit nationals and 
beneficial owners from engaging in or supporting IUU fishing, to “cooperate to 
identify those nationals who are the operators or beneficial owners of vessels in-
volved in IUU fishing” as well as to impose proper sanctions to those who under-
mine the law.208 However, the identification of beneficial owners is complicated. 
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One reason is that usually the registered owner of ships can be a shell company. 
Another reason is that confidentiality legislation or rules of certain countries may 
prohibit the disclosing of information or beneficial ownership.209 
 
 
 
2.3.1.2.4 Record of fishing vessels 
 
In order to apply the flag State supervision, Article IV of the FAO Compliance 
Agreement requires each Party to maintain a record of fishing vessels entitled to 
fly its flag and authorized to fish on the high seas, which is also requested by the 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement.210 This Article is in conjunction with Article VI, un-
der which each Party must make readily available to the FAO the following in-
formation on each fishing vessel authorized to fish on the high seas, as well as 
promptly update this information: 
 
“(a) name of fishing vessel, registration number, previous names (if 
known), and port of registry; 
(b) previous flag (if any); 
(c) International Radio Call Sign (if any); 
(d) name and address of owner or owners; 
(e) where and when built; 
(f) type of vessel; 
(g) length.”211 
 
Each Party shall also make available the following additional information to the 
FAO to the extent practicable: 
 
“(a) name and address of operator (manager) or operators (manag-
ers) (if any); 
(b) type of fishing method or methods; 
(c) moulded depth; 
(d) beam; 
(e) gross register tonnage; 
(f) power of main engine or engines.”212 
 
The FAO shall circulate periodically this information to the Parties of the FAO 
Compliance Agreement as well as to global, regional or sub regional fisheries or-
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ganization. Significantly, flag States shall report to the FAO when fishing vessels 
flying its flag undermine the effectiveness of international conservation and man-
agement measures.  
Next to information required by Article VI (1) and (2) of the FAO Compliance 
Agreement referring to fishing vessels on the high seas, paragraph 42 of the 
IPOA-IUU provides additional requirements that apply to all fishing vessels and 
their owners: 
 
“… 42.2 name, address and nationality of the natural or legal person 
in whose name the vessel is registered;  
42.3 name, street address, mailing address and nationality of the 
natural or legal persons responsible for managing the operations of the 
vessel;  
42.4 name, street address, mailing address and nationality of natural 
or legal persons with beneficial ownership of the vessel;  
42.5 name and ownership history of the vessel, and, where this is 
known, the history of non-compliance by that vessel, in accordance with 
national laws, with conservation and management measures or provi-
sions adopted at a national, regional or global level; and  
42.6  vessel dimensions, and where appropriate, a photograph, taken 
at the time of registration or at the conclusion of any more recent struc-
tural alterations, showing a side profile view of the vessel.” 
 
This provision shows that the natural or legal persons with beneficial owner-
ship of a vessel are stressed in the IPOA-IUU except aspects emphasized in the 
FAO Compliance Agreement. Additionally, the IPOA-IUU also allows States to 
include information provided by Article VI (1) and (2) of the FAO Compliance 
Agreement into their records of fishing vessels that are not authorized to fish on 
the high seas.213 
In order to enforce the record requirements, the FAO especially applies the 
High Seas Vessel Authorisation Record (HSVAR) database that includes the ele-
mental information of the registration, the authorisation status and the infringe-
ments of high seas fishing vessels.214  Until October 2013, 60 States had accepted 
the HSVAR. However, 22 of those are Member States of the European Union, 
which can be considered as one entity.215 Only 22 of the remaining 38 parties have 
submitted data and only two of the 22 countries have reported that their vessels are 
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all authorized.216 These facts demonstrate that the HSVAR is far from a universal 
implementation. 
Additionally, the Unique Vessel Identifier system, which assigns a global 
unique number to a vessel, regardless of changes in flag, ownership and names, is 
the key component of the Global Record to identify and track vessels.217 Given the 
cooperation between the FAO and the IMO, as well as the recommendation of the 
2006 UN Fish Stocks Agreement Review Conference, fishing vessels, including 
refrigerated transport and supply vessels, have been tabulated in the IMO number-
ing scheme operated by IHS-Fairplay (formerly Lloyd’s Register-Fairplay). 218 
Although the participation of the Unique Vessel Identifier system is voluntary, 
there are around 23,500 fishing vessels currently included in the IHS-Fairplay da-
tabase, containing fishing vessels from certain main fishing States, such as the EU 
and China.219 However, the numbering scheme merely applies to vessels of 100 
gross tonnage and upwards, while it does not apply to vessels less than 100 gross 
tonnage, which are also usually engaged in IUU fishing. Thus, the Unique Vessel 
Identifier system works more effectively in large scale fisheries.  
 
 
 
2.3.1.2.5 Monitoring, Control and Surveillance 
 
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance of fishing vessels, which is vital to discover 
IUU fishing, is a means to ensure the implementation of other enforcement 
measures. Article 18 (3) (g) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement specifies measures 
of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance, including:  
 
“(i) the implementation of national inspection schemes and sub re-
gional and regional schemes for cooperation in enforcement pursuant to 
Article 21 and 22, including requirements for such vessels to permit ac-
cess by duly authorized inspectors from other States;  
(ii) the implementation of national observer programmes and sub re-
gional and regional observer programmes in which the flag State is a 
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participant, including requirements for such vessels to permit access by 
observers from other States to carry out the functions agreed under the 
programmes; and  
(iii) the development and implementation of vessel monitoring sys-
tems, including, as appropriate, satellite transmitter systems, in accord-
ance with any national programmes and those which have been sub re-
gionally, regionally or globally agreed among the States concerned.” 
 
It can be seen from the provisions that there are mainly three kinds of Monitor-
ing, Control and Surveillance measures provided by the UN Fish Stocks Agree-
ment, including inspection schemes, observer programmes and Vessel Monitoring 
Systems. The former two schemes mainly rely on the work of inspectors or ob-
servers. Although the latter does not need any active input from anyone on board 
and the data of vessel locations can be automatically transmitted from vessels to 
the monitoring centre, data related to catch and other variables still need to a man-
ual input. The major differences between inspection schemes and observer pro-
grammes are: inspection schemes allow inspectors to board and inspect a vessel, 
its licence, gear, equipment, records, facilities, fish and fish products and relevant 
documents necessary to verify compliance with the relevant conservation and 
management measures,220 while observer programmes assign observers to collect 
catch and bycatch data from particular vessels. A flag State has the duty to require 
vessels flying its flag and fishing on the high seas or within waters covered by a 
RFMO to permit access by duly authorized inspectors and observers. In cases 
where the flag State is a State Party to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, it even 
shall require its flagged-vessels to permit access by duly authorized inspectors or 
observers from other States, which is due to the high seas enforcement by non-flag 
States codified by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. However, if a non-Party flag 
State to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement is not a Party to a RFMO, inspectors from 
other States are not permitted to board and inspect a vessel flagged to the non-
Party State to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement unless the inspectors are authorized 
by the non-Party State. There is an increase in the prevalence of assigning observ-
ers to distant water fishing vessels (including transport vessels); however, it is not 
sufficiently prevalent due to the capacity and willing of certain States. 
Vessel Monitoring Systems, which is useful for flag States to monitor the activi-
ties of their vessels when fishing in waters under national jurisdictions and on the 
high seas, largely facilitate Monitoring, Control and Surveillance. The IPOA-IUU 
encourages flag States to make Vessel Monitoring Systems a condition for author-
ization to fish.221 However, Vessel Monitoring Systems are not capable of detect-
ing vessels that are fishing without a licence or not fitted with equipment or not 
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reporting.222 On the other hand, it is useful in detecting non-compliant vessels in 
maritime patrols in cases where vessels are also being monitored by radar and oth-
er types of Vessel Detection Systems.223 The 2005 FAO Rome Declaration on IUU 
Fishing called upon to ensure all large-scale fishing vessels operating on the high 
seas be fitted with Vessel Monitoring Systems no later than December 2008.224 
Many countries have implemented Vessel Monitoring Systems for their large-
scale vessels. For example, the European Union now requires most of its fishing 
vessels over 15 metres overall length to be included in its Vessel Monitoring Sys-
tems programme. Since 2012, including distant water fishing vessels in a Vessel 
Monitoring System has become an essential condition for approving and confirm-
ing distant water fishing projects in China.225 In addition, RFMOs, such as the 
NAFO and the NEAFC, are incorporating Vessel Monitoring Systems into their 
requirements for the vessels of their member States.226  
    The inspection schemes, the observer programmes and the Vessel Monitoring 
Systems, which mostly rely on the compliance of flag States, are supposed to en-
hance the Monitoring, Control and Surveillance. However, due to the disad-
vantages of such tools discussed above, the Monitoring, Control and Surveillance 
needs to be complemented by other tools, such as Port State measures that are dis-
cussed in Section 2.3.3. Coastal State measures discussed in Section 2.3.2 also 
play a significant role in combating IUU fishing within national jurisdiction of 
States. Trade-market measures as newly developed tools deprive the economic in-
terests of IUU fishing. 
 
 
 
2.3.1.3 The lacuna in the flag State duties 
 
As discussed above, there are no globally agreed minimum standards for flag State 
duties. 227  Although the FAO Compliance Agreement and the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement have provided relevant measures, they have not been widely ratified. 
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The principle of exclusive flag State jurisdiction on the high seas depends on the 
willingness and the abilities of flag States to regulate their fishing vessels.228 How-
ever, flag State duties are not effective enough without other sanctions against a 
flag State in this respect.229 Thus, measures taken by coastal States, port States and 
trade-markets are necessary to deal with non-compliance of flag States. It should 
be pointed out that high seas enforcement by non-flag State under certain RFMOs’ 
framework has played a significant role in combating IUU fishing, which has been 
discussed in Section 2.2.1.4. The following sections mainly focus on State 
measures of coastal, port and trade-market States. 
 
 
 
2.3.2 Coastal State duties and measures 
 
2.3.2.1 Sovereignty 
 
The UNCLOS codifies the sovereignty of a coastal State over its territorial sea and 
archipelagic waters.  
 
“The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory 
and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archi-
pelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial 
sea.”230 
 
 “Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial 
sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from base-
lines determined in accordance with this Convention.”231 
 
    Sovereignty in the territorial sea includes sovereignty over the sea bed, the sub-
soil and airspace and needs to be exercised in accordance with the UNCLOS and 
other rules of international law.232  
    Within the territorial seas or archipelagic water, the coastal States has sover-
eignty over fisheries resources. Fisheries activities in the territorial sea are not 
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considered as being innocent passage for vessels flying a foreign flag, empower-
ing coastal States to prohibit fishing by those vessels unless an agreement allows 
them to fish.233  
In the case of archipelagic waters, the UNCLOS also provides that an archipe-
lagic State should respect certain rights of other States.  
 
“An archipelagic State must: (a) respect existing agreements with 
other States; (b) recognize traditional fishing rights and other legitimate 
activities of the immediately adjacent neighbouring States; and (c) at the 
request of any of the States concerned, negotiate bilateral agreements 
with such immediately adjacent neighbouring States setting forth the 
terms and conditions of the exercise of such rights and activities, includ-
ing the nature, extent and areas to which they apply.”234 
 
The UNCLOS does not provide specific conservation and management 
measures for fishing activities within the sovereignty of coastal States. This is be-
cause according to the spirit of the UNCLOS, coastal States have absolute sover-
eignty in respect of the living and non-living resources under their sovereignty.235 
 
 
 
2.3.2.2 Sovereign rights  
 
One of the most significant influences of the UNCLOS on fisheries is permitting a 
coastal State to declare a 200-nautical-mile EEZ for, inter alia, fisheries in order to 
reduce the tragedy of the commons236 on part of the former high seas. 90 per cent 
of fish is caught under national jurisdiction, so effective management and conser-
vation within EEZs is particularly important.237  
                                                          
233 The UNCLOS, Art. 19 (2) (i). 
234 The UNCLOS, Art. 51 (1). Also see: Nandan SN, Rosenne S (1993) United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 – a commentary. Volume II. Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publisher, Dordrecht; Boston and London, p. 448. 
235 Tsamenyi M, Hanich Q (2012) Fisheries jurisdiction under the Law of the 
Sea Convention: rights and obligations in maritime zones under the sovereignty of 
coastal States.  International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 27(4), pp. 789-
790. 
236 Hardin G (1968) The tragedy of the commons. Science 162: 1243-1248. 
237  Barnes R (2006) The Convention on the Law of the Sea: an effective 
framework for domestic fisheries conservation. In Freestone David, Barnes Rich-
ard and Ong David M. (eds.) The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford; New York, p. 233. 
53 
Under the UNCLOS, a coastal State has sovereign rights rather than sovereign-
ty within its EEZ. Sovereign rights are not as comprehensive as sovereignty and 
are specific rights. A coastal State has sovereign rights “for the purpose of explor-
ing and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources” in its EEZ.238  
Other States may claim to share the resources under certain conditions. In order 
to promote optimum utilization of living resources in the EEZ, the UNCLOS 
grants a coastal State discretion to adopt laws and regulations when giving access 
to nationals of other States. These laws and regulations may include: licensing of 
fishermen; determining harvested species and quotas; regulating fishing seasons, 
areas, gear and vessels; fixing the age and size of fish and other species that may 
be caught; specifying information required of fishing vessels; placing observers on 
board fishing vessels; the landing of all or any part of the catch by such vessels in 
the ports of the coastal States; terms and conditions relating to joint ventures or 
other cooperative arrangements and enforcement procedures. 239  In addition, a 
coastal State is recommended to take effective Monitoring, Control and Surveil-
lance in the EEZ; to cooperate and exchange information with other States; to en-
sure that an authorization to fish is issued only if the vessel concerned is entered in 
a record of vessels; to ensure that each vessel maintains a logbook; to ensure that 
at-sea transhipment and processing of fish are authorized by the coastal State, or 
conducted in conformity with management regulations; and to avoid licensing a 
vessel to fish in its waters if such vessel has a history of IUU fishing.240 
When exercising the sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage 
living resources in its EEZ, a coastal State is endowed to take actions to ensure 
compliance with the laws and regulations adopted by it according to the 
UNCLOS, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings.241 With 
respect to violations of coastal State’s fisheries laws and regulations, imprison-
ment or some other form of corporal punishment may be imposed only if there is 
agreement in that respect between the coastal State and the other State or States 
concerned.242  
In the case of arrest or detention of foreign vessels, the coastal State shall 
promptly notify the flag State of the action taken and of any penalties imposed.243 
Arrested vessels and their crew should be promptly released if reasonable bond or 
security is given, which is discussed in Section 2.3.3.2.244  
In addition, coastal States also exercises sovereign rights over their continental 
shelves for the purpose of exploring natural resources, limited to non-living re-
sources and living organisms belonging to sedentary species. The latter are those 
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organisms, which at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the 
seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed 
or the subsoil.245 Such rights are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State 
does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its national resources, no one may 
undertake these activities without the express consent of the coastal State.246 Fish-
eries resources in the superjacent waters are not under the legal regime of the con-
tinental shelf. 
 
 
 
2.3.2.3 Coastal States and transboundary stocks, straddling fish stocks 
and highly migratory species 
 
According to Article 63 of the UNCLOS, transboundary stocks occur within the 
EEZs of two or more coastal States, while straddling fish stocks are stocks that 
occur between the EEZ and the adjacent high seas. For the conservation of strad-
dling stocks, agreement between the coastal State and the States fishing for these 
stocks is similar to that for the conservation of transboundary stocks. In both cas-
es, the States concerned shall work “either directly or through appropriate sub re-
gional or regional organizations”.247  
    The precondition of cooperative fishery management and arrangements of 
transboundary stocks is that EEZ boundaries have been defined among neighbour-
ing States.248 For those transboundary stocks in areas with agreed EEZ boundaries, 
multilateral or bilateral cooperation will benefit to the management and conserva-
tion of transboundary stocks. Examples can be seen in joint management of trans-
boundary stocks between the EU and its neighbouring countries, such as Norway, 
Iceland and the Faeroe Islands. On the other hand, fishery conflicts, such as the 
conflict between China and Korea, usually happen in boundary disputed areas.  
The term highly migratory species is derived from Article 64 of the UNCLOS. 
Although this Convention has not provided a definition of highly migratory spe-
cies, it uses Annex I to list those species that are considered as highly migratory 
species. At present, there are 17 species belonging to highly migratory species. 
Coastal States and other States whose nationals harvest these species should coop-
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erate directly or through appropriate international organizations. International co-
operation is emphasized because multiple coastal States and States whose nation-
als harvest these species might be involved in the management and conservation 
of highly migratory species. In regions where there is no appropriate international 
organization, States concerned should cooperate to establish such an organization 
and participate in its work.  
The cooperation between coastal States and high seas fishing States is further 
specified by Article 7 of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. If no agreement between 
coastal States and high seas fishing States can be reached within a reasonable pe-
riod of time, any concerned State may invoke the procedures for the dispute set-
tlement provided in Part VIII of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which is con-
sistent with the Part XV of the UNCLOS discussed in Section 2.2.1.1.249 A coastal 
State may be excluded from compulsory dispute settlement for a dispute concern-
ing its management of straddling stocks and highly migratory species in its EEZ. 
However, the dispute relating to the management of such stocks on the high seas 
may not be excluded according to Article 297 (3) of the UNCLOS.  
A court or tribunal a dispute has been duly submitted to may prescribe provi-
sional measures “to preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or 
to prevent serious harm to the marine environment” pending the final decision.250 
The ITLOS has confirmed in the order of the South Bluefin Tunas cases that “the 
conservation of the living resources of the sea is an element in the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment”.251 If States are unable to agree on such 
provisional arrangements, any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or fail-
ing such agreement within two weeks from the date of the request for provisional 
measures, the ITLOS may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures.252  
Until now, three cases concerning the conservation and management of highly 
migratory species have been brought to the ITLOS. Two southern bluefin tuna 
cases are provisional measures proceedings. They mainly focus on the following 
measures: not aggravating disputes concerned; not exceeding the annual national 
allocations; not taking any unilateral experimental fishing programme; resuming 
negotiations to reach agreement on conservation and management measures; and 
making further efforts to reach agreement with other States and fishing entities 
engaged in fishing for southern bluefin tuna.253 Following the ITLOS’s order of 
provisional measures, the cases were passed to a tribunal. However, the tribunal 
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found that it lacked jurisdiction so that it did not deal with the merits of the dis-
pute. Although the ITLOS’s order has been revoked, it indeed has promoted nego-
tiations between parties and eventually has resolved the dispute.254 The other case 
is the swordfish case, in which the proceedings have been suspended and discon-
tinued because the EU and Chile have reached an understanding to settle the dis-
pute.255  
    It can be seen that both coastal States and high seas fishing States are rarely 
willing to settle a dispute concerning conservation and management of straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory species according to the dispute settlement pro-
vided by the UNCLOS, while negotiation is always the primary recourse. 
 
 
 
2.3.2.4 Hot pursuit 
 
As discussed above, a coastal State has sovereignty and sovereign rights to take 
surveillance and enforcement measures in waters under its national jurisdiction. 
Although the UNCLOS does not codify the high seas enforcement by non-flag 
States, the right of hot pursuit, which evolved as a customary international law 
doctrine256 and is codified by Article 111 of the UNCLOS, may involve enforce-
ment on the high seas. Hot pursuit is not particularly used for combating IUU fish-
ing, which is just one of reasons for commencing a pursuit. Although hot pursuit 
can be continued on high seas, if certain conditions are fulfilled, it can be seen as 
an extension of coastal State sovereignty and sovereign rights. 257 
The ITLOS pointed out in the Judgment of the M/V Saiga (No 2) Case that each 
of the conditions for the exercise of the right of hot pursuit under Article 111 of 
the UNCLOS has to be satisfied for the pursuit to be legitimate.258 First, the com-
petent authorities of a coastal State must have good reason to believe that the ves-
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sel has violated the laws and regulations of that State.259 The ITLOS also found in 
the M/V Saiga (No 2) Case that only having a suspicion could not constitute hav-
ing good reason to believe.260  
The second condition is the maritime zones where a pursuit commences. The 
pursuit must be commenced when a foreign vessel or one of its boats is within the 
internal waters, the archipelagic waters, the territorial sea or the contiguous zone 
of the pursuing State.261 Article 111 (1) of the UNCLOS particularly points out 
that if a foreign vessel is within a contiguous zone, the pursuit may only be under-
taken if there has been a violation of the rights for the protection of which the zone 
was established. According to Article 33 of the UNCLOS, a coastal State may ex-
ercise necessary control measures in the contiguous zone to prevent infringement 
of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its terri-
tory or territorial sea. Therefore, hot pursuit can begin in the contiguous zone 
when offences relating to the coastal State’s customs, fiscal, immigration or sani-
tary laws and regulations within the coastal State’s internal waters or territorial 
sea.262 Article 111 (2) of the UNCLOS states that the right of hot pursuit applies 
mutatis mutandis to violations of the laws and regulations of the coastal State ap-
plicable in the EEZ or on the continental shelf. A coastal State has sovereign 
rights to explore and exploit the natural resources in its EEZ and on its continental 
shelf according to the UNCLOS.263 Therefore, in cases where IUU fishing took 
place in the EEZ or on the continental shelf and the foreign vessel is within the in-
ternal waters, the archipelagic waters and the territorial sea, the competent authori-
ties of the coastal State may begin a pursuit.  
The third condition is the time when a pursuit begins. Article 111 (4) states: 
“the pursuit may only be commenced after a visual or auditory signal to stop has 
been given at a distance which enables it to be seen or heard by the foreign ship”. 
This provision does not require the coastal State to prove that the pursued vessel 
has received the signal. However, the ITLOS concluded in the Judgment of the 
M/V Saiga (No 2) Case that no signal had been given by Guinea’s pursuing vessel 
at the commencement of the alleged pursuit. An important reason for the conclu-
sion is that both the Master and another witness on the pursued vessel of Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines had categorically denied that any such signals had 
been given.264 It can be seen that in practice a coastal State indeed has to prove 
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that the pursued vessel has received the signal otherwise judges may decide 
against the coastal State.  
Fourth, the pursuit must be continuous and uninterrupted.265 Although the term 
“interrupted” has not been defined in the UNCLOS, it is arguable that short gaps 
due to weather, darkness or other such factors do not prevent the pursuing vessel 
from continuing the pursuit and should not be considered as a substantial interrup-
tion.266 
Fifth, Article 111 (4) of the UNCLOS provides “the right of hot pursuit ceases 
as soon as the ship pursued enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third 
State”. A pursued vessel may enter in the territorial seas of a third State for the 
purpose of avoiding the pursuit, which is contrary to the continuous and expedi-
tious passage.267 In that case, the third State can deem the passage is non-innocent 
and proceed against the vessel in accordance with its own law, while strictly 
speaking the pursuit has ceased.268 State practice intends to broaden the interpreta-
tion of UNCLOS provisions. For example, the Treaty between the Government of 
Australia and the Government of the French Republic on Cooperation in the Mari-
time areas adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard Island 
and the McDonald Islands was concluded in 2003. 269 The Treaty allows each Par-
ty to continue a hot pursuit through the other’s territorial seas to combat IUU fish-
ing. 270 Additionally, a pursued vessel may temporarily enter the territorial sea of a 
third State and re-enter the EEZ of that State and the high seas in order to be 
“washed clean of its sins by the territorial waters of a third State”.271 In that case, 
it is unknown whether it is lawful under the UNCLOS to recommence hot pursuit 
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when the pursued vessel re-enters the high seas, which needs the proof of future 
cases. 
Sixth, Article 111(4) of the UNCLOS provides the doctrine of “constructive 
presence”. 
 
“Hot pursuit is not deemed to have begun unless the pursuing ship 
has satisfied itself by such practicable means as may be available that 
the ship pursued or one of its boats or other craft working as a team and 
using the ship pursued as a mother ship is within the limits of the terri-
torial sea, or, as the case may be, within the contiguous zone or the ex-
clusive economic zone or above the continental shelf…” 
 
The UNCLOS did not define the meaning of “working as a team” or “using the 
ship pursued as a mother ship”. In the case of fisheries, constructive presence can 
be understood as where small craft, including canoes and dories, operate inside the 
relevant jurisdiction while the mother ship is located outside. Examples can be 
seen in The Araunah case and The Tenyu Maru case.272 In addition, “working as a 
team” can also be considered in cases where supply and bunkering vessels or other 
vessels are involved in the transhipment of IUU catches at sea.273 In this case, one 
of the boats need to be in the internal waters, the archipelagic waters, or in the ter-
ritorial sea of the pursuing State. 
Seventh, hot pursuit can only be exercised by warships or military aircraft, or 
other vessels or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government 
service and authorized to that effect.274 Here the other authorized vessels may cov-
er vessels of other government agencies, including coast guard, customs, fisheries 
or police involved in the protection of a coastal State’s maritime zone.275 
Article 111 (6) of the UNCLOS allows a vessel or an aircraft of the coastal 
State to take over the pursuit from another aircraft. Although the Convention does 
not expressly points out whether one vessel can take over the pursuit from another, 
the International Law Commission recognized this in 1957. 
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“The ship finally arresting the ship pursued need not necessarily be 
the same as the one which began the pursuit, provided that it has joined 
in the pursuit and has not merely effected an interception.” 276 
 
In practice, multilateral hot pursuit, which refers to “hot pursuit involving pur-
suing vessels, aircraft or officials with different nationalities”,277 contributes to the 
combat of IUU fishing through the cooperation of States. For example, the success 
of the pursuit of the Viarsa 1 and the South Tomi is due to the cooperation be-
tween the authorities of Australia and other States.278 
Hot pursuit is an extension of coastal States’ sovereignty and sovereign rights. 
However, the UNCLOS has imposed many limitations on the conditions of a law-
ful hot pursuit to prevent coastal States from abusing this right. In cases where a 
ship has been stopped or arrested outside the territorial sea in circumstances that 
do not justify the exercise of the right of hot pursuit, it shall be compensated for 
any loss or damage that may have been thereby sustained.279 In The I’m Alone 
case, the Arbitration did not answer the question whether the conditions of the 
commencement and the termination of the hot pursuit are legitimate.280 However, 
the act of sinking the ship by officers of the US Coast Guard was considered an 
unlawful act, so the Arbitration considered that the US ought to acknowledge its 
illegality, to apologize to the Canadian Government and to pay the sum of 25,000 
USD to Canada.281 It should be pointed out that the award to Canada was made af-
ter the rejection of Canada’s claims for compensation for material damage on be-
half of the owners of the vessel. The rejection was made because the ownership 
was found to belong to nationals of the US rather than Canada. Therefore, the 
above award to Canada was on account of moral damage, which is one of the first 
cases in international law where substantial damages were awarded to a State on 
account of moral damage rather than material damage done to it.282  
In practice, a coastal State must be able to enforce hot pursuit, including having 
pursuing vessels or aircraft with the necessary equipment and enforcing officers. 
Sometimes, the cooperation of other States is desired. With respect to most devel-
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oping States where IUU fishing happens most frequently, they do not have the 
ability to enforce independently hot pursuit. Thus, there are limitations of coastal 
States to combat IUU fishing through enforcement at sea. 
 
 
 
2.3.3 Head-to-head clashes between coastal States and flag States 
 
Except for the cooperation discussed in Section 2.3.2.3, there are two situations 
that flag States and coastal States have to face each other in enforcing their con-
servation and management measures in the field of fisheries. 
 
 
 
2.3.3.1 Investigation, boarding and inspection on the high seas 
 
Article 20 (6) of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement provides that: 
 
 “Where there are reasonable grounds for believing that a vessel on 
the high seas has been engaged in unauthorized fishing within an area 
under the jurisdiction of a coastal State, the flag State of that vessel, at 
the request of the coastal State concerned, shall immediately and fully 
investigate the matter. The flag State shall cooperate with the coastal 
State in taking appropriate enforcement action in such cases and may 
authorize the relevant authorities of the coastal State to board and in-
spect the vessel on the high seas. This paragraph is without prejudice to 
Article 111 of the Convention”.  
 
Requesting a flag State to investigate its vessels on the high seas by a coastal 
State is in accordance with Article 94 (6) of the UNCLOS. However, the right of 
visit provided in Article 110 of the UNCLOS does not allow a warship to board a 
foreign vessel on the high seas for the reason that the latter has engaged in unau-
thorized fishing unless the vessel is without nationality or of the same nationality 
as the warship.283 Therefore, only by being authorized by the flag State or by con-
ducting hot pursuit can a coastal State board or inspect a foreign vessel on the high 
seas due to unauthorized fishing within an area under its jurisdiction.  
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2.3.3.2 Prompt release 
 
Arrested vessels and their crew shall be promptly released upon the posting of a 
reasonable bond or other security.284 Article 292 of the UNCLOS provides: 
 
“1. Where the authorities of a State Party have detained a vessel fly-
ing the flag of another State Party and it is alleged that the detaining 
State has not complied with the provisions of this Convention for the 
prompt release of the vessel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable 
bond or other financial security, the question of release from detention 
may be submitted to any court or tribunal agreed upon by the parties or, 
failing such agreement within 10 days from the time of detention, to a 
court or tribunal accepted by the detaining State under Article 287 or to 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, unless the parties oth-
erwise agree. 
2. The application for release may be made only by or on behalf of 
the flag State of the vessel. 
3. The court or tribunal shall deal without delay with the application 
for release and shall deal only with the question of release, without 
prejudice to the merits of any case before the appropriate domestic fo-
rum against the vessel, its owner or its crew. The authorities of the de-
taining State remain competent to release the vessel or its crew at any 
time. 
4. Upon the posting of the bond or other financial security deter-
mined by the court or tribunal, the authorities of the detaining State 
shall comply promptly with the decision of the court or tribunal con-
cerning the release of the vessel or its crew.” 
      
This Section mainly reviews cases of the ITLOS and elaborates on the interpre-
tation and the application of Article 292 of the UNCLOS. The UNCLOS confers 
on the ITLOS compulsory jurisdiction in respect of the prompt release of vessels 
and crew. If the parties to the dispute have not agreed on a particular court or tri-
bunal, or if the flag State does not submit the case to a court or tribunal accepted 
by the detaining State under Article 287 of the UNCLOS within ten days from the 
time of detention, the ITLOS may have compulsory jurisdiction. The UNCLOS 
has given the compulsory jurisdiction to the ITLOS rather than other pre-
established bodies, such as the International Court of Justice. Therefore, the re-
view of cases of the ITLOS concerning the prompt release is the best way to inter-
pret the provisions of the UNCLOS in this respect. There are nine cases brought 
before the ITLOS referring to prompt release of vessels and crew, with the excep-
tion of the M/V Saiga case, all of them result from fisheries conflicts. Except for 
the Chaisiri Reefer 2 case, which was removed from the ITLOS’s list of cases be-
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cause the Applicant and the Respondent had reached an out-of-court agreement, 285 
the other cases mainly consider the following elements. 
 
 
 
2.3.3.2.1 Jurisdiction 
 
The ITLOS must examine whether it has jurisdiction to deal with an application. 
Three elements need to be considered. First, the flag State and the detaining State 
must both be State Parties to the UNCLOS. Second, the disputed Parties have not 
agreed to submit the question of release of the vessel to another court or tribunal 
within ten days from the time of detention. Last, the application for the prompt re-
lease must be submitted by the flag State or by a person or entity duly authorized 
to do so on behalf of the flag State.  
There are two aspects to be specified for the last element. When an applicant is 
a State, it shall establish that it is the flag State of the vessel when an application is 
made. Otherwise, the ITLOS does not have jurisdiction to hear the application, 
which became clear in the Grand Prince case. Although the vessel was flying the 
flag of Belize when it was arrested, the de-registration of the vessel by Belize be-
fore the application made Belize no more the flag State of the detained vessel and 
resulted in no jurisdiction of the ITLOS to hear the application.286 The ITLOS in 
the Juno Trader case further stated that the flag State refers to the State whose flag 
the vessel is entitled to fly at the time that the application is submitted to the 
ITLOS.287 In addition, the Judgment of this case stressed that whatever may be the 
effect of a definitive change in the ownership of a vessel upon its nationality, there 
was no legal basis in the particular circumstances of the case for holding that there 
had been a definitive change in the nationality of such vessel.288 Therefore, the 
                                                          
285 ITLOS (2001) The “Chaisiri Reefer 2” Case (Panama v. Yemen), Prompt 
Release. ITLOS Press 52: Case removed from Tribunal’s list. Available via Inter-
national Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/press_releases_english/PR_No.52.
pdf. Accessed 19 September 2013. 
286 ITLOS (2001) The “Grand Prince” Case (Belize v. France), Prompt Release, 
Judgment of 20 April 2001. Available via International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea. 
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_8/Judgment.20.04.0
1.E.pdf. Accessed 17 September 2013, para. 93.  
287 Mensah TA (2007) The Tribunal and the prompt release of vessels. The In-
ternational Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 22 (3), p. 430. 
288 ITLOS (2004) The “Juno Trader” Case (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines v. 
Guinea-Bissau), Prompt Release, Judgment of 18 December 2004. Available via 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. 
64  
change in the ownership of a vessel does not influence the right of its flag State to 
bring an application of prompt release before the ITLOS. 
With respect to an application submitted by another person or entity on behalf 
of the flag State of the detained vessel, Article 110 of the Rules of the ITLOS 
specifies the requirement that the person making an application on behalf of the 
flag State must be expressly authorized by the competent authorities that the 
ITLOS recognizes as able to act in the name of the State.289 In practice, the sub-
mission of applications by officials and agencies varies from case to case. For ex-
ample, in the Volga case, the authorization to submit the application on behalf of 
Russia was given to the Deputy Director of the Legal Department of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs,290 while private attorneys were authorized on behalf of Panama 
in the Camouco case.291  
 
 
 
2.3.3.2.2 Admissibility 
 
After dealing with the question of jurisdiction of the ITLOS, the ITLOS shall de-
cide whether the application is admissible, that is, whether it falls within the scope 
of the other requirements set out in Article 292 (1) of the UNCLOS.292 Precisely, 
an application is admissible when a flag State that is a State Party to the UNCLOS 
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alleges that a vessel flying its flag has been detained by another State Party in vio-
lation of a provision of the UNCLOS that requires the prompt release of the vessel 
upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security.293 For example, 
if the applicant declares that the respondent has violated Article 73 (3) and (4) of 
the UNCLOS, but does not indicate a violation of Article 73 (2) of the UNCLOS, 
the submissions concerning the alleged violation are not admissible. The reason is 
that Provision (3) and (4) of Article 73 do not concern the prompt release of a ves-
sel or its crew upon the posting of a reasonable bond or other financial security. 
Mensah has further pointed out that “an Application that does not indicate the 
particular provision that is alleged to have been violated will not be accepted as 
admissible”.294 At this stage, the ITLOS does not deal with whether the allegation 
is “well-founded”. 
As the Judgment of the Camouco case stated, Article 292 of the UNCLOS does 
not need the flag State to file an application at particular time after the detention of 
a vessel or its crew. The ten-day period referred to in Article 292 (1) of the 
UNCLOS is to enable the parties to submit the question of release from detention 
to an agreed court or tribunal.295 The Judgement of the Hoshinmaru case further 
indicated that the earliest date for initiating such procedure before the ITLOS is 
ten days from the time of detention.296 Therefore, it does not influence the admis-
sibility if the application is not made to the ITLOS immediately after the 10-day 
period. Although Article 292 of the UNCLOS does not require a flag State to file 
an application at a particular time after the detention of a vessel or its crew, 
promptly applying for the prompt release by a flag State is still significant. 
 
 
 
2.3.3.2.3 Whether the allegation is “well-founded” 
 
After determining that the allegation is admissible, the ITLOS shall consider 
whether the allegation is well-founded. First, there must be a detention of the ves-
sel or crew by the detaining State; moreover, the detaining State must have failed 
to release such vessel or crew. Second, the failure of the release constitutes a non-
compliance of the provisions of the UNCLOS concerning prompt release of the 
vessel upon the posting of a bond or other financial security. If the ITLOS decides 
that the allegation is well-founded, the detaining State must promptly release the 
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vessel (or crew) and the ITLOS is required to determine the bond or other finan-
cial security to be posted for the release of the vessel or the crew. 
As the ITLOS stated in the Hoshinmaru case, the UNCLOS and the ITLOS do 
not set a precise time limit for setting a bond, but the time required for setting a 
bond should be reasonable due to the object and purpose of Article 292 of the 
UNCLOS.297 However, in cases where the allegation is well-founded, whether the 
detaining State sets a bond or other financial security does not influence how the 
ITLOS determines the reasonableness of such a bond or other financial security. 
At this stage, the reasonableness of the bond or other financial security set by 
the detaining State is mainly emphasised. Whether the applicant has posted a bond 
or anther financial security is not necessarily a condition for filing an application 
under Article 292 of the UNCLOS.298 The Judgment in the M/V Saiga case estab-
lished the criterion of “reasonableness”, including the amount, form and nature of 
the bond or financial security. In addition, the overall balance of the amount, form 
and nature must be reasonable.299 In the Camouco case, the ITLOS specified a 
number of factors to assess the reasonableness, including the gravity of the alleged 
offences, the penalties imposed or imposable under the laws of the detaining State, 
the value of the detained vessel and of the cargo seized, as well as the amount of 
the bond imposed by the detaining State and its form.300 The ITLOS further stated 
in the Monte Confurco case that the factors specified in the Camouco case, which 
complement the criterion of reasonableness specified by the ITLOS in the M/V 
Saiga case, are not complete. 301 
The ITLOS in the Volga case confirmed that the expression “bond or other se-
curity” in Article 73 (2) of the UNCLOS should be interpreted as a bond or securi-
ty of a financial nature, so non-financial conditions cannot be considered compo-
nents of a bond or other financial security for the purpose of applying Article 292 
of the UNCLOS in respect of an alleged violation of Article 73 (2) of the 
UNCLOS.302 
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2.3.3.2.4 The relationship between the prompt release and the merits of 
any case before a domestic forum 
 
The Judgment in the M/V Saiga case confirms that when a domestic court of a 
State considers the merits of a case, the domestic court is not bound by any find-
ings of fact that the ITLOS may have made in order to reach its conclusions.303 
The Judgment of this case also indicated that the ITLOS cannot deal with any mat-
ters relating to the legality of the arrest and detention.304 The ITLOS in the Cam-
ouco case expressly pointed out “Article 292 provides for an independent remedy 
and not an appeal against a decision of a national court”.305  
The Judgment of the Tomimaru case shows significant influences of the confis-
cation of a fishing vessel on the conclusion of a case of the prompt release before 
the ITLOS. First, a change in ownership of a confiscated vessel does not automat-
ically lead to the change or loss of its flag.306 Thus, the decision to confiscate a 
vessel does not prevent the ITLOS from considering an application for prompt re-
lease of such vessel while proceedings are still pending before the domestic courts 
of the detaining State.307  
Second, the decision of confiscation eliminates the provisional character of the 
detention of the vessel, rendering the procedure for the prompt release without le-
gal object.308 However, the decision to confiscate a vessel is limited by the ITLOS:  
 
“Such a decision should not be taken in such a way as to prevent the 
ship owner from having recourse to available domestic judicial reme-
dies, or as to prevent the flag State from resorting to the prompt release 
procedure set forth in the Convention; nor should it be taken through 
proceedings inconsistent with international standards of due process of 
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law. In particular, a confiscation decided in unjustified haste would 
jeopardize the operation of Article 292 of the Convention”.309  
 
In the Tomimaru case, the ITLOS did not decide to release the vessel because 
the vessel had been confiscated through the judgment of the domestic court of the 
respondent. Therefore, the Tomimaru case shows that the ship owner and the flag 
State shall take action within a reasonable time either to have recourse to the na-
tional judicial system of the detaining State or to initiate the prompt release proce-
dure.310 
 
The elements discussed above are just major factors that the ITLOS has empha-
sized in its judgments in cases of prompt release. There is no doubt that in the fu-
ture new cases will bring more elaboration on the interpretation and application of 
Article 292 of the UNCLOS. Although cases relating to IUU fishing have been re-
peatedly brought to the ITLOS for prompt release, the ITLOS is not allowed to as-
sess the actions of a coastal State in the exercise of its sovereign rights.311 
    The prompt release is also used for the balance of the interests between coastal 
States and flag States. It imposes limitations on coastal States and prevents coastal 
States from abusing its rights. However, cases of the ITLOS have indicated that 
the prompt release does not deal with any matters relating to the legality of the ar-
rest or detention. It is not an appeal against a decision of a national court. On the 
other hand, because the prompt release can only be asked by a flag State or on its 
behalf, submitting an application for prompt release indeed urges the flag State to 
control vessels flying its flag. 
 
 
 
2.3.4 Port State measures against IUU fishing 
 
Initially, port State control was used for inspecting foreign-flagged ships in the 
ports of coastal States and for verifying compliance with international standards, 
particularly with conventions of the IMO and the International Labour Organiza-
tion. 312 With the success in that field, port State control has also become an im-
portant means to combat IUU fishing. Port State measures are considered as “a 
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powerful and cost-effective tool” to combat IUU fishing.313 All catches at sea must 
be landed and there are always fishing vessels or supporting vessels that tranship, 
refuel or re-supply in ports. In this case, port States, who have sovereignty over 
their ports,  have rights to check, to refuse the port access, landing or using port 
services, as well as to detain or to punish vessels that have been engaged in IUU 
fishing. These actions can prohibit IUU catches from entering international mar-
kets and can deprive the motivation of IUU fishing.314  
 
 
 
2.3.4.1 Port State measures before the FAO Port State Measures 
Agreement 
 
The UNCLOS provides for universal port State jurisdiction allowing the port State 
to take measures against illegal discharges outside the territorial sea or EEZ of that 
coastal State, which is not the case for IUU fishing.315 The UNCLOS only men-
tions fisheries in connection to port State control in Article 62 (4) (h). Under this 
provision, a coastal State can require part or all of the catches harvested by nation-
als of other States fishing in the EEZ of the coastal State to land in the ports of the 
coastal State. However, the UNCLOS does not specify what port State measures 
can be taken to control the landing of fish nor does it provide for port State control 
in case of high seas fisheries. 
However, the FAO Compliance Agreement complements port State control in 
case of high seas fisheries. Article V (2) of the FAO Compliance Agreement al-
lows a port State to take arrangements for investigatory measures as may be con-
sidered necessary to establish whether a suspected fishing vessel has been used for 
an activity that undermines the effectiveness of international conservation and 
management measures. Birnie has proposed that although the expression ‘may 
make arrangements’ leaves the port State’s power both optional and limited, the 
agreement is progressive to authorise national authorities to prohibit landings and 
transhipments if the catches had been taken illegally.316   
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The UN Fish Stocks Agreement specifies port State measures to control fishing 
vessels fishing for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species. Port States 
are authorized to inspect documents, fishing gear and catches on board fishing 
vessels that are voluntary in their ports or at their offshore terminals, as long as 
these measures do not discriminate vessels of particular States. 317  Stringent 
measures to regulate transhipment, especially at-sea transhipment, are demand-
ed.318 
The IPOA-IUU explicitly provides possible port State measures against IUU 
fishing. On the basis of the FAO Model Scheme and the FAO Port State Measures 
Agreement, it reiterates the requirements codified in the UN Fish Stocks Agree-
ment.319 It also provides several new measures, such as requiring fishing vessels 
and vessels involved in fishing related activities to provide reasonable advanced 
notice of their entry into the port before allowing a vessel port access;320 publiciz-
ing ports to which foreign flagged vessels can access and ensuring these ports 
have the capacity to conduct inspections;321 collecting certain information and re-
mitting to the flag State and relevant RFMO when exercising inspection;322 report-
ing suspected IUU matter to the flag State, the relevant coastal States and RFMO 
in case that the port State finds there are reasonable grounds to believe the vessel 
has engaged in or supported IUU fishing beyond the jurisdiction of the port 
State; 323  as well as cooperating bilaterally, multilaterally and within relevant 
RFMOs to develop compatible measures for port State control and to exchange in-
formation.324  
Paragraph 63 of the IPOA-IUU adds to port State measures.  
 
“…fishing vessels entitled to fly the flag of States not parties to [a 
RFMO] and which have not agreed to cooperate with that [RFMO], 
which are identified as being engaged in IUU fishing. Such port State 
measures may prohibit landings and transhipment of catch unless the 
identified vessel can establish that the catch was taken in a manner con-
sistent with those conservation and management measures. …” 
 
                                                                                                                                     
ment Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. Review of European Com-
munity & International Environmental Law 8, p. 53. 
317 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 23 (1) (2). 
318 The Outcome of the 2006 UN Fish Stocks Agreement Review Conference, 
para. 43(c). 
319 IPOA-IUU, paras. 52, 53 and 56. 
320 IPOA-IUU, para. 55. 
321 IPOA-IUU, para. 57. 
322 IPOA-IUU, para. 58. 
323 IPOA-IUU, para. 59. 
324 IPOA-IUU, para. 63. 
71 
This presumption first supposes a fishing vessel has been involved in IUU fish-
ing if its flag State is not a party to a RFMO and has not agreed to cooperate with 
that RFMO. Then it requires the fishing vessel to prove it has not been engaged in 
IUU fishing. Thus, this provision introduces the reversal of the burden of proof.325 
The FAO Model Scheme provides voluntary principles and guidelines for port 
States to take measures. Except for the requirements mentioned above,326 the FAO 
Model Scheme also emphasizes the following points:  
First, it specifies that fishing vessels refer to “any vessel used or intended for 
use for the purpose of fishing, including support ships, carrier vessels and any 
other vessels directly involved in such fishing operations”.327  
Then, the FAO Model Scheme specifies duties of port States for inspection and 
afterwards.328 In particular, the annexes contain details on required information to 
be provided in advance by foreign fishing vessels, port State inspection procedures 
of foreign fishing vessels, information contained in the results of the inspection, 
elements of training of port State inspectors, as well as information systems on 
port State inspections. 329 
     To sum up, before the adoption of the FAO Port State Measures Agreement, 
specific port State measures against IUU fishing were mainly provided by two po-
litical documents – the IPOA-IUU and the FAO Model Scheme. However, the two 
instruments are non-legally binding, which cannot promise the integration of port 
State measures at sub-regional, regional or global level. On the one hand, not eve-
ry port State has adopted and implemented port State measures against IUU fish-
ing. On the other hand, port State measures that have been adopted by different 
States and RFMOs are based on different standards. IUU fishing vessels usually 
seek to land their catches or to use the port services in ports of States that have no 
or less stringent port State measures. Such ports are known as “ports of conven-
ience”.330 Therefore, a legally-binding international agreement that provides the 
minimum standards for port State measures is desired.  
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2.3.4.2 Port State measures provided by the FAO Port State Measures 
Agreement 
 
Based on the previous instruments, the FAO Port State Measures Agreement is the 
first legally binding international agreement which specifically applies to port 
States in addressing measures against IUU fishing, albeit not in force yet. 
The purpose of this agreement is to inspect fishing vessels entering the ports of 
parties to the Agreement and to verify whether they have been engaged in IUU 
fishing.331 The FAO Port State Measures Agreement only provides the minimum 
standards for port States. However, parties to this agreement can also adopt more 
stringent port States measures in accordance with international law due to the sov-
ereignty they have over their ports.332  
Under the FAO Port State Measures Agreement, port States enforce their juris-
diction over foreign vessels in their ports through controlling the entry of ports, 
the use of ports and the inspection of fishing vessels. 
 
 
 
2.3.4.2.1 Entry into Ports 
 
Article 7 of the FAO Port State Measures Agreement requires each Party to desig-
nate and publicize the ports to which vessels may request entry and ensure that it 
has adequate capacity to conduct inspections. Examples of States that have codi-
fied the designation of ports in their national legislation are the EU, New Zea-
land,333 South Africa,334 Turkey,335 Canada,336 and Mauritius.337  
     Each Party shall require the information requested in Annex A of the FAO Port 
State Measures Agreement to be provided before granting a vessel access to its 
port and then examine this information.338 According to Annex A, the minimum 
information required includes the purpose and information of access to port, vessel 
identification, fishing authorization(s), information of the master, transhipment au-
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thorization(s) as well as information about catches. Countries such as Australia,339 
Norway340 and Ireland341 have required advanced notice of port entry. 
     After examining the information received, the port State may determine wheth-
er the vessel has been engaged in IUU fishing or fishing related activities in sup-
port of such fishing. Then the port State can decide whether to authorize or deny 
the entry to its port and shall communicate this decision to the vessel or to its rep-
resentative.342   
     In cases where there is sufficient evidence that a vessel seeking entry to a port 
has been engaged in IUU fishing or fishing related activities in support of such 
fishing, the vessel will be included in a blacklist adopted by a relevant RFMO ac-
cording to international law. Additionally, the port State shall deny that vessel en-
try into its ports.343 Alternatively, exclusively for the purpose of inspecting the 
vessels, the port State may allow the suspected vessel to enter its port and take 
other appropriate actions in conforming to international law.344 The FAO Port 
State Measures Agreement does not specify what actions a port State can take in 
this case. Such actions must be consistent in international law and as effective as 
denial of port entry in combating IUU fishing and related activities.345   
     
 
 
2.3.4.2.2 Use of Ports 
 
In cases where a vessel involved in IUU fishing or related fishing activities is al-
ready in a port, the port State shall deny such vessel the use of its port for landing, 
transhipping, packaging, and processing of the fish that has not been previously 
landed and for other port services, including refuelling and resupplying, mainte-
nance and drydocking.346 Landing and transhipment of fish needs authorization of 
a port State. Specifically, Gambia does not allow a fishing vessel engaged in drift-
net fishing to tranship, land or process the fish or have access to its ports and port 
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services.347 As to Ghana, restrictions on landing and transhipment shall be im-
posed on vessels that have used prohibited fishing methods.348 In Nauru, the im-
port of illegally caught fish shall also face restrictions on landing and tranship-
ment.349 Tuvalu stipulates that restrictions on landing and transhipment may be 
imposed on fishing for endangered species.350 However, transhipment of fish at 
sea with authorization is still allowed by certain States, such as Ghana,351 New 
Zealand352 and Namibia.353 
     If a port State denies the use of its port, it shall promptly notify its decision to 
the flag State, relevant coastal States, RFMOs and other relevant international or-
ganizations.354 If there is sufficient proof that the grounds for denial are inadequate 
or such grounds no longer apply, the port State shall withdraw its denial and 
promptly notify those to whom the notification was issued.355 
 
 
 
2.3.4.2.3 Inspections and follow-up actions 
 
Each party shall inspect a number of vessels in its ports in order to reach an annual 
level of inspection sufficient to achieve the objectives of the FAO Port State 
Measures Agreement.356 The FAO Port State Measures Agreement does not pro-
vide a specific number or proportion of inspections. Port States shall agree on the 
minimum levels of inspection through, as appropriate, RFMOs, FAO or other-
wise.357 Take the EU as an example. EU Member States are required to carry out 
inspections in their ports for at least 5 per cent of landings and transhipments op-
erations by third country fishing vessels each year.358 Although many States have 
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port inspections, there are only a few States that have codified port inspection of 
fishing vessels for the combat of IUU fishing, including Mauritius,359 Thailand,360 
Vanuatu361 and Canada.362 
     In determining which vessels to inspect, a Party shall give priority to vessels: 
(a) that have been denied entry or use of a port according to this Agreement; (b) 
requested by other relevant Parties, States or RFMOs, in particular where such re-
quests are supported by evidence of IUU fishing or supporting activities; (c) for 
which there are clear grounds for suspecting that they have been engaged in IUU 
fishing or supporting activities.363 It should be pointed out that the priorities main-
ly work on illegal fishing, while unreported fishing can easily escape if the fishing 
vessels are not be inspected.364 
     During the inspection, inspectors shall: (a) verify the authenticity of vessel 
identification documents on board and information relating to the owner of the 
vessel; (b) verify the vessel’s flag and markings are consistent with the infor-
mation contained in the documents; (c) verify the consistency between the author-
izations for fishing and related activities and the information provided by the ves-
sel when requesting entry; (d) review all other relevant documentation and records 
onboard; (e) examine fishing gear onboard; (f) determine whether the fish on 
board has been harvested in accordance with the applicable authorizations; (g) ex-
amine the quantity and composition of fish; (h) evaluate whether there is clear ev-
idence for believing that a vessel has been engaged in IUU fishing or fishing relat-
ed activities in support of such fishing; (i) provide the master of the vessel with 
the report containing the result of the inspection, including possible measures that 
could be taken; (j) arrange, where necessary and possible, for translation of rele-
vant documentation.365  
     Avoiding undue delay of a vessel to minimize interference and inconvenience 
is indeed a duty of care that is also required by port State control over the security 
of foreign vessels in ports.366 The FAO Port State Measures Agreement considers 
the duty of care as legally binding, but it does not provide any recourse when un-
due inspections happen. Although Article 292 of the UNCLOS provides the 
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prompt release procedure against undue detention, using such procedure against 
undue inspection is without merit. Therefore, avoiding undue inspection relies on 
whether a port State codifies the duty of care in its national legislation. 
     If there are clear grounds for believing that a vessel has been engaged in IUU 
fishing or supporting activities, the inspecting Party shall promptly notify the flag 
State, relevant coastal States, RFMOs, other international organizations, and the 
State of which the vessel’s master is a national of its findings. Moreover, the port 
State can deny the vessel the use of its port for landing, transhipping, packaging 
and processing of fish that have not been previously landed and for other port ser-
vices.367 
     Additionally, port States have the right to seek compensation according to their 
national laws and regulations concerning port State measures applied in any case 
of unlawful action, but need to  inform the flag State, the owner, operator, master 
or representatives of the outcome of any such recourse as appropriate.368  
 
 
 
2.3.4.2.4 Flag State duties in connection with port State measures 
 
The FAO Port State Measures Agreement codifies port State measures concerning 
the entry into ports, the use of ports and inspections. However, it does not permit a 
port State to take enforcement action itself.369 A port State shall take enforcement 
action with the endeavour of the related flag State. The FAO Port State Measures 
Agreement repeatedly emphasizes the significance of cooperation between port 
States and flag States. Article 20 of the FAO Port State Measures Agreement es-
pecially indicates the role of flag States in the cooperation with port States.  
Flag States shall encourage vessels flying their flag to land, tranship, pack and 
process fish, and use other port services in ports of States that act in a manner con-
sistent with the FAO Port State Measures Agreement.370  
In case that the flag State has clear grounds to believe that a vessel entitled to 
fly its flag has engaged in IUU fishing or supporting activities and is seeking entry 
to or is in the port of another State, it shall request that port State to inspect the 
vessel or take other appropriate actions.371 After receiving an inspection report 
with clear grounds to believe that the vessel has been involved in IUU fishing or 
supporting activities, the flag State shall immediately and fully investigate the 
matter and take enforcement action without delay in accordance with its laws and 
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regulations.372 Then, the flag State shall report to other Parties, relevant port States 
and, as appropriate, other relevant States, RFMOs and FAO the actions it has tak-
en for such vessels and the results.373 Those actions taken by flag States shall be as 
effective as the port State measures provided in the FAO Port State Measures 
Agreement.374 
 
 
 
2.3.4.3 Effectiveness 
 
As the FAO Port State Measures Agreement has not entered into force, the practi-
cal effect of this Agreement is still unknown. There is a concern that IUU fishing 
vessels rarely enter ports of countries that endeavour to combat IUU fishing 
through port State measures. Instead, IUU catches can be offloaded to reefer ships 
and landed in ports in order to be “white washed”.375 In order to understand the 
process of improving port State control, it is necessary to draw an analogy be-
tween port State measures against IUU fishing and port State security. Port State 
security control of foreign vessels mainly takes place in Europe, the US, Australia 
and other developed States and regions. As a result of this, there was a period that 
many vessels chose ports in other countries with less port State control. Currently, 
port State security control of foreign vessels is prevalent worldwide. Although 
port State control on IUU catches has not yet been considered as equally important 
as security measures, port State control on IUU catches gets increasing attention 
due to the enforcement by major port States. The transhipment at sea, which is not 
an issue that can be resolved only through port State control, relies on the coopera-
tion of flag and coastal States, relevant RFMOs as well as trade market measures 
that are discussed below. At present, port State measures only function to a limited 
extent, but it is expected that together with other State measures, particularly trade 
measures, port State measures will play an important role in dealing with IUU 
fishing in the future. 
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2.3.5 International agreed market-related measures against IUU 
fishing 
 
2.3.5.1 The IPOA-IUU 
 
The IPOA-IUU is the main international instrument that utilises market-related 
measures to combat IUU fishing. The purpose of such measures is to eliminate the 
economic incentives for vessels to engage in IUU fishing. The IPOA-IUU does 
not define what market-related measures are. Instead, it recommends possible 
measures, such as multilateral catch documentation and certification, the traceabil-
ity of fish or fish products, the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding 
System for fish and fisheries products and several other measures.376 The IPOA-
IUU particularly indicates that a “certification and documentation requirement 
should be standardized to the extent feasible, and electronic schemes should be 
developed where possible, to ensure their effectiveness, reduce opportunities for 
fraud, and avoid unnecessary burden on trade”.377 The IPOA-IUU mainly focuses 
on certain administrative issues such as coordination between international fisher-
ies legislation and multilateral trade law, cooperation at different level and coop-
eration of stakeholders rather than specifying such market-related measures.  
It first stresses the coordination between international fisheries legislation and 
multilateral trade law. In order not to create unnecessary green barriers, market-
related measures against IUU fishing should be consistent with the principles, 
rights and obligations codified by the WTO and implemented in a fair, transparent 
and non-discriminatory manner.378 Although there is no particular WTO agree-
ment with respect to fisheries, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
(GATT 1994) has established two rules that can apply to fish trade. Those rules 
are the Most Favoured Nation clause and the National Treatment clause.379 Under 
these conditions, like products between foreign contracting parties enjoy the same 
treatment; also, the domestic and foreign like products should be treated equally. 
Nevertheless, Article XX of GATT allows for an exception to the above obliga-
tions in case of the conservation of exhaustible natural resources:  
                                                          
376 IPOA-IUU, paras. 66-76. Although prohibitions on foreign landing or tran-
shipment of fish in ports are also related to trade of fish, they are considered as 
parts of port State measures by the IPOA-IUU and FAO guidelines. Therefore, 
this paper merely focuses on trade-market measures under the framework of the 
IPOA-IUU. 
377 IPOA-IUU, para. 76. 
378 The IPOA-IUU, para. 65. 
379 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 30 October 1947, signed 
in 1948, modified in 1994, 61 Stat. A-11, Arts. I and III. The GATT has been in-
corporated into the WTO Agreement. 
79 
 
“Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or 
a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any con-
tracting party of measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction 
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”380  
 
The Dolphin/Tuna I case (1991) indicated that a country is not allowed to intro-
duce unilateral trade limitation measures in order to enforce its national legislation 
solely, even if this legislation aims to protect animals.381 Furthermore, this prohibi-
tion equally applies in favour of countries that act as an intermediary (Dol-
phin/Tuna II case (1994).382 In the Shrimp/Turtle case (1998), the WTO-Panel 
came to the conclusion that a unilateral import prohibition is not compatible with 
GATT rules, unless the import prohibition is the result of the implementation of a 
cooperation agreement to serve global conservation strategies.383 On Appeal an 
equal reasoning was followed, albeit in less strong words towards the conclusion 
of a multilateral approach. 384  Additionally, the Appellate Body established a 
framework to guide States in utilizing Article XX’s environmental exceptions 
while complying with GATT’s policy against unilateral trade restrictions.385 Envi-
ronmental measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources 
and having trade effects have since the Shrimp/Turtle case not been challenged in 
the WTO. Thus, in order to combat IUU fishing, import restrictions can be applied 
as an exception to GATT rules, either to implement an international agreement or 
a multilateral decision. However, market-related measures should only be used 
where other measures have failed to combat IUU fishing and only after prior con-
                                                          
380 GATT, Art. XX (g).  
381 GATT (1991) Dispute settlement panel report on United States restrictions 
on import of tuna. International Legal Materials 30, pp. 1594-1623. 
382 GATT (1994) Dispute settlement panel report on United States restrictions 
on import of tuna. International Legal Materials 33, pp. 839-903. 
383 WTO (1998) Report of the panel on the United States - import prohibition of 
certain shrimp and shrimp products. International Legal Materials 37, pp. 832-857. 
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121-175. 
385 Taylor CR (2010) Fishing with a Bulldozer: Options for unilateral action by 
the United States under domestic and international law to halt destructive bottom 
trawling practices on the high seas. Environs Environmental Law and Policy Jour-
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sultation with interested States; while, unilateral measures should be avoided.386 
Additionally, those measures need to be implemented in a fair, transparent and 
non-discriminatory manner.387  
Secondly, international, regional and bilateral cooperation is strongly recom-
mended.388 The functions of RFMOs in combating IUU fishing are especially em-
phasized. For example, States should take all necessary steps to prevent fish 
caught by vessels identified by the relevant RFMO to have been engaged in IUU 
fishing and fish traded or imported into their territories.389 The IPOA-IUU empha-
sizes that the identification of the vessels by the RFMO should take place through 
agreed procedures, which means unilateral action is not recommended. Normally, 
RFMOs use IUU vessel lists to identify illegal operating vessels.  
In addition, assistance between States is also encouraged by the IPOA-IUU. 
When requested by another interested State, a State should assist the interested 
State to deter trade in fish and fish products illegally harvested in the latter’s juris-
diction. The assistance should be given according to terms agreed by both States 
and fully respect the jurisdiction of the requesting State.390 
Thirdly, at the national level, the cooperation of stakeholders is significant. The 
IPOA-IUU encourages States to ensure that their domestic stakeholders do not 
conduct business with those involved in IUU fishing.391 Furthermore, States are 
expected to “make it a violation to conduct such business or to trade in fish or fish 
products derived from IUU fishing” under national law.392 In cases where a State 
maintains a large part of the fish market, market-related measures can play a vital 
role in combating IUU fishing.393  
 
 
 
2.3.5.2 Implementing instruments of the IPOA-IUU  
 
As discussed previously, the FAO has developed a set of technical guidelines for 
responsible fisheries in order to implement the Code of Conduct and IPOA-IUU. 
Two of those technical guidelines are related to combat IUU fishing by making 
                                                          
386 IPOA-IUU, para. 66. 
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392 IPOA-IUU, para. 73. 
393 Chaves LA (2000) Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing: WTO con-
sistent trade related measures to address IUU fishing. In: FAO (ed) Report of and 
papers presented at the Expert Consultation on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulat-
ed Fishing, FAO Fisheries Report No 666. FAO, Rome, pp. 268-281. 
81 
use of market-related measures: the IPOA-IUU Implementation Guidelines and 
the Responsible Fish Trade Guidelines.  
The IPOA-IUU Implementation Guidelines elaborate the main market-related 
measures provided by the IPOA-IUU. For instance, the Guidelines distinguish be-
tween the catch certification and the trade documentation scheme. Catch certifica-
tion is issued by national authorities in order to accompany all fish harvested and 
fish products, no matter whether such fish and fish products enter the international 
trade.394 While, the trade documentation scheme is “established by RFMOs that 
require documentation to accompany particular fish and fish products through in-
ternational trade, identifying the origin of fish for the purpose of ascertaining lev-
els of unreported fishing”. 395 Thus, it can be seen that, in the context of the IPOA-
IUU Implementation Guidelines, the trade documentation scheme is only utilized 
in international trade and under the framework of RFMOs. 
Additionally, the IPOA-IUU Implementation Guidelines reiterate the role of 
traceability to combat IUU fishing, which is called upon by the IPOA-IUU. Trace-
ability is initially developed to ensure food security and quality. In recent years, it 
has been considered as a trading approach to combat IUU fishing. Traceability of 
fish can allow fish or fish products to be traced back to the moment of harvest in 
order to identify whether the fish or fish product is derived from IUU fishing or 
not, although not every traceability system can make this distinction. This raises a 
question about the different roles catch certification and traceability in combating 
IUU fishing play. The IPOA-IUU Implementation Guidelines provide the con-
cepts of traceability and certification. Certification, such as catch certification, 
records all information related to when and where the fish is harvested and by 
whom; while, traceability of fish allows a fish or fish product to be traced through 
the whole process from harvest to table, including the landing, transhipment and 
importation.396 It should be pointed out that not every traceability system guaran-
tees the provenance of a product is traceable. Catch certification is particularly 
used for verifying that the fish has been caught in compliance with all applicable 
regulations. However, it is not necessary to pass the information to the supply 
chain.397 Thus, the catch certificate is the core of a traceability system that can be 
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used for combating IUU fishing. Various networks and standards of traceability 
result in a difficult coordination of measures adopted by different fish trading 
countries, creating the possibility of trade barriers.398 One excellent example is the 
certification program and the seafood ecolabel of the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC), which contains around 20,000 MSC certified products worldwide. In 
2012-13, the MSC certified about 7 per cent of the global catch, among which 
fewer than 8 per cent were in developing countries.399  
The Responsible Fish Trade Guidelines recommend developed States and rele-
vant organizations to provide financial and technical assistance to developing 
States and States in transition to ensure sustainable fish trade. It also emphasizes 
“such financial and technical assistance should aim at capacity building in areas 
such as improving fishery management, and developing and implementing catch 
documentation, trade certification and ecolabeling schemes”.400 Catch certifica-
tion and trade documentation are the most primary trade-related requirements for 
combating IUU fishing. Thus, the support to developing countries to fulfil those 
formal requirements can contribute to a fair and equal fish trade. Ecolabeling 
schemes are used for indicating sustainable fisheries.  
In addition, the Responsible Fish Trade Guidelines focus on the issue of fishery 
subsidies. Paragraph 24 of the technical guidelines requires States to eliminate 
subsidies that disregard the conservation and management of fisheries resources, 
in particular those subsidies that result in IUU fishing. Global fisheries subsidies 
are estimated at 30-34 billion USD annually, resulting in overfishing.401 
Although the IPOA-IUU and its Implementing Guidelines are non-legally bind-
ing instruments, there are more and more RFMOs and States implementing them 
through regional and national plans or legislation. State practice has made trade-
market measures legally binding in a regional or national context, for example, the 
electronic bluefin tuna Catch Document Programme (eBCD) established by the 
ICCAT with a central database at the ICCAT Secretariat to identify the origin of 
bluefin tuna. The eBCD tracks bluefin tuna from the point of capture throughout 
the trade cycle. In fact, it is a combination of a catch certification and trade docu-
mentation scheme. The eBCD requires that each step of the catching, farming, 
harvesting and trading sections be validated before the eBCD passes to the next 
stage. 402 Additionally, the system only allows fishermen or trap owners to insert a 
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new quantity that results in a new eBCD rather than a combination with the previ-
ous one.403 The eBCD is expected not only to detect fraud but also improve the in-
formation exchange. Moreover, similar electronic catch documentation schemes 
have been gradually adopted by other major RFMOs, for instance, the CCAMLR 
already established electronic catch documentation schemes for toothfish.404  
 
 
 
2.3.5.3 Possible embargo on major fishing States 
 
Trade-market measures adopted by major market States have become significant 
in combating IUU fishing recently. An impressive case is an import ban that may 
be imposed on South Korea’s fisheries products by the US due to the former’s in-
adequate fisheries legislation and enforcement, which has pushed South Korea to 
adopt a more stringent amendment of Water Fisheries Act. 
On 23 and 24 February 2011, the South Korean fishing vessel Insung No. 7 set 
fishing gear in CCAMLR Division 58.4.2 Subarea E when the master knew the 
catch limit had already been exceeded. The illegal catch of 35.5 tons of toothfish 
amounted to 710,000 USD and exceeded the Division’s catch limit by 339 per 
cent. Korea imposed a fine of appropriately 1,300 USD and a 30-day suspension 
of the vessel’s distant water fishing authorization. However, at the 2011 
CCAMLR meeting, many delegations, including the US, were of the view that 
Korea’s sanctions were inadequate to punish this serious illegal fishing. 
CCAMLR’s Standing Committee on Implementation and Compliance proposed 
placing the Insung No. 7 on the Contracting Party IUU Vessel List, but South Ko-
rea blocked its inclusion.  
Given the pressure from international society, the Government of Korea indi-
cated that it was undertaking the amendment of the relevant law and would in-
crease maximum fines to combat IUU fishing. In reviewing the text of Korea’s 
proposed amendment, the National Maritime Fisheries Service (NMFS) of the US 
was concerned that the potential law sanctions were insufficient to deter IUU fish-
ing activities. For example, although the pending amendment would raise the 
maximum fine for a third violation from approximately 4,660 USD to 18,450 
USD, the NMFS believed that the fine would be not enough to prevent such prof-
itable illegal fishing. Additionally, the pending amendment did not provide that 
the illegal catch or its proceeds could be seized, while a US vessel involved in a 
similar violation would be subject to more stringent sanctions.  Therefore, the 
NMFS has identified South Korea as an illegal fishing country, which means 
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South Korean fishing vessels may be denied entry into US ports, and imports of 
certain fish or fish products from South Korea into the US may be prohibited 
too.405 
The identification of the US is based on its national legislation: Pelly Amend-
ment to the Fishermen’s Protective Act of 196 406 and the Magnuson-Stevens 
Reauthorization Act of 2006 (MSRA).407 The former “authorizes the President to 
embargo wildlife products (including all fish) whenever the Secretary of the Inte-
rior or the Secretary of Commerce certifies that nationals of a foreign country are 
engaging in trade or taking that diminishes the effectiveness of an international 
program in force with respect to the United States for the conservation of endan-
gered or threatened species”.408 The latter authorizes the Secretary of Commerce 
to “identify each nation whose nationals or vessels are conducting large-scale 
driftnet fishing or [IUU] fishing beyond the exclusive economic zone of any na-
tion” and notify the President of this identification.409 Within 30 days of this iden-
tification, the President “shall enter consultations with the government of that na-
tion for the purpose of obtaining an agreement that will effect the immediate 
termination of large-scale driftnet fishing or [IUU] fishing by the nationals or 
vessels of that nation beyond the exclusive economic zone of any nation”.410 If the 
consultations with the government of the nation identified are not concluded satis-
factorily, the President shall direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the 
importation of fish and fish products and sport fishing equipment within 45 days 
of the President’s directive.411 After six months of identification, the Secretary 
shall determine whether the import prohibition is effective to make the nation ter-
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minate its IUU fishing behaviour.412 If the prohibition is not effective, the Secre-
tary of Commerce shall certify that nation to the President under the Pelly 
Amendment.413 
On 2 July 2013, the South Korean National Assembly passed the amended Wa-
ter Fisheries Act. The amendment “increases penalties for illegal fishing to a max-
imum of three times the value of the fish caught, up from the current fine of 5,000 
USD”.414 It also “includes provisions for imprisonment, while industries involved 
in IUU fishing, or mistreating their fishing crews, will lose their government sub-
sidies under the new legislation”.415 Greenpeace believes that this is a good first 
step for South Korea to combat IUU fishing, even though further legislation and 
stringent implementation are still desired to ensure a transparent traceability and 
the supervision of fisheries products from all South Korean vessels to the mar-
kets.416 
It can be seen from this example that countries holding a significant position in 
the fishing industry can also be recognized as illegal fishing countries by major 
fish markets. Trade-market measures can indeed promote fishing States to take 
their State duties to ensure sustainable fisheries. 
 
 
 
2.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Under the international legal framework for combating IUU fishing, measures 
against IUU fishing include flag State duties, coastal State measures, port States 
measures, market-related measures, RFMOs measures and measures applied to all 
States. The UNCLOS codifies the principle of exclusive flag state jurisdiction 
over vessels on the high seas as well as coastal States sovereignty in the territorial 
sea and sovereign rights in the EEZ. The FAO Compliance Agreement focuses on 
the duties of high seas fishing States over vessels entitled to fly their flag. The UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement also pays attention to high seas fishing but focuses on flag 
State duties especially in fishing straddling fish stocks and highly migratory spe-
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cies. In particular it indicates the significant role of RFMOs in the management 
and conservation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species. Minimum 
requirements for port State measures and relevant flag State duties are provided by 
the FAO Port State Measures Agreement, which is the first international legally 
binding agreement specifically dealing with IUU fishing. However, the FAO Port 
State Measures Agreement has not entered into force yet. 
     The Code of Conduct is the most comprehensive instrument in the field of in-
ternational fisheries, which intends to establish principles and criteria for the elab-
oration of national and international policies for responsible fisheries. A number 
of concepts and provisions of the Code of Conduct are overlapping with the FAO 
Compliance Agreement and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Under the framework 
of the Code of Conduct, the IPOA-IUU was adopted as the most comprehensive 
international instrument that deals with IUU fishing in particular. It provides com-
prehensive State measures that can be applied to all fisheries rather than to high 
seas fishing alone and fishing under the jurisdiction of RFMOs. It reiterates and 
further specifies flag State duties, coastal State measures, port State measures and 
RFMOs measures provided by previous international fisheries instruments. Addi-
tionally, the IPOA-IUU is the first international fisheries instrument that refers to 
utilizing market-related measures to combat IUU fishing at international level. 
Later, the FAO Model Scheme was established based on the port State measures 
in the IPOA-IUU and creates a basis for the FAO Port State Measures Agreement. 
     To sum up, at the international level, flag State duties are the core problem in 
combating IUU fishing. Other measures are used for pressuring flag States to take 
their duties when flag State measures have failed. Therefore, measures that can be 
taken by different States are not isolated but interact with each other. Cooperation 
is needed particularly between high seas fishing States and coastal States. It is sig-
nificant to coordinate benefits of coastal States and States fishing in the jurisdic-
tion of such coastal States. Furthermore,  the interaction between port States and 
flag States, as well as the effective function of market measures in forcing other 
States to take their coastal, flag, port and market State duties, have been signifi-
cant in combating IUU fishing. 
     The following chapters focus on the adoption and ratification of the interna-
tional fisheries instruments by the EU and China as well as how they implement 
those measures to deal with IUU fishing. 
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Chapter 3 EU law against IUU fishing 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The European Union (EU) has 28 Member States that now comprise more than 
7,044,342 km
2
 exclusive economic zones (EEZs), covering areas of the Atlantic 
Ocean, the Baltic Sea, the North Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.417 
However, the fisheries sector represents a relatively small portion of EU’s econo-
my. It only makes up 0.06 per cent of the total EU Gross Domestic Product in 
2009.418 Five of the most notable countries, France, Italy, Spain, Greece and the 
UK, generate 81 per cent of the total EU fisheries income.419 The EU adopted the 
Common Fisheries Policies (CFP) to reduce overcapacity in its fishing fleets. Dur-
ing the last two decades, the EU fishing fleet capacity has been reduced in both 
tonnage and engine power. According to the latest FAO report on the state of 
world fisheries and aquaculture, the combined EU-15 motorized fishing fleet was 
reduced by 8 per cent in the number of vessels and11 per cent in engine power be-
tween 2005 and 2010.420 Despite the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007, the num-
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ber of vessels from 1995 to September 2011 decreased by 23715.421 The total 
catches of the EU decreased by 40 per cent between 1995 and 2010.422  
The reduction of fleet capacity and catches contributes to an increasing domes-
tic demand for fish and fisheries products. One the one hand, the EU actively de-
velops distant water fisheries through fisheries partnership agreements and north-
ern agreements. 423 On the other hand, the EU highly relies on imports of fish and 
fisheries products. Except for intraregional trade in the EU, fish and fisheries 
products imported from outside of the EU reached 23.7 billion USD in 2010 and 
increased by 11 per cent from 2009.424 65 per cent of fish consumed in the EU is 
imported.425 As the EU has become the largest fish and fisheries market, it has also 
attracted over 1.1 billion EUR of illegal catches annually before 2010, represent-
ing almost 16 per cent of the EU’s imports of fish.426 Except for destroying fish 
stocks, such illegal catches have gained a competitive price advantage in the EU 
market, which is believed to undermine conservation measures and discourage 
law-abiding fishermen.427 Therefore, the EU has been dedicated to combat IUU 
fishing. The most outstanding endeavour of the EU was the adoption and imple-
mentation of The Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008, 
establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreport-
ed and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 
1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1093/94 and 
(EC) No 1447/1999 (IUU Regulation).428 The IUU Regulation deals with IUU 
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fishing mainly through port State measures and market measures. Thus, the EU’s 
implementation of the IUU Regulation has a significant impact on its fish trade 
partners, such as the US, Japan and China. Chapter 4 will address fisheries legisla-
tion and implementation in China, which is EU’s second exporter of fish and fish-
eries products,429 and the influence of the EU IUU Regulation on China.  
     This chapter first discusses the competences of the EU and its Member States 
in the field of fisheries. The functions of the EU’s institutions in this aspect are al-
so generally introduced. Then the focus turns to the legal framework of EU’s fish-
eries law against IUU fishing, including the adoption and ratification of interna-
tional fisheries instruments and the laws adopted at Community level. Finally, this 
chapter examines various duties, rights and measures against IUU fishing as well 
as their implementations to analyse whether they are effective. This sets the scene 
for comparison in Chapter 5. The Chinese regime differs in terms of competences 
between the Central Government and local governments, institutions, the attitude 
towards international fisheries instruments as well as the different measures it 
adopts. 
 
 
 
3.2 Legal framework 
 
3.2.1 Institutions  
 
3.2.1.1 Decision-making 
 
Under the pre-Lisbon institutional framework, the European Commission (Com-
mission) exclusively initiated legislative and policy proposals, while the European 
Council (Council) adopted those proposals by simple or qualified majority voting, 
in association with the European Parliament (Parliament).430 As the Lisbon Treaty 
entered into force, the Parliament has been involved in co-deciding on the recent 
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430 Pech L (2012) The institutional development of the EU post Lisbon: a case 
of plus ça change …? In: Ashiagbor D, Countouris N and Lianos I (eds) The EU 
after the Treaty of Lisbon: a legal assessment. Cambridge University Press, p. 14. 
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reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) with the Council. 431 Except for the 
adoption of the Total Allowable Catches and the Total Allowable Efforts where 
the Council decides on its own, all CFP measures need an agreement between the 
Parliament and the Council according to the ordinary legislative procedure.432 The 
Committee on Fisheries of the Parliament and the Agriculture and Fisheries Coun-
cil are responsible for negotiating and adopting fisheries legislation. The participa-
tion of the Parliament in the fisheries legislation can help to “reconcile a variety of 
interests with the aim of securing the long term sustainability of the marine envi-
ronment, fish stocks, fishermen, related industries and coastal communities”.433 
However, the participation of the Parliament extends the time of decision-making 
and even delayed the adoption of the recent reformed CFP.  
 
 
 
3.2.1.2 Enforcement 
 
In order to implement the CFP, the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries (DG MARE), as a department of the Commission, is responsible for the 
implementation of the CFP.  
    The Commission is responsible for ensuring Member States to comply with 
fisheries legislation adopted by the EU. Article 258 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union (TFEU) codifies that “if the Commission considers that 
a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties [Treaty on Eu-
ropean Union (TEU) and TFEU], it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter 
after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the 
State concerned does not comply with the opinion…, [the Commission] may bring 
the matter before the Court of Justice of the European Union”. This provision in-
dicates that when a Member State does not comply with the EU’s legal acts adopt-
ed under the TEU and the TFEU, the Commission can bring a case against a 
Member State before the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ). For ex-
ample, the Commission instituted court actions against Italy and France respec-
tively because they failed to comply with the Community legislation against drift 
nets as well as lacked appropriate measures against those responsible for in-
fringements of such legislation.434 In both cases, the ECJ supported the Commis-
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sion’s claims. The ECJ as an independent institution plays a significant role in 
treaty interpretation and the European integration process.435 The ECJ is also a 
driver mechanism to promote coordination in legislation between the EU and its 
Member States. 
    The Commission can also coordinate the conflicts between Member States 
when implementing fisheries legislation adopted by the EU. According to Article 
259 of the TFEU, “A Member State which considers that another Member State 
has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties may bring the matter before 
the [ECJ]. Before a Member State brings an action against another Member 
State …, it shall bring the matter before the Commission. The Commission shall 
deliver a reasoned opinion … If the Commission has not delivered an opinion …, 
the absence of such opinion shall not prevent the matter from being brought be-
fore the Court”. This provision indicates that bringing the matter before the Com-
mission is an essential prerequisite when a Member State brings another Member 
State before the ECJ, no matter whether the Commission delivers its opinion.  
   The Commission and the ECJ both are responsible for ensuring compliance with 
judgments of the ECJ. On the one hand, if the ECJ finds that a Member State has 
failed to fulfil an obligation under the TEU or the TFEU, the ECJ shall require the 
State to take necessary measures to comply with its judgment.436 On the other 
hand, if the Commission considers that a Member State concerned has not taken 
the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the ECJ, after giving the 
State the opportunity to submit its observations, the Commission can bring the 
case before the ECJ with the aim of penalizing that Member State by asking a fine. 
The Commission shall specify the amount of the lump sum or penalty payment to 
be paid by the Member State concerned. If the ECJ finds that the Member State 
has not complied with its judgment, it may impose a lump sum or penalty payment 
on the State concerned. According to the judgment of the Case C-304/02 between 
the Commission and France, the imposition of a penalty payment is particularly to 
induce a Member State to put an end as soon as possible to a breach of obliga-
tions. 437 The imposition of a lump sum is based on the assessment of the effects on 
public and private interests of the failure of the Member State concerned to com-
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ply with its obligations, in particular where the breach has persisted for a long pe-
riod since the judgment initially established it.438 The judgment also states, “the 
imposition of both a penalty payment and a lump sum cannot infringe the princi-
ple non bis in idem”.439 Thus, in this case, the ECJ ordered France to pay to the 
Commission both a penalty payment and a lump sum because France had not im-
plemented all the necessary measures to comply with a previous judgment of the 
ECJ.  
    The newly adopted Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 11 December 2013 on the Common Fisheries Policy, 
amending Council Regulations (EC) No 1954/2003 and (EC) No 1224/2009 and 
repealing Council Regulations (EC) No 2371/2002 and (EC) No 639/2004 and 
Council Decision 2004/585/EC (2013 CFP Regulation) requires that EU financial 
assistance to be made conditional upon compliance by Member States and opera-
tors, including vessel owners.440 Non-compliance by Member States with the CFP 
rules may result in the interruption or suspension of payments or in the application 
of a financial correction to the EU financial assistance under the CFP.441 
 
 
 
3.2.2 EU’s competence 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty on European Union (TEU) and Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union (TFEU))442confirms that the EU has exclusive, 
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shared and supporting competence,443 but the classification of competence as ex-
clusive or shared is relative.444 
 
 
 
3.2.2.1 Exclusive competence 
 
Article 2(2) of the TFEU provides: “When the Treaties confer on the Union exclu-
sive competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate and adopt legally 
binding acts, the Member States being able to do so themselves only if so empow-
ered by the Union or for the implementation of acts of the Union”. This provision 
raises the question whether Member States can adopt measures in cases where the 
EU has not adopted any measures belonging to its exclusive competence. Accord-
ing to the Judgment of the ECJ in the Case 804/79 between the Commission and 
the United Kingdom, which concerns the compatibility with Community law of 
the fisheries conservation measures adopted by the UK, “…the transfer to the 
Community of powers in this matter being total and definitive, such a failure to act 
could not in any case restore to the Member States the power and freedom to act 
unilaterally in this field”.445 Thus, even though the Union has not adopted any 
measures belonging to the EU’s exclusive competence, Member States cannot 
adopt measures in this field with the exception of being empowered by the Union 
or for the purpose of implementing the EU’s law. 
Moreover, Article 3 (2) of the TFEU stipulates that the EU has exclusive com-
petence to conclude an international agreement when its conclusion is provided in 
a legislative act of the EU or is necessary to enable the EU to exercise its internal 
competence, or in so far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their 
scope. In the case of external competences, the ECJ is likely to interpret in favour 
of EU competences rather than shared competences, which is specified in the fol-
lowing sections.446  
In the Joined cases 3, 4 and 6  6 Kramer, the ECJ stipulated that the Community’s 
competence to enter into international commitments arose not only from an ex-
press attribution by the EC Treaty but might equally flow implicitly from other 
provisions of the Treaty, from the act of accession and from measures adopted by 
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the Community institutions within the framework of those provisions.447 Accord-
ing to the Judgment in the AETR case, if the Community adopted provisions lay-
ing down common rules to implement a common policy envisaged by the Treaty, 
the Member States no longer have the right, acting individually or even collective-
ly, to undertake obligations with third countries which affect those rules.448 As 
pointed out by Paragraphs 25 and 26 of the ECJ Opinion 2/91, in cases where an 
international agreement is already covered to a large extent by Community rules, 
the commitments arising from such an international agreement are considered fall-
ing within the areas covered by Community measures, so Member States cannot 
undertake such commitments outside the framework of the Community institu-
tions.449 For example, in the field of port States measures against IUU fishing, the 
EU has ratified the FAO Port State Measures Agreement and adopted comprehen-
sive port State measures in its IUU Regulation, making the EU exclusive compe-
tent for adopting port State measures against IUU fishing. The endorsement of the 
IPOA-IUU and the adoption of trade-related measures against IUU fishing in the 
IUU Regulation also make the EU exclusive competent in this field.     
     It has to be pointed out that the EU’s exclusive competence is only related to 
legislative competence; while, the EU is endowed very limited enforcement com-
petence and not exclusive.450 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
     447 ECJ (1976) Cornelis Kramer and others, Joined cases 3/76, 4/76 and 6/76, 
Judgment of the Court of 14 July 1976. Available via EUR-Lex. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/Result.do?T1=1976&T2=1279&T3=V1&RechType=RECH_recueil
&Submit=Search. Accessed 22 October 2013, paras. 19-20. 
     448 ECJ (1971) Commission v Council, Case 22/70, AETR, Judgment of the 
Court of 25 November 1971, Judgment of the Court of 25 November 1971. 
Available via EUR-Lex. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:61971CJ0022&rid=1. Accessed 8 April 
2014, para. 17. 
     449 European Court of Justice (1993) Opinion 2/91 of the Court of 19 March 
1993, delivered pursuant to the second subparagraph of Article 228 (1) of the EEC 
Treaty – Convention No 170 of the International Labour Organization concerning 
safety in the use of chemicals at work. Available via EUR-Lex. http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:61991CV0002. Accessed 8 
April 2014; Zijlmans JMIJ (1995) The (exclusive) external competence of the Eu-
ropean Community. Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 2 (4), 
p. 408. 
450 Churchill R, Owen D (2010) The EU Common Fisheries Policy. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, p. 130. 
95 
3.2.2.2 Shared competence 
 
According to Article 2 (2) of the TFEU, when the Treaties confer on the Union a 
competence shared with the Member States in a specific area, the Union and the 
Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The 
Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the EU has not 
exercised its competence or decided to cease exercising its competence. In the 
case of shared competence, the EU’s legislation in a specific area does not auto-
matically make Member States excluded from adopting any measures, while 
Member States are still free to adopt legislation that does not conflict with EU law 
in this field.451 
 
 
 
3.2.2.3 Supporting competence 
 
In addition, the EU only has supporting competence in cases where Member 
States have exclusive competence. Article 2 (5) of the TFEU provides that the EU 
is competent to carry out actions to support, coordinate or supplement the actions 
of the Member States, without thereby superseding their competence in these are-
as.452  
 
 
 
3.2.2.4 EU’s competence in the field of fisheries 
 
In the field of fisheries, exclusive competence is conferred on the EU in the area 
of “the conservation of marine biological resources under the common fisheries 
policy”.453 On the other hand, the EU has shared competence with Member States 
in the field of fisheries excluding the conservation of marine biological re-
sources.454 The Treaty of Lisbon does not elaborate on which area the Member 
States have exclusive competence over fisheries. However it can be seen in the 
Judgments of the ECJ. For example, the Judgment of the Commission v Council 
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case indicates that vessel registration lies within the Member States’ compe-
tence.455  
Combating IUU fishing aims to deal with fishing activities that infringe conser-
vation and management measures applied to a particular fishery. The Treaty of 
Lisbon does not define the scope of “conservation”.  Therefore, the terminology 
used by the ECJ judgements and the Treaty of Lisbon shows that the EU’s exclu-
sive competence is only related to “fisheries conservation” and not to “fisheries 
conservation and management”.456 As to some matters of fisheries “management” 
that go beyond “conservation”, the EU may have shared competence with its 
Member States.457 However it can be inferred from the judgments of the ECJ. For 
example, the judgment in the Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76 explicitly include the fix-
ing of catch quotas and their allocation between the different Member States into 
an exclusive EU competence.458 In the Case 25/94 between the Commission and 
the Council, the ECJ confirms that most of the provisions in the Food and Agricul-
ture Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (the FAO Compli-
ance Agreement),459 including flag State duties such as fishing authorization, be-
long to the exclusive competence of the EU.460 It seems that “conservation” ap-
plies in a broad scope, which is also illustrated below. The EU has exclusive 
competence to regulate the conservation of marine biological resources and shared 
competence in structural policies and the market organization, while Member 
States have primarily executive powers in implementing and enforcing EU law.461  
The adoption of the 2013 CFP Regulation shows a decentralising trend of deci-
sion-making. The 2013 CFP Regulation reiterates the decentralization of the com-
petence of the EU in adopting conservation and management measures. Member 
States are empowered to adopt those measures for stocks in EU waters applicable 
solely to fishing vessels flying their flag according to the requirements of Article 
19 of the 2013 CFP Regulation.462 In addition, Member States are also empowered 
to adopt non-discriminatory conservation and management measures applicable to 
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all EU fishing vessels in their 12 nautical mile zones, if the EU has not adopted 
conservation and management measures concerned.463  
     The 2013 CFP Regulation also reiterates the decentralization of the adoption of 
emergency measures. On the basis of evidence of a serious threat to the conserva-
tion of marine biological resources or to the marine ecosystem, the Commission, 
at the reasoned request of a Member State or on its own initiative, may adopt im-
mediately implementing acts. 464  A Member State may also adopt emergency 
measures on the basis of evidence of a serious threat to the conservation of marine 
biological resources or to the marine ecosystem relating to fishing activities in wa-
ters falling under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of that Member State.465 Where 
emergency measures to be adopted by a member State are liable to affect fishing 
vessels of other Member States, such measures can only be adopted after consult-
ing the Commission, the relevant Member States and the relevant Advisory Coun-
cils.466 
     The 2013 CFP Regulation has further decentralized fisheries competences. It 
allows Member States to adopt conservation measures necessary for compliance 
with obligations under EU environmental legislation, including Article 13(4) of 
Directive 2008/56/EC, Article 4 of Directive 2009/147/EC or Article 6 of Di-
rective 92/43/EEC.467 In cases where other Member States have direct fisheries 
management interests to be affected by such measures, the Commission shall be 
empowered to adopt such measures, upon request, by means of delegated acts.468  
 In specific cases, particularly with regard to the Mediterranean region, Member 
States may be empowered to adopt legally binding acts in the area of the CFP, in-
cluding conservation measures, and to adopt measures specifying an EU conserva-
tion measure that applies to a relevant geographical area.469    
     Moreover, the Commission may be empowered in a multiannual plan to estab-
lish biologically sensitive protected areas, but the Commission needs to report 
regularly to the Parliament and to the Council on protected areas.470 The Commis-
sion may also be empowered in the adoption of delegated acts for implementing 
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international obligations concerning landings into the EU and derogations from 
the landing obligation, as well as the adoption of delegated acts laying down a 
temporary discard plan in case of the absence of a multiannual plan or manage-
ment plan. 471 
     Besides the competences provided by legislation and case law, the different 
fisheries competences between the EU and its Member States can also be found in 
the adoption and implementation of conventions and agreements by the EU and its 
Member States. In the following sections, this specific division of competences 
between the EU and its Member States will be discussed in more detail.  
 
 
 
 
3.2.3 EU and international fisheries law 
 
3.2.3.1 EU’s participation in the UNCLOS  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) provides the basis for international fisheries management and conser-
vation. The Community signed the UNCLOS on 7 December 1984 and became an 
official party to the Convention on 1 April 1998.472 Additionally, all 28 Member 
States of the EU are contracting Parties to the UNCLOS. According to Article 5 
(1) of Annex IX of the UNCLOS, when an international organization formally 
confirms its accession to the UNCLOS, the organization shall make a declaration 
specifying which competence has been transferred to the organization by its mem-
ber States that are Parties to the UNCLOS. Article 4 (2) of Annex IX of the 
UNCLOS states that member States of the international organization shall not ex-
ercise competence that they have transferred to the organization.  
     When the EU signed the UNCLOS, it made a declaration to specify which 
competence had been transferred to it by its Member States.473 On the one hand, 
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EU Member States have transferred competence to the EU with regard to the con-
servation and management of sea fishing resources. The EU has exclusive compe-
tence to adopt the relevant rules and regulations in this respect and enter into ex-
ternal undertakings with third States or competent international organizations. 
Nevertheless, it is for the EU Member States to enforce those rules and regula-
tions. According to the declaration, EU Member States also have exclusive com-
petence in respect of measures concerning the exercise of jurisdiction over vessels, 
flagging and registration of vessels and the enforcement of penal and administra-
tive sanctions. However, the variety of sanctions across Member States encour-
aged illegal operators to operate in waters of the Member States where sanctions 
were lowest.474 In response to this practice the Member States were asked to adopt 
sanctions in their national legislation in proportion to the seriousness of those in-
fringements and taking into account the economic benefit of the infringements, 
with the aim to discourage further offences of the same kind.475 The choice of im-
plementation, by means of administrative sanctions or criminal proceedings, was 
left to the Member States. On the other hand, the EU shares competence with its 
Member States in the field of fisheries when matters are not directly related to the 
conservation and management of sea fishing resources, such as research, techno-
logical development and development cooperation. 
     As to the dispute settlement provided by Article 287 of the UNCLOS, the EU 
initially maintained a “wait and see” attitude towards the ITLOS. The Commission 
even proposed to the Council of Ministers in 1999 to take a decision not to express 
a preference for any of the three dispute settlement procedures provided for in this 
provision.476 Therefore, disputes between the EU and third States that are Party to 
the UNCLOS must be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the procedure 
set down in Annex VII of the UNCLOS.477 Despite the 1999 proposal, the EU was 
positively disposed towards the ITLOS in the 2000 fisheries dispute between the 
EU and Chile.478 The latter requested the ITLOS to constitute an arbitral tribunal 
under Article 287 of the UNCLOS, while the EU agreed that the case should be 
                                                                                                                                     
#European Community Declaration made upon formal confirmation. Accessed 25 
March 2014. 
474 Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993 establishing a 
control system applicable to the common fisheries policy, repealed by Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009; OJ L 261 of 20 October 1993, pp. 1-16. 
475 Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the con-
servation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common 
Fisheries Policy, repealed by Regulation (EU) No 1380/2013 of the Parliament 
and of the Council; OJ L 358 of 31 December 2002, pp. 59-80, Art. 25 
476 Europa (2005) Speech by EU Commissioner Borg on Oceans and the Law 
of the Sea (2 September 2005: Hamburg). http://www.eu-
un.europa.eu/articles/es/article_5001_es.htm. Accessed 10 January 2014. 
477 The UNCLOS, Art. 287 (3). 
478 Europa (2005) Speech by EU Commissioner Borg on Oceans and the Law 
of the Sea (2 September 2005: Hamburg). 
100  
heard by a special Chamber of the ITLOS.  Chile alleged that fishing activities of 
Spanish vessels on the high seas in the Southeast Pacific adjacent to Chile’s 200-
nautical-mile EEZ had infringed Chile’s conservation measures on swordfish (a 
highly migratory species conserved under the framework of the UNCLOS).479 The 
dispute focused on two aspects. One is whether the Community had performed the 
obligations of the UNCLOS, such as cooperation on conservation and manage-
ment of highly migratory species between the high seas fishing State and the 
coastal State and the conservation of living resources on the high seas. The other 
is whether Chile’s unilateral conservation measures had breached these provisions 
and infringed the Community’s freedom of high seas fishing.480 With the involve-
ment of the proceedings before the World Trade Organization (WTO), the ITLOS 
proceedings were suspended because Chile and the EC reached a provisional ar-
rangement concerning the dispute.481 On the one hand, the compromise reveals 
gaps and potential inconsistencies among different aspects of international law.482 
On the other hand, the bilateral negotiation between the EC and Chile also reflects 
the UNCLOS’s spirit that requires the cooperation between coastal States and high 
seas fishing States. 
    As to a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS be-
tween EU Member States, Article 282 of the UNCLOS allows the dispute to be 
submitted to the EU’s dispute settlement procedure in lieu of the procedures pro-
vided for in Part XV of the UNCLOS, which indeed preserves the autonomy of 
the Community legal system.483 The ECJ has declared in Case 459/03 that Ireland 
has failed to fulfil its obligations of sincere cooperation under the European Trea-
                                                          
     479 The UNCLOS, Annex I. 
480 ITLOS (2000) Case concerning the conservation and sustainable exploita-
tion of swordfish stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile/European Un-
ion), Order 2000/3 of 20 December 2000. 
http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=99&L=0%20%255Co%20Opens%20internal%
20link%20in%20current%20window. Accessed 24 October 2013. For more dis-
cussion on the case, see Orellana MA (2002) The swordfish dispute between the 
EU and Chile at the ITLOS and the WTO. Nordic Journal of International Law 71: 
55-81; and Tang Q (2007) New trends in trade-environment conflict seen from the 
swordfish dispute (Chinese). Wuhan University Journal (Philosophy & Social Sci-
ences) 60 (1): 57-63. 
     481 ITLOS (2001) Case concerning the conservation and sustainable exploita-
tion of swordfish stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific Ocean (Chile/European Un-
ion), Order 2001/1 of 15 March 2001. 
http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=99&L=0%20%255Co%20Opens%20internal%
20link%20in%20current%20window. Accessed 24 October 2013. 
482 Orellana (2002), p. 80. 
     483  ECJ (2006) Commission of the European Communities v Ireland, Case 
459/03, Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 30 May 2006. Available via 
CURIA. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-459/03. Ac-
cessed 11 January 2014, para. 132. 
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ties by instituting a dispute-settlement procedure under the UNCLOS on matters 
falling within the EC’s shared competence and that were regulated by EC 
measures to a large extent.484 The Judgment in the Case 459/03 also states, “the 
system for the resolution of disputes set out in the EC Treaty must in principle take 
precedence over that contained in Part XV of the Convention”.485 
The EC has not adopted specific legislation that directly reflects the terminolo-
gy of the UNCLOS, but it has adopted conservation and management measures to 
implement the rights and duties of coastal and flag States codified by the 
UNCLOS. In order to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources 
in a sustainable manner within the jurisdiction of its Member States, the EU estab-
lishes total allowable catches for most significant commercial fish stocks annually 
and permits foreign vessels to fish its surplus through fisheries agreements with 
neighbouring countries. The EU has signed “northern agreements” with Norway, 
Iceland and the Faeroe Islands for shared stocks travelling within their EEZs. In 
order to get fishing rights in other countries EEZs, the EU also signed fisheries 
partnership agreements with several southern partner countries, including Cape 
Verde, Seychelles and Senegal. 
Additionally, States are required by the UNCLOS to cooperate directly or 
through appropriate regional fisheries management organizations and arrange-
ments (RFMOs) to adopt applicable measures to conserve and manage shared 
stocks, straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species.486  
The EU, represented by the Commission, plays an active role in five RFMOs 
that manage highly migratory species, including: 
 the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT),487 
 the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC),488  
                                                          
484 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 30 May 2006, Commission of 
the European Communities v Ireland, Case 459/03, p. 718. 
485 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 30 May 2006, Commission of 
the European Communities v Ireland, Case 459/03, para. 125. 
486 The UNCLOS, Arts. 63 and 64. 
487 The EU is a cooperating non-member of the CCSBT, which was created by 
the Convention of Southern Bluefin Tuna. The Convention was signed in May 
1993 and entered into force on 20 May 1994. CCSBT (1994) Text of the Conven-
tion for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna. 
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/basic_documents/convention.pdf. 
Accessed 24 October 2013. 
488 The IATTC was established by the 1949 Convention for the Establishment 
of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission between the United States of 
America and the Republic of Costa Rica, signed at Washington on 31 May 1949, 
UNTS 1041, p. 3. The 1949 Convention was replaced by the Convention for the 
Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Established by 
the 1949 Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Costa Rica (Antigua Convention), which was signed at Washington on 13 Decem-
ber 2004 and entered into force on 10 October 2008. Available via IATTC. 
102  
 the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT),489  
 the Western and central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC),490 
 the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC).491 
 
The EU also actively takes part in nine RFMOs that manage fish stocks by geo-
graphical area, including: 
 the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR),492  
 the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Pollock Resources in 
the Central Bering Sea (CCBSP),493  
 the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM),494  
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.iattc.org/IATTCdocumentationENG.htm. Accessed 6 March 2014. 
The IATTC is responsible for the conservation and management of tuna and other 
marine resources in the eastern Pacific Ocean. 
489 The ICCAT is responsible for the conservation of tunas and tuna-like spe-
cies in the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas. It was established by the Interna-
tional Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic, which was concluded at Rio 
de Janeiro on 14 May 1966 and entered into force on 21 March 1969, UNTS 673, 
p. 63. 
490 The WCPFC was established by the Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean, which was concluded at Honolulu on 5 September 2000 and entered into 
force on 19 June 2004, UNTS 2275, p. 43. 
491 The IOTC was established by the Agreement for the Establishment of the 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, which was concluded at Rome on 25 November 
1993, UNTS 1927, p. 329. 
492 The CCAMLR was established in 1982 with the objective of conserving 
Antarctic marine life under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Ma-
rine Living Resources, which was concluded at Canberra on 20 May 1980, UNTS 
1329, p. 47. 
     493 The EU is a cooperating non- Party to the CCSBT, which was adopted on 16 
June 1994 and entered into force on 8 December 1995. NOAA Fisheries (2013) 
The Convention on the Conservation and Management of the Pollock Resources 
in the Central Bering Sea. 
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/refm/cbs/convention_description.htm. Accessed 24 Oc-
tober 2013. 
494 The GFCM was established by the Agreement for the Establishment of the 
General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean, which was adopted on 24 
September 1949 and entered into force on 20 February 1952. Amendments to this 
Agreement were approved in 1963, 1976 and 1997. The new obligations came into 
force on 29 April 2004. GFCM (2013) General Fisheries Commission for the 
Mediterranean.  http://www.gfcm.org/gfcm/about/en. Accessed 24 October 2013. 
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 the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC),495 
 the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO),496 
 the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO),497 
 the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO),498 
 the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization 
(SPRFMO),499 and 
 the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA).500  
 
The EU is also a member of two advisory regional fisheries organizations: the 
Western Central Atlantic Fishery Commission (WECAFC) 501  and the Fishery 
Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF).502  
                                                          
495 The NEAFC was established by the Convention on Future Multilateral Co-
operation in the North-East Atlantic Fisheries, which was concluded at London on 
18 November 1980, UNTS 1285, p. 129. 
496 The NASCO was established under the Convention of Salmon in the North 
Atlantic Ocean, which was entered into force on 1 October 1983. NASCO (2013) 
North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization. 
http://www.nasco.int/documents.html. Accessed 24 October 2013. 
497 The NAFO, replaced the International Commission for the Northwest Atlan-
tic Fisheries, was established by the Convention on Future Multilateral Coopera-
tion in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, which was concluded at Ottawa on 24 
October 1978, UNTS 1135, p. 369. 
498 The SEAFO was established under the framework of the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South East Atlantic 
Ocean, which was adopted at Windhoek on 20 April 2001 and entered into force 
on 13 April 2003, UNTS 2221, p. 189. 
499 The SPRFMO was established under the framework of the Convention on 
the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South 
Pacific Ocean, which entered into force on 24 August 2012. SPRFMO (2013) 
About the SPRFMO. http://www.southpacificrfmo.org/about-the-sprfmo/. Ac-
cessed 24 October 2013. 
500 The SIOFA was adopted on 12 June 2006 and entered into force on 21 June 
2012. SIOFA (2013) The Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement – text. 
http://www.siodfa.org/the-sio/the-southern-indian-ocean-fisheries-agreement-
text/. Accessed 24 October 2013. 
501 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture (2013) Western Central Atlantic Fishery 
Commission. http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/wecafc/en. Accessed 24 October 
2013. 
502 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture (2013) Fishery Committee for the Eastern 
Central Atlantic. http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/cecaf/en. Accessed 24 October 
2013. 
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3.2.3.2 EU’s participation in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
 
The Council decided to ratify the United Nations Agreement for the Implementa-
tion of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement) in 
June 1998.503 However, due to the shared competence of the EU and its Member 
States in concluding this Agreement, it is necessary for both the EU and Member 
States simultaneously to become Parties.504 So the ratification was not finished un-
til December 2003. Now all Member States of the EU are Parties to the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement.  
     When ratifying the Agreement, the EU made a declaration concerning the 
competence between the Community and its Member States.505 It confirms that 
EU Member States have transferred competences concerning the conservation and 
management of living marine resources, no matter under national jurisdiction or 
on the high seas, to the EU.506 Although “management” and “conservation” in the 
field of fisheries are usually overlapping, the ECJ judgments in the joined cases 
3/76, 4/76, 6/76 and Case 25/94 explicitly pointed out that the Community has the 
internal power to take measures for the conservation of the biological resources of 
the sea, including the fixing of catch quotas and their allocation between the dif-
ferent Member States.507 Therefore, the utilization of “management” in this con-
text is not unintentional, aiming to broaden the EU’s exclusive competence, which 
can be seen from EU enforcement of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.  
     Because the UN Fish Stocks Agreement mainly concerns flag State duties con-
cerning fishing for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species, the Decla-
                                                          
503 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement was concluded at New York on 4 August 
1995 and entered into force on 11 December 2001, UNTS 2167, p. 88. 
504 Council Decision 98/414/EC of 8 June 1998 on the ratification by the Euro-
pean Community of the Agreement for the implementing of the provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating 
to the conservation and management of straddling stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks; OJ L 189 of 3 July 1998, pp.14-41.  
505  Available via Ocean & Law of the Sea. 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/fish_stocks_agreement_decl
arations.htm#EC. Accessed 25 March 2014. 
506 Agreement on the implementation of the provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the conserva-
tion and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks - 
Declaration concerning the competence of the European Community - Interpreta-
tive declarations; OJ L 189 of 3 July 1998, Annex B, para. 5. 
507 Judgment of the Court of 14 July 1976, Cornelis Kramer and others, Joined 
cases 3/76, 4/76 and 6/76, paras. 30-33. Also see: Judgment of the Court of 19 
March 1996, Commission v Council, Case 25/94, para. 41. 
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ration concerning the competence of the Community for the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement focuses on the division of competence between the Community and its 
Member States for determining flag State duties in this respect. The declaration 
states “the Community enjoys the regulatory competence granted under interna-
tional law to the flag State of a vessel to determine the conservation and manage-
ment measures for marine fisheries resources applicable to vessels flying the flag 
of Member States and to ensure that Member States adopt provisions allowing for 
the implementation of the said measures”.508 This demonstrates that the EU has 
exclusive competence to determine flag State duties as to the conservation and 
management of marine fisheries resources, while Member States can only adopt 
implementing provisions to enforce those measures. The following aspects are 
within the exclusive competence of Member States: the registration of vessels,509 
measures applicable to masters and other officers of fishing vessels, measures 
concerning the exercise of jurisdiction by the flag State over its vessels on the high 
seas, international cooperation for enforcement and the recovery of the control of 
their vessels.510 Additionally, the EU and its Member States share competence on 
requirements of developing States, scientific research, port State measures and 
measures adopted in respect of non-members of RFMOs and non-Parties to the 
Agreement. 511  These aspects within the shared competence of the EU and its 
Member States are mainly not related to flag State duties against IUU fishing. The 
Declaration on the competences of the Community concerning the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement indicates shared competence between the EU and its Member States. 
The following flag State duties provided by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement can be 
considered as within the EU’s exclusive competence: fishing authorization; re-
quirements for marking fishing vessels and fishing gear; requirements for record-
ing and timely reporting of vessel position; catch of target and non-target species; 
fishing effort and other relevant fisheries data; requirements for verifying the 
catch of target and non-target species through such means as observer pro-
grammes, inspection schemes, unloading reports, supervision of transhipment and 
monitoring of landed catches and market statistics; as well as monitoring, control 
and surveillance of such vessels, their fishing operations and related activities. 
Although the Declaration indicated that the EU and its Member States had shared 
competence on port State measures concerning the conservation and management 
of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species, the ratification of the FAO 
Port State Measures Agreement and the adoption of the IUU Regulation made the 
                                                          
508 UN Fish Stocks Agreement - Interpretative declarations; OJ L 189 of 3 July 
1998, Annex B, para. 6. 
509 Judgment of the Court of 19 March 1996, Commission v Council, Case 
25/94, para. 9. 
510 UN Fish Stocks Agreement - Interpretative declarations; OJ L 189 of 3 July 
1998, Annex B, para. 7. 
511 UN Fish Stocks Agreement - Interpretative declarations; OJ L 189 of 3 July 
1998, Annex B, para. 8. 
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EU exclusively competent for adopting port States measures against IUU fish-
ing.512 
In practice, the EU’s competence over these matters is broader than expressed 
in the Declaration concerning the competence of the Community for the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement. As mentioned previously, the EU has concluded many bilateral 
fisheries access agreements to the exclusion of its Member States with non-EU 
countries. Among those agreements, northern agreements aim at conservation and 
management of shared stocks travelling between EEZs. Thus, there is no doubt 
that the EU has exclusive competence over such agreements. The situation of fish-
eries partnership agreements is complicated. For the EU, fisheries partnership 
agreements offer surplus resources and require assistance to developing countries. 
Although requirements of developing countries are considered under shared com-
petence, in practice, the EU has signed all bilateral fisheries agreement to the ex-
clusion of its Member States.  
     Additionally, the EU has partaken, with the exclusion of its Member States, in 
RFMOs except the GFCM and the CCAMLR. The EU shares competence with its 
Member States in the CCAMLR because the CCAMLR concerns not only fisher-
ies conservation but also environmental issues that are belonging to shared compe-
tence.513 The reason why the EU does not have exclusive competence in GFCM 
may be that the Agreement for the Establishment of the General Fisheries Com-
mission for the Mediterranean entered into force before the Treaty of Rome did. 
However, for those RFMOs in which the EU has exclusive competence, they also 
provide some measures that should belong to the exclusive competence of Mem-
ber States of the EU according to the Declaration concerning the competence of 
the Community for the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. For example, NAFO, 
NEAFC, WCPFC and SEAFO all provide international inspection schemes over 
vessels on the high seas.514 At the time of ratifying the UN Fish Stocks Agree-
ment, even though the Community’s competence was limited, it has been broad-
ened in later practice. 
Provisions concerning flag State duties in managing and conserving straddling 
fish stocks and highly migratory species are mainly reflected in following regula-
tion, viz. the 2013 CFP Regulation,515 the Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 
of 20 November 2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring 
compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy, amending Regulations 
(EC) No 847/96, (EC) No 2371/2002, (EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 768/2005, 
(EC) No 2115/2005, (EC) No 2166/2005, (EC) No 388/2006, (EC) No 509/2007, 
(EC) No 676/2007, (EC) No 1098/2007, (EC) No 1300/2008, (EC) No 1342/2008 
and repealing Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1627/94 and (EC) No 
                                                          
512 The EU ratified the UN Fish Stocks Agreement earlier than the FAO Port 
State Measures Agreement and adopted the IUU Regulation later. 
513 Churchill and Owen (2010), p. 360.  
514 Detailed discussion see: Churchill and Owen (2010), pp. 311-312. 
515 The Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 1380/2013, Art. 31(4). 
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1966/2006 (Control Regulation), 516  Council Regulation (EC) 1006/2008 of 29 
September 2008 concerning authorizations for fishing activities of Community 
fishing vessels outside Community waters and the access of third country vessels 
to Community waters (Regulation 1006/2008) 517  and the IUU Regulation, 518 
which will be discussed in following sections. Additionally, in accordance with 
Port State measures required by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the Control 
Regulation requires Member States to inspect vessels in their ports.519  
 
 
 
3.2.3.3 EU’s participation in the FAO Compliance Agreement 
 
Although some matters in the FAO Compliance Agreement lie in the shared com-
petence between the EU and its Member States, the Community has been a Party 
to the agreement to the exclusion of its Member States since 6 August 1996.520 
Why the EU has exclusive competence to conclude this agreement can be found in 
the Judgment of the Case 25/94 between the Commission and the Council.521 The 
Judgement states that the main provisions of the FAO Compliance Agreement lie 
                                                          
     516 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009 of 20 November 2009 establishing 
a Community control system for ensuring compliance with the rules of the com-
mon fisheries policy, amending Regulations (EC) No 847/96, (EC) No 2371/2002, 
(EC) No 811/2004, (EC) No 768/2005, (EC) No 2115/2005, (EC) No 2166/2005, 
(EC) No 388/2006, (EC) No 509/2007, (EC) No 676/2007, (EC) No 1098/2007, 
(EC) No 1300/2008, (EC) No 1342/2008 and repealing Regulations (EEC) No 
2847/93, (EC) No 1627/94 and (EC) No 1966/2006; OJ L 343 of 22 December 
2009, pp. 1-50, Arts. 2, 6-16, 55, 62, 72, 80, 111. 
517 Council Regulation (EC) 1006/2008 of 29 September 2008 concerning au-
thorizations for fishing activities of Community fishing vessels outside Communi-
ty waters and the access of third country vessels to Community water, amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 and (EC) No 1627/94 and repealing Regulation 
(EC) No 3317/94; OJ L 286 of 29 October 2008, pp. 33-44, Arts. 1(a), 3, 11, and 
16. 
     518 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, Arts. 37 (1) and (2), 41-47. 
519 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Arts 18 and 19.  
520 Council Decision 96/428/EC of 25 June 1996 on acceptance by the Commu-
nity of the Agreement to promote compliance with international conservation and 
management measures by fishing vessels on the high seas; OJ L 177 of 16 July 
1996, pp. 24-25. 
521 Judgment of the Court of 19 March 1996, Commission v Council, Case 
25/94. 
108  
in the exclusive competence of the Community, so the Community enjoys exclu-
sive competence to conclude this agreement.522  
     Similar to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the FAO Compliance Agreement al-
so provides flag State duties and port State measures for high seas fishing activi-
ties. According to the requirements of the FAO Compliance Agreement concern-
ing submitting information to the High Seas Vessel Authorization Record 
(HSVAR), twenty two EU Member States have submitted data on vessels author-
ized to operate on the high seas.523 All of the reported vessels of twenty one Mem-
ber States are authorized.  Although the HSVAR is far from a universal implemen-
tation, EU Member States have well implemented the HSVAR. 
 
 
 
3.2.3.4 EU’s participation in the FAO Port State Measures Agreement 
 
The EU played an active role in the development of the FAO Port State Measures 
Agreement. It not only took the lead in signing and approving this Agreement,524 
but also encourages other countries to sign it in order to make the Agreement enter 
into force as soon as possible.  
     The competence of the EU over adopting port State measures has changed 
from shared to exclusive. As discussed above, the Declaration concerning the 
competence of the Community for the UN Fish Stocks Agreement states that the 
Community and its Member States shared competence on port State measures. 
However, the EU has participated in the exclusion of its Member States in several 
RFMOs which have adopted port State measures, for example, the NEAFC and 
ICCAT. Then the EU has exclusive competence in ratifying the FAO Port State 
Measures Agreement, which is specifically concerning port State measures against 
IUU fishing. The trend in the EU’s exclusive competence in adopting port State 
measures has been expanded. 
Although this Agreement has not come into effect, the EU has already adopted 
and implemented comprehensive port State measures in its IUU Regulation.525  In 
                                                          
522 Judgment of the Court of 19 March 1996, Commission v Council, Case 
25/94, para. 40. 
     523 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture (2013) HSVAR: High Seas Vessels Author-
ization Record. http://www.fao.org/fishery/collection/hsvar/2/en#table1. Accessed 
31 October 2013. 
     524The EU signed the FAO Port State Measures Agreement on 22 November 
2009 and approved it on 7 July 2011. Council Decision 2011/443/EU of 20 June 
2011 on the approval, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement on Port 
State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregu-
lated Fishing; OJ L 191 of 22 July 2011, pp. 1-2. 
     525 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, Arts. 4-11, 37 (5) and (6), and 56. 
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this Regulation Member States have exclusive competence in respect of measures 
concerning the enforcement of sanctions.526 
 
 
 
3.2.3.5 EU’s participation in international non-legally binding instru-
ments 
 
Article 1 (4) of the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (Code of 
Conduct)527 and paragraph 6 (a) of the 2001 International Plan of Action to Pre-
vent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-
IUU)528 both refer that the EU can adopt those measures indicated in such instru-
ments as a regional economic integration organization in matters within its compe-
tence. Although the two instruments are soft law, the EU adopted management 
and conservation measures in Community law and policies in accordance with the 
Code of Conduct and the IPOA-IUU. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is overlap-
ping content between the 1995 Code of Conduct, the 1993 FAO Compliance 
Agreement and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement in respect of combating IUU 
fishing. Such measures are also expressed in Community law as mentioned previ-
ously.  Additionally, the EU adopted its own code - the European Code of Sus-
tainable and Responsible Fisheries Practices (European Code). However, the Eu-
ropean Code does not directly implement the Code of Conduct; instead, it “[is 
built] on the framework that the Code of Conduct provides for fisheries authori-
ties [and] refers more relevantly to EU fishing activities and  is fundamentally at 
fishing operators”.529 
     The Community also endorsed the IPOA-IUU and afterwards established its 
Community Action Plan. 530  This Community Action Plan divides measures 
                                                          
526 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, Art. 11 (4). 
527 The Code of Conduct was unanimously adopted by the Conference of the 
FAO in Rome on 31 October 1995. Available via FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM. Accessed on 22 October 
2013. 
528 The IPOA-IUU was adopted by consensus at the 24
th
 Session of Committee 
on Fisheries (COFI) in Rome on 2 March 2001 and endorsed by the 120
th
 Session 
of the FAO Council on 23 June 2001. Available via FAO Fisheries and Aquacul-
ture. http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.HTM. Accessed 22 Octo-
ber 2013. 
     529 EU Book shop (2004) European Code of Sustainable and Responsible Fish-
eries Practices. http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/european-code-of-sustainable-and-
responsible-fisheries-practices-pbKL5703443/. Accessed 4 November 2013, p. 5. 
     530 European Commission (2002) Community action plan for the eradication of 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, (Community Action Plan), Communi-
cation from the Commission, COM(2002) 180 final, Brussels, 2002. 
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against IUU fishing into four categories, including measures taken at the Commu-
nity level, at the RFMOs level, at the international level and in partnership with 
developing countries. In 2007, the Community adopted a strategy for the Commu-
nity to prevent, deter and eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing 
(Community Strategy on IUU Fishing), which mainly focuses on removing the in-
centives and profits of conducting IUU fishing.531 EU’s measures combating IUU 
fishing are mainly reflected in the IUU Regulation which provides port State con-
trol of third States’ fishing vessels, catch certification, IUU vessel listing, identifi-
cation of non-cooperating third countries, and control of nationals and the Com-
munity Alert System. The integration of port State measures into the IUU 
Regulation is also a reflection that the EU complies with the measures of the 2005 
FAO Model Scheme on Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing (FAO Model 
Scheme).532 As discussed in Section 3.2.2.1, the EU has exclusive competence in 
adopting trade-related measures against IUU fishing. However, in cases where the 
importation of fishery products is refused, Member States may confiscate and de-
stroy, dispose of or sell such fishery products in accordance with their national 
law.533  
     The EU is not a member of the UN. Although the UNGA resolutions are not 
legally binding, the EU has adopted some measures according to such resolutions. 
Since 1991, the UNGA Resolution 46/215 has required a global moratorium on 
large-scale pelagic driftnet fishing. From June 1992, no vessel can be allowed to 
keep on board, or use fishing driftnets of more than 2.5 km in the EU waters, with 
the exception of the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the Sound, and for all EU vessels 
outside EU waters.534 Since 1 January 2008 it has been prohibited to keep on board 
or use for fishing any kind of driftnets in the Baltic Sea, the Belts and the 
Sound.535 Moreover, the EU has taken further action than the UNGA Resolution. It 
                                                          
     531 European Commission (2007) Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions – on a new strategy for the Community to pre-
vent, deter and eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing (Community 
Strategy on IUU Fishing). Available via Europa. 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/maritime_affairs_and_fisheries/fisheries_r
esources_and_environment/l66052_en.htm. Accessed 26 February 2014. 
532 The FAO Model Scheme was endorsed by the 26
th
 Session of the FAO 
COFI in Rome in 2005. Available via FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0985t/a0985t00.HTM. Accessed 22 October 
2013. 
533 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, Art. 18 (3). 
534 Council Regulation (EEC) No 345/92 of 27 January 1992 amending for the 
eleventh time Regulation (EEC) No 3094/86 laying down certain technical 
measures for the conservation of fishery resources; OJ L 42 of 18 February 1992, 
pp. 15-23, Art. 1 (8). 
535  Council Regulation (EC) No 2187/2005 of 21 December 2005 for the 
conservation of fishery resources through technical measures in the Baltic Sea, the 
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prohibits all driftnets, no matter their size, when capturing particular species, in-
cluding some tuna, swordfish, sharks since 1 January 2002.536 The Council Regu-
lation (EC) No 809/2007 of 28 June 2007 amending Regulations (EC) No 894/97, 
(EC) No 812/2004 and (EC) No 2187/2005 concerning driftnets, has given a full 
definition of a “driftnet” for the first time.537 The judgments of ECJ Case 556/07 
and Case 479/07 show that the ECJ has taken a wide view of the type of driftnets, 
including driftnets derived fishing gear, such as thonailles.538 
    UNGA resolutions also reiterate the issue of discards as introduced in Chapter 
2.539 The new CFP has introduced a landing obligation to prevent the wasteful 
practice of discarding. In order to allow fishermen to adapt to the change, the land-
ing obligation will be introduced gradually, between 2015 and 2019 for all com-
mercial fisheries (species under TACs, or under minimum sizes) in European wa-
ters.540 
IUU fishing is particularly emphasized in UNGA resolutions. These resolutions 
call upon many measures against IUU fishing. The EU has also actively adopted 
such measures. One issue needs to be mentioned. As the UNGA Resolution 
61/105 requires vessels to cease bottom fishing in areas where vulnerable marine 
ecosystems are encountered, the EU adopted Council Regulation No 734/2008 for 
the protection of vulnerable marine ecosystems in the high seas from the adverse 
impacts of bottom fishing gears in 2008.541 The Regulation stipulates the condi-
tions under which Community fishing vessels can obtain special fishing permits to 
                                                                                                                                     
Belts and the Sound, amending Regulation (EC) No 1434/98 and repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 88/98; OJ L 349 of 31 December 2005, pp. 1-23, Art. 9. 
536 Council Regulation (EC) No 1239/98 of 8 June 1998 amending Regulation 
(EC) No 894/97 laying down certain technical measures for the conservation of 
fishery resources; OJ L 171 of 17 June 1998, pp. 1-4, Art. 1. 
537 Council Regulation (EC) No 809/2007 of 28 June 2007 amending Regula-
tion (EC) No 894/97, (EC) No 812/2004 and (EC) No 2187/2005 as concerns 
driftnets; OJ L 182 of 12 July 2007, pp. 1-2, Art. 1. Caddell R (2010) Caught in 
the net: driftnet fishing restrictions and the European Court of Justice. Journal of 
Environmental Law 22 (2), p. 309. 
     538 ECJ (2009) French Republic v Council of the European Union, Case 479/07, 
Judgment of the Court (Third Chamber) of 5 March 2009. Available via CURIA. 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62007CJ0479&lang1=en&type=NOT
&ancre=. Accessed 14 January 2014. 
539  See UNGA Resolutions 49/118, 50/25, 51/36, 52/29, 53/33, 55/8 and 
57/142. 
540  European Commission Fisheries (2014) Discarding and the landing 
obligation. http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/discards/index_en.htm. 
Accessed 27 March 2014. 
541 Council Regulation (EC) No 734/2008 of 15 July 2008 on the protection of 
vulnerable marine ecosystems in the high seas from the adverse impacts of bottom 
fishing gears; OJ L 201 of 30 July 2008, pp. 8-13. 
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carry out fishing activities with bottom gears in the high seas.542 It also provides 
that actions may be taken when encountering an unforeseen vulnerable marine 
ecosystem.543 In addition, the Regulation pays attention to the determination of ar-
ea closures, Vessel Monitoring Systems, serious infringements as well as arrang-
ing observers on board.544 
 
 
 
3.2.4 The internal legal acts 
 
As discussed previously, the EU has exclusive competence in concluding most in-
ternational fisheries agreements, so studying the EU’s internal legal acts is the best 
way to know what measures the EU and its Member States have taken to combat 
IUU fishing.  
There are three categories of internal legal sources on fisheries under the EU’s 
legal framework, including provisions in primary law, secondary fisheries laws 
and case law referring to fisheries.545 This section mainly introduces the categories 
of EU’s secondary fisheries laws, including regulations, directives, decisions, rec-
ommendations and opinions. According to Article 288 of the TFEU,  
 
   “A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety 
and directly applicable in all Member States.  
   A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member 
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice 
of form and methods.  
   A decision shall be binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to 
whom it is addressed shall be binding only on them. 
   Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.” 
 
   Most legal acts in the field of fisheries are adopted in the form of regulations. 
Therefore, in fighting against IUU fishing, most of the EU legal acts are binding in 
their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. The European fisheries 
law against IUU fishing is within the framework of the CFP and is based on the 
2013 CFP Regulation, the IUU Regulation, Council Regulation 1006/2008, the 
Control Regulation and implementing regulations. 
 
 
                                                          
542 Council Regulation (EC) No 734/2008, Art. 3. 
543 Council Regulation (EC) No 734/2008, Art. 7. 
544 Council Regulation (EC) No 734/2008, Arts. 8-11. 
545 Liu X (2007) A case review of France being fined for violating EU fishery 
law (in Chinese). Journal of Ocean University of China (Social Science Edition) 3, 
p. 45. 
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3.2.4.1 2013 CFP Regulation 
 
The 2013 CFP Regulation codifies the framework of the EU’s fisheries manage-
ment and conservation system, which was first adopted in 1983, reformed in 1992, 
2002 and 2013 respectively. The 2013 CFP Regulation applied in the EU waters 
from 1st January 2014 on. The Regulation applies to activities carried out “on the 
territory of Member States to which the Treaty applies” or in the EU waters or by 
EU fishing vessels outside EU waters or by nationals of Member States.546 There-
fore, provisions in this Regulation mainly focus on the internal fisheries conserva-
tion and management by the EU. A major progress of the 2013 CFP Regulation is 
the adoption of measures to avoid and minimize unwanted catches and the landing 
obligation of these catches.547 
The 2013 CFP Regulation explicitly indicates that fighting against IUU fishing 
activities constitutes an effective system of control, inspection and enforcement, 
which ensures compliance with the rules of the CFP.548 Therefore, the 2013 CFP 
Regulation made progress in not only internal EU fisheries policy but also in the 
external EU fisheries policy. In particular, the EU shall ensure that EU fishing ac-
tivities outside EU waters are based on the same principles and standards as those 
applicable under EU law, which shows that the EU aims to take responsibility in 
foreign waters.549 The 2013 CFP Regulation further points out that the EU shall 
promote and support action necessary to eradicate IUU fishing in all international 
spheres, through supporting and contributing to the activities of international or-
ganizations dealing with fisheries, including RFMOs, as well as cooperating with 
third countries. 550  With regard to sustainable fisheries partnership agreements, 
which have not been implemented sustainably before, the 2013 CFP Regulation 
particularly imposes restrictions on fishing authorization when an EU fishing fleet 
registers to a State recognized under EU law as a non-cooperating State concern-
ing combating IUU fishing or as a State allowing for non-sustainable exploitation 
of living marine resources.551 In this case, the fishing authorization can only be 
granted if it is established that the vessel’s fishing operations ceased and the own-
er took immediate action to remove the vessel from the register of that State.552  
                                                          
546 The 2013 CFP Regulation, Art. 1 (2). According to Article 4 (1) of the 2013 
CFP Regulation, Union waters means “the waters under the sovereignty or juris-
diction of the Member States, with the exception of waters adjacent to the territo-
ries listed in Annex II to the Treaty”. 
547 The Parliament and Council Regulation No 1380/2013, Arts. 2(5)(a), 14 and 
15. 
548 The Parliament and Council Regulation No 1380/2013, para. 59. 
549 The Parliament and Council Regulation No 1380/2013, Art. 28(2)(d). 
550 The Parliament and Council Regulation No 1380/2013, Arts. 28(2)(e), 29(1) 
and 30. 
551 The Parliament and Council Regulation No 1380/2013, Art. 31(9). 
552 The Parliament and Council Regulation No 1380/2013, Art. 31(9). 
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3.2.4.2 IUU regulation and its implementing regulations 
 
The Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008, establishing a 
Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregu-
lated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and 
(EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 
1447/1999 (IUU Regulation) 553 is a significant outcome of the EU in combating 
IUU fishing. The policies of this regulation can be traced back to the 2002 Com-
munity Action Plan,554 which consistently transformed the provisions of the IPOA-
IUU, and ideas of the 2007 Community Strategy for IUU Fishing. The IUU Regu-
lation entered into force on 1 January 2010, which is a breakthrough of EU law.  
The IUU Regulation applies to “all IUU fishing and associated activities car-
ried out within the territory of Member States to which the Treaty applies, within 
Community waters, within maritime waters under the jurisdiction or sovereignty 
of third countries and on the high seas”.555 Unlike the Control Regulation, the IUU 
Regulation can apply to IUU fishing and associated activities conducted by fishing 
vessels flying the flag of a third country outside the territories of EU Member 
States and the Community waters. The main difference is that the Control Regula-
tion focuses on controlling fisheries activities in the Community waters or con-
ducting by Community fishing vessels or nationals of Member States; while, the 
IUU Regulation also pays attention to combat IUU fishing activities outside the 
Community. Around two thirds of the fish consumed in the EU comes from im-
portation and half of this is wild fish.556 Therefore, the EU intends to combat IUU 
fishing activities outside the Community through prohibiting IUU fishing products 
from entering the Community market. Specifically, this is deemed to be achieved 
through the monitoring, control and surveillance of all landings and transhipments 
of EU and third country fishing vessels in EU ports and all trade of marine fisher-
ies products to and from the EU. 
This Regulation adopts the definitions of IUU fishing defined by the IPOA-
IUU.557 It further specifies conditions for fishing vessels engaged in IUU fishing, 
including the infringements of fishing authorization, records, reporting, closed ar-
eas, closed seasons, prohibited stocks, fishing gear, markings, identification, regis-
tration and other management and conservation measures.558  
In order to implement the IUU Regulation, the Commission adopted Commis-
sion Regulation (EC) No 1010/2009 of 22 October 2009 laying down detailed 
                                                          
553 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, pp. 1-36. 
554 European Commission (2002) Community action plan for the eradication of 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, (Community Action Plan). 
555 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, Art. 1 (3). 
556 Europa (2013) Intervention in the European Parliament plenary session on 
Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) fishing. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_SPEECH-13-519_en.htm. Accessed 29 November 2013. 
557 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, Art. 2 (2)-(4). 
558 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, Art. 3. 
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rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establish-
ing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing, 559  which lies down detailed rules to implement the IUU 
Regulation, and other detailed implementing regulations and decisions. 560 
                                                          
     559 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1010/2009 of 22 October 2009 laying 
down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate ille-
gal, unreported and unregulated fishing; OJ L 280 of 27 October 2009, pp. 5-41. 
560 EU implementing regulations and decisions on combating IUU fishing in-
clude, viz. Council Implementing Decision 2014/170/EU of 24 March 2014 estab-
lishing a list of non-cooperating third countries in fighting IUU fishing pursuant to 
Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter 
and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, OJ L 91 of 27 March 
2014, pp. 43-47; Commission Decision 2013/C 346/03 of 26 November 2013 on 
notifying the third countries that the Commission considers as possible of being 
identified as non-cooperating third countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1005/2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate il-
legal, unreported and unregulated fishing, OJ C 346 of 27 November 2013, pp. 26-
49; Commission Implementing Decision 2013/C 346/02 of 26 November 2013 
identifying the third countries that the Commission considers as non-cooperating 
third countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a 
Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregu-
lated fishing, OJ C 346 of 27 November 2013, pp. 2-25; Commission Decision 
2012/C 354/01 of 15 November 2012 on notifying the third countries that the 
Commission considers as possible of being identified as non-cooperating third 
countries pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 establishing a 
Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregu-
lated fishing, OJ C 354 of 17 November 2012, pp. 1- 47; Commission Implement-
ing Regulation (EU) No 137/2014 of 12 February 2014 amending Regulation 
(EU) No 468/2010 establishing the EU list of vessels engaged in illegal, unreport-
ed and unregulated fishing, OJ L 43 of 13 February 2014, pp. 47-54; Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 672/2013 of 15 July 2013 amending Regula-
tion (EU) No 468/2010 establishing the EU list of vessels engaged in illegal, unre-
ported and unregulated fishing, OJ L 193 of 16 July 2013, pp. 6-11; Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1234/2012 of 19 December 2012 amending 
Regulation (EU) No 468/2010 establishing the EU list of vessels engaged in ille-
gal, unreported and unregulated fishing, L 350 of 20 December 2012, pp. 38-43; 
Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 724/2011 of 25 July 2011 amend-
ing Regulation (EU) No 468/2010 establishing the EU list of vessels engaged in il-
legal, unreported and unregulated fishing, OJ L 194 of 26 July 2011, pp. 14-18; 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 468/2010 of 28 May 2010 establishing the EU 
list of vessels engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, OJ L 131 of 
29 May 2010, pp. 22-26; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 
116  
3.2.4.3 Council Regulation 1006/2008 
 
The Council Regulation No 1006/2008 foresees fishing authorization in two spe-
cific situations: one is authorization for fishing activities of Community fishing 
vessels outside Community waters; the other is authorization for fishing activities 
of third country vessels in Community waters. This Regulation provides flag State 
duties and coastal State rights of Member States through specifying the criteria of 
issuing fishing licenses and fishing authorization, control of catches and fishing 
effort, closure of fisheries and the suspension of fishing authorization.561 Further 
allocation of fishing opportunities is provided by annual regulations in this re-
spect, such as the Council Regulation 40/2013.562  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     
865/2013 of 9 September 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 1010/2009 as re-
gards administrative arrangements with third countries on catch certificates for 
marine fisheries products, OJ L 241 of 10 September 2013, pp. 1-3; Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 336/2013 of 12 April 2013 amending Regula-
tion (EC) No 1010/2009 as regards administrative arrangements with third coun-
tries on catch certificates for marine fisheries products, OJ L 105 of 13 April 2013, 
pp. 4-6; Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1222/2011 of 28 No-
vember 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1010/2009 as regards administrative 
arrangements with third countries on catch certificates for marine fisheries prod-
ucts, OJ L 314 of 29 November 2011, pp. 2-11; Commission Regulation (EU) No 
395/2010 of 7 May 2010 amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 1010/2009 
as regards administrative arrangements on catch certificates, OJ L 115 of 8 May 
2010, pp. 1-22; Commission Regulation (EU) No 86/2010 of 29 January 2010 
amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 as regards the defi-
nition of fishery products and amending Commission Regulation (EC) No 
1010/2009 as regards exchange of information on inspections of third country ves-
sels and administrative arrangements on catch certificates, OJ L 26 of 30 January 
2010, pp. 1-16; Commission Regulation (EU) No 202/2011 of 1 March 2011 
amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 as regards the defi-
nition of fishery products and amending Regulation (EC) No 1010/2009 as regards 
prior notification templates, benchmarks for port inspections and recognized catch 
documentation schemes adopted by regional fisheries management organizations, 
OJ L 57 of 2 March 2011, pp. 10-18. 
561 Council Regulation (EC) No 1006/2008, Arts. 5, 14-16, 20-24. 
562 Council Regulation (EU) No 40/2013 of 21 January 2013 fixing for 2013 the 
fishing opportunities available in EU waters and, to EU vessels, in certain non-EU 
waters for certain fish stocks and groups of fish stocks which are subject to inter-
national negotiations or agreements; OJ L 23 of 25 January 2013, pp. 54-153. 
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3.2.4.4 Control Regulation and its implementing regulation 
 
In 2009, a new Control Regulation was adopted to apply to all fishing and fishing 
related activities on the territory of Member States or in Community waters or to 
activities of Community fishing vessels, as well as to nationals of Member States 
outside Community waters.563 It is complementary to the IUU Regulation and to 
the Council Regulation No 1006/2008 to form a control system. The Control Reg-
ulation specifies the issuing of fishing license and authorization,564 marking of 
fishing vessels and gears,565 Vessel Monitoring Systems,566 Automatic Identifica-
tion System,567 Vessel Detection System,568 submitting fishing logbook,569 prior 
notification of landing,570 completing transhipment declarations and landing decla-
rations,571 transhipment and landing in Member States’ port,572 control of market-
ing,573 surveillance,574 inspection and proceedings,575 enforcement,576 and measures 
to ensure compliance by Member States with CFP objectives.577 In this Regula-
tion, port Member State duties are incorporated in the duties of coastal Member 
States. Under many control schemes, cooperation between flag Member States and 
coastal Member States are emphasized.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
563 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Art. 2. 
564 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Arts. 6 (3), (4) and 7 (4). 
565 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 404/2011 of 8 April 2011 
laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1224/2009 establishing a Community control system for ensuring compliance with 
the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy; OJ L 112 of 30 April 2011, pp. 1-153, 
Arts. 6-17. 
566 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Art. 9. 
567 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Art. 10. 
568 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Art. 11. 
569 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Arts. 14-16. 
570 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Arts. 17-18. 
571 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Arts. 20-25. 
572 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Arts. 42-43. 
573 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Arts. 56-70. 
574 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Arts. 71-73. 
575 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Arts. 74-88. 
576 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Arts. 89-93. 
577 Council Regulation (EC) No 1224/2009, Arts. 103-108. 
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3.2.4.5 Balance between internal and external effects 
 
The EU’s State measures are in accordance with the international fisheries instru-
ments. The IUU Regulation mainly represents the external impacts of the CFP; 
while the Council Regulation No 1006/2008 and the Control Regulation comple-
ments the internal impacts of the CFP in combating IUU fishing. The Council 
Regulation No 1006/2008 and the Control Regulation both apply to fishing activi-
ties conducted on the territory of Member States or in Community waters or by 
Community fishing vessels as well as by nationals of Member States. The Control 
Regulation mainly provide the duties of Member States as flag, coastal, port and 
market States against non-compliance of Community fishing vessels, Member 
States and other non-compliant fishing activities under the CFP.  
On the other hand, the IUU Regulation pays more attention to port State 
measures and trade-market measures against third countries fishing vessels and 
fisheries products; as well as, the control of nationals of the EU also partly lies 
within the IUU Regulation. Therefore, the IUU Regulation pays less attention to 
the flag Member States control over their fishing vessels, port State measures con-
cerning Member States flagged fishing vessels as well as trade-market measures 
for internal fish trade.  
Only when the EU take sufficient measures to deal with the internal IUU fish-
ing issue, the EU’s endeavour to combat IUU fishing conducted by fishing vessels 
of third countries can be recognized at the international level. Therefore, the bal-
ance between internal and external effects of the EU fisheries law is significant to 
the success of the EU’s endeavour in this respect.  
 
 
 
3.2.5 Concluding remarks 
 
The EU’s decision-making emphasizes the balance of power among decision-
making institutions. In the field of fisheries, the Commission exclusively initiates 
legislative and policy proposals, while most fisheries legislation needs an agree-
ment between the Council and the Parliament. However, the need of an agreement 
between the Council and the Parliament has resulted in the delay of the recent re-
formed CFP. 
The TFEU confers exclusive competence in decision-making to the EU in the 
area of conservation of marine biological resources under the CFP. Although the 
TFEU does not define the scope of “conservation”, it can be inferred from the 
judgments of the ECJ, as well as the external and internal effect of the CFP, that 
“conservation” has been applied in a broader scope. The EU has exclusive compe-
tence to fix catch quotas and to allocate them between the Member States. As to 
flag State duties, most of the provisions in the FAO Compliance Agreement, in-
cluding fishing authorizations, belong to the EU exclusive competence. The ratifi-
cation of the FAO Port State Measures Agreement and the adoption of the IUU 
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Regulation made the EU exclusive competent for adopting port State measures 
against IUU fishing. The endorsement of the IPOA-IUU and the adoption of trade-
related measures against IUU fishing in the IUU Regulation also make the EU ex-
clusive competent in this respect. On the other hand, flagging and registration of 
vessels, measures concerning the exercise of jurisdiction over vessels, measures 
applicable to masters and other officers of fishing vessels, international enforce-
ment cooperation, the recovery of the control of their vessels and the enforcement 
of penal and administrative sanctions lie within the Member States’ exclusive 
competence. Additionally, the EU and its Member States share competence on re-
quirements for developing States, scientific research and measures adopted in re-
spect of non-members of RFMOs and non-Parties to the UN Fish Stocks Agree-
ment. At regional level, the EU has concluded many bilateral fisheries agreements 
to the exclusion of its Member States with non-EU countries. In addition, the EU 
has also partaken, with the exclusion of its Member States, in many RFMOs. 
However, the recent adoption of the 2013 CFP Regulation shows a decentralising 
trend of decision-making. Member States are empowered to adopt conservation 
measures under certain conditions. 
The Commission, in particular DG MARE, is responsible for the implementa-
tion of the CFP. Together with the ECJ, the Commission also ensures Member 
States to comply with fisheries legislation adopted by the EU. 
    The EU has actively adopted management and conservation measures in Com-
munity law and policies in accordance with all major international fisheries in-
struments, including legally binding and non-legally binding instruments. It also 
actively participates in regional fisheries management and conservation organiza-
tions and arrangements. Because the EU’s fish market mainly relies on the import, 
the EU plays an active role in prohibiting IUU fishing products entering the EU 
market. At the Community level, the EU particularly adopted the IUU Regulation, 
the Council Regulation No 1006/2008and the Control Regulation within the 
framework of the CFP.  
 
 
 
3.3 Internal implementation of the CFP 
 
The CFP has authorized the EU to regulate fisheries in Member States’ EEZs, 
which has promoted a closer cooperation between the EU Member States in the 
field of fisheries and alleviated IUU fishing in the EU’s water. According to the 
2013 CFP Regulation, existing CFP rules that restrict access to resources within 
the 12 nautical mile zones of Member States have operated satisfactorily.578 The 
2013 CFP Regulation also addresses IUU fishing conducted by EU fishing vessels 
                                                          
578 The Parliament and Council Regulation No 1380/2013, para. 19. 
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outside EU. Therefore, the following discussion mainly focuses on the EU’s re-
sponsibility outside EU waters. 
 
 
 
3.3.1 Implementation in the EU’s major fishing area 
 
According to the data of Eurostat, from 1995 to 2011, the catch of the EU-27 de-
creased by 43 per cent even with the enlargement of the EU.579 This is mainly be-
cause of the decline of fishing vessels, in particular in gross tonnage and engine 
power.580 In fact, the EU’s fish market relies on imports more than fishing by EU 
fishing vessels. In order to conserve fisheries resources within the Community wa-
ters, the EU allocates fewer quotas to third countries now. The most important 
fishing areas for the EU are Area 27 (Northeast Atlantic), Area 34 (Eastern and 
Central Atlantic) and Area 37 (Mediterranean and Black Sea), accounting for 
around three quarters of all catches.581 Therefore, this part mainly focuses on the 
flag State duties of EU fishing vessels in those areas. 
    It should be pointed out that the three areas are all located in the regulatory area 
of the ICCAT of which the measures against IUU fishing have been discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
579 European Commission Eurostat (2012) Agriculture, fishery and forestry sta-
tistics – main results – 2010-11. Publications Office of the European Union, Lux-
embourg, pp. 153-157. 
580 European Commission Eurostat (2012) Agriculture, fishery and forestry sta-
tistics – main results – 2010-11, p. 162. 
581 European Commission Eurostat (2012) Agriculture, fishery and forestry sta-
tistics – main results – 2010-11,  p. 153. 
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Figure 3.1 FAO major fishing areas 
 
 
 
 
FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture (2003) FAO major fishing areas. 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/area/search/en.  
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3.3.1.1 In Area 27 
 
 
Figure 3.2 FAO fishing area 27 
 
 
 
 
 
FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture (2013) FAO major fishing areas – Atlantic, Northeast (Major Fishing 
Area 27). http://www.fao.org/fishery/area/Area27/en 
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Among the three fishing areas, catches from Area 27 account for the most. Figure 
3.2 shows that the NEAFC regulatory area, the waters of Iceland, Norway, Green-
land and Russia, and the waters of the EU Member States are located in this area. 
The EU has signed fisheries agreements with Norway, Iceland and the Faeroe Is-
lands to exchange fisheries resources. On the one hand, through the annual ar-
rangements, the EU allocates quotas of certain species within the jurisdiction of its 
Member States and issues fishing authorizations to third countries. On the other 
hand, the EU gets quotas and fishing authorizations from third countries RFMOs 
and allocates the quotas to its Member States. Therefore, the major flag and 
coastal State duty in this Area is fishing authorization. The fisheries agreements 
with Norway and Iceland are lasting for 34 and 21 years respectively. It can be 
seen that the EU and the northern countries both satisfy the fisheries cooperation. 
The agreement with Norway is the most significant one among northern agree-
ments. Norway has closely cooperated with the EU in combating IUU fishing. 
However, such cooperation mainly pays attention to port and trade measures ra-
ther than flag and coastal State measures. For example, the arrangement for 2008 
between the EU and Norway emphasized the necessity of strengthening the com-
bat of IUU fishing and the significance of port State measures.582 Additionally, the 
EU and Norway have signed an agreement formalizing the Norwegian implemen-
tation of the catch certificate requirement of the IUU Regulation, allowing a new 
and simplified Norwegian catch certificate for all Norwegian landings and export 
shipments to the EU.583 This agreement encourages Norway to require a catch cer-
tificate for landings and imports to Norway of catches taken by fishing vessels fly-
ing the flag of a Member State of the EU. However, the catch certificate require-
ment for imports into Norway has not been implemented yet.584  
Additionally, the EU has also signed a new Protocol to the fisheries partnership 
agreement with Greenland for the period from 1 January 2013 to 31 December 
2015. This is the only fisheries partnership agreement the EU has signed with 
northern countries. Like other partnership agreements, the EU gives financial and 
technical support in exchange for fishing opportunities in the waters off Green-
land. 
Except for signing bilateral fisheries agreements, countries including the EU in 
this area also join the NEAFC to manage and conserve fisheries resources beyond 
                                                          
582 European Commission Fisheries (2012) Bilateral agreements with countries 
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583 Agreed record between the EU and Norway on implementation of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, signed 3 September 2009, entered into force 1 
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their jurisdictions. The major measures taken by the NEAFC against IUU fishing 
are NEAFC A and B lists as well as port State control. The NEAFC A and B lists 
are used for identifying non-contracting parties' fishing vessels engaged in IUU 
fishing in the Convention Area. When such a vessel is identified, it will be imme-
diately put on the A list, which is a provisional list. A vessel on the A-list entering 
a port will not be authorized to land or tranship and will be thoroughly inspect-
ed.585 If the flag State cannot provide satisfactory explanations or information after 
requesting, the vessel will be put on the confirmed B list and will not be author-
ized to enter into port or fish in waters under the jurisdiction of contracting parties 
of the NEAFC.586 Non-contracting parties’ vessels authorized to engage in fishing 
activities within waters under national jurisdiction should not be contained in the 
NEAFC A and B lists. For example, the EU identified the vessels “Franziska” and 
“Enterprise” as non-contracting parties' vessels in July 2011 because such vessels 
were flying the flag of Peru. However, the two vessels were finally removed from 
the A list because they had been authorized by a Contracting Party to operate 
within its jurisdiction.587 Obviously, vessels of contracting parties involved in IUU 
fishing should not be contained in the NEAFC A and B lists. Due to the NEAFC 
and NAFO port State control and the close cooperation between NEAFC contract-
ing parties, there are very few IUU activities in the North Atlantic ocean.588 
As to high seas bottom fisheries, the North Atlantic is an area where such fisher-
ies are the largest in the world as measured by volume of catch.589 In 2006 over 
one third of fishing vessels engaged in high seas bottom fisheries were flagged to 
the EU Member States and the EU fleet took one-half or more of the total high 
seas catch, mostly through bottom trawling.590 The EU fleet is responsible for ap-
proximately 80 per cent of the catch in high seas bottom fisheries in the Northwest 
Atlantic and 95 per cent of the catch in the Northeast Atlantic.591 The Parliament 
agreed on 10 December 2013 to several deep-sea conservation measures but nar-
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rowly rejected elimination of deep-sea bottom trawling in the Northeast Atlan-
tic. 592  Although 20 Parliament members declared they has mistakenly voted 
against the ban and corrected their votes, European parliamentary procedures do 
not allow the result of the vote to be changed.593 Instead, the Parliament adopted 
the following measures: strengthening the scientific basis for setting fishing quo-
tas, reducing bycatch of deep-sea species, protecting vulnerable deep-sea marine 
ecosystems by requiring prior environmental impact assessments, and establishing 
areas closed to bottom fishing where such ecosystems are known or are likely to 
exist.594 The measures adopted can limit both unregulated fishing in the Northeast 
Atlantic and the harm of deep-sea bottom fisheries if they are effectively imple-
mented.  
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3.3.1.2 In Area 34 
 
 
Figure 3.3 FAO fishing area 34 
 
 
 
FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture (2001) FAO major fishing areas – Atlantic, Eastern Central (Major 
Fishing Area 34). http://www.fao.org/fishery/area/Area34/en 
 
 
The Area 34 covers Eastern Central Atlantic and the coastal waters of certain 
western and northern African countries and regions from Morocco to the Republic 
of the Congo. Area 34 is estimated to have suffered the highest levels of IUU fish-
ing in the world, representing up to 37 per cent of the regions’ catch.595  
In this Area, the EU has fisheries partnership agreements with Cape Verde, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Morocco, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, 
Gabon and Equatorial Guinea. Protocols agreed by parties of agreements set out 
specific fishing opportunities and financial contributions for a period of time. 
However, there is no new protocol between the EU and those countries, except 
with Cape Verde and Côte d'Ivoire. Guinea has even withdrawn from the agree-
ment and protocol with the EU. Therefore, the implementation of partnership 
                                                          
595 EJF (2012) Pirate fishing exposed: the fight against illegal fishing in West 
Africa and the EU. EJF, London, p. 4. 
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agreements in the Area 34 cannot satisfy either the EU or West African countries, 
which mainly is caused by the following reasons. 
Fisheries partnership agreements between the EU and West African countries 
are not sufficiently equal. Since the reformed CFP in 2002, the EU has renegotiat-
ed almost all of its fisheries agreements with the purpose of sustainable fishing in 
third countries’ EEZs and providing financial contributions to promote sustainable 
development of fisheries in the partner countries.596 Although those agreements 
only provide rights and obligations for both parties and contain some specific du-
ties for the EU, they do not establish a system of responsibility for possible viola-
tions.597 In this case, the general rules of international law governing the flag State 
responsibility for its vessels apply in the EEZ of a coastal State.598 Therefore, it is 
believed that most agreements are still disadvantageous to coastal States. Taking 
the agreement between the EU and Cape Verde as an example, the price the EU 
paid for fish is at 40 per cent below market value.599 Additionally, in cases where 
an EU longliner fishes more than it should, the price merely increases by 65 Euros 
per ton, which indeed encourages operators to overfish.600 Unfortunately, poor and 
developing States cannot easily refuse the agreements with the superpowers due to 
the financial incentives.601  
West African coastal States lack capacity to combat IUU fishing. First, although 
the UNCLOS authorizes coastal States to board, inspect, arrest and take judicial 
proceedings to ensure the compliance with their national laws and regulation, 
many West African countries lack the capability to monitor vast marine areas at 
sea. In the case of Cape Verde, a couple of boats have to monitor an area of at 
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least 734,265 km2.602 Although the agreement between Cape Verde and the EU 
particularly contains provisions referring to regional oversight, especially the ob-
server regime, the surveillance of fisheries activities in the EEZ of Cape Verde 
remains inadequate.603 Second, many of those countries allow transhipment at sea, 
for instance Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Gabon. 
Without port inspection, transhipment at sea facilitates the laundering of IUU 
catches because the authorities of coastal and flag States are not capable of moni-
toring how, by whom and where transferred fish were caught.604 Third, the lack of 
port inspection by West African countries also facilitates the use of port services 
by IUU catches and the access of markets. Last but not least, in the West African 
waters, cooperative fisheries enforcement has been limited and inconsistent.605  
    The control of the EU over fishing vessels flying the flag of its Member States 
is imperative. In cases where vessels fail to comply with the laws and regulations 
of a coastal State, the flag Member State of the EU must take effective measures 
to prosecute and impose sanctions on vessels that are engaged in illegal fishing ac-
tivities.606 In fact, as discussed in Chapter 2, flag State duties are very weak if they 
are not accompanied by other State measures, especially under conditions that the 
coastal State concerned has not taken sufficient and active State actions. It is not 
uncommon that the EU Member States take insufficient flag State duties in Area 
34, unlike in Areas 27 and 37 where EU Member States' waters are. It is revealed 
that the EU has been paying subsidies to the fishing companies based in its Mem-
ber States that have been fishing illegally in African waters.607 Therefore, the Par-
liament calls upon the Commission to amend the requirements for any financial 
support.608 In addition, the EU has recently started to pay attention to fight against 
illegal fishing in West Africa mainly through port and trade-market measures, 
which is discussed in following sections. 
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Additionally, bargaining collectively by West African States with the EU has 
been recommended in recent years. States along the West African coast share 
many common problems and interests. Therefore, bargaining collectively can “en-
sure that countries share the same long-term goals regarding coastal community 
cooperation and assistance, compensation, marine protection, and sustainable uti-
lization of living resources within the EEZ”.609 One option is to negotiate together 
their fisheries partnership agreements with the EU, while there might be heavy 
administrative work.610  An alternative option is to negotiate together through a 
particular organization, either establishing a new organization or through the exist-
ing regional fisheries body – Sub-regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC).611 The 
SRFC is the major regional fisheries organization that is established to harmonize 
the fishing conservation and exploitation of fisheries resources among coastal 
States in West Africa. Members of the SRFC include Cape Verde, Gambia, Guin-
ea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone.612 However, it is doubt-
ful whether the States are reluctant to abandon part of their national sovereignty to 
such a body. 613  If the second solution is acceptable, more funding obtained from 
such fisheries partnership agreements should be directed to such organization for 
the purpose of improving monitoring and enforcement.614 
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3.3.1.3 In Area 37 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Fishing Area 37 
 
 
 
FAO (2001) GFCM report of the fourth session of the scientific advisory committee. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/003/y1333e.htm. Accessed 7 June 2001 
 
 
The Area 37, which covers the waters of the Mediterranean and Black Sea, 
coincides with the regulatory area of the GFCM which most coastal States in this 
area have joined. In addition, the EU and Japan are also contracting to the GFCM. 
The EU takes an active role in the fight against IUU in this area. For example, the 
Commission funded the Joint GFCM-BSC Workshop on IUU Fishing in the Black 
Sea in Istanbul in February 2013. On the other hand, the CFP of the EU has 
provided financial incentives that contribute to overfishing and increased IUU 
fishing by EU Member States and the Mediterranean regional partners. 615 The 
GFCM has adopted several recommendations to implement measures against IUU 
fishing, concerning port State measures, the list of IUU fishing vessels, the 
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minimum standards for the establishment of a Vessel Monitoring System and the 
identification of non-compliance.616  
In 2008 Bulgaria and Romania became Member States of the EU. The CFP and 
its relevant regulations, particularly the IUU Regulation, the Control Regulation 
and the Council Regulation 1006/2008, apply to the Black Sea through those 
countries. Since then, they have been fishing sprat and turbot under a quota 
system.617 According to the 2013 final report of the joint GFCM BSC workshop 
on IUU fishing in the Black Sea, IUU fishing happens frequently in Bulgarian 
waters. In 2012, 254 infringements were reported. So Bulgaria has developed and 
implemented three information systems according to the EU Regulations, 
including an Information Statistical system, a Vessel Monitoring System and a 
Fishing Fleet Register for the commercial and recreational fishing fleet.  In 
addition, a particular database has been created within the Vessel Monitoring 
System, which allows faster identification of fishing vessels and contributes a lot 
to the fighting against IUU fishing in Bulgarian waters.618  
    This report also shows that there were eight Turkish boats and one Bulgarian 
fishing boat that had been caught while practicing illegal fishing of dogfish in 
Romanian waters between 2007 and 2011. In recent years, the reports of illegal 
fishing in Romanian waters is minimal  due to “better frontier control and 
implementation of security measures since Romania has joined the EU”. Romania 
has taken monitoring or controlling systems for fishing fleets in its waters, 
including track records on length categories, the Coastal Fishing Logbook and the 
Black Sea Fishing Logbook. In addition, vessels licensed for commercial fishing 
in the Black Sea must be assigned to the Landing Point and First Sale 
Center/Point. When landing the fish, it is required to fill in a Landing Statement. 
Romania has also approved closed seasons for two main target species of IUU 
fishing, including turbot and dogfish.619  
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Bulgaria and Romania have been working together on implementing a protocol 
on controls and surveys under the relevant EU regulations. For example, they have 
a joint inspection scheme which “enables to carry out inspections by nationals of 
one country on fishing vessels of the other in EU waters”.620 Therefore, Bulgaria 
and Romania have taken certain measures to combat IUU fishing since they joined 
the EU, which is expected to promote responsible fisheries in the Black Sea. 
There is not sufficient information about IUU fishing in the Mediterranean Sea. 
According to a speech of Commissioner Damanaki, Italian authorities and the 
Commission have closely cooperated and verified that no new illegal driftnet ac-
tivity has been found in the Mediterranean Sea.621 The EU also actively promotes 
Vessel Monitoring Systems as a tool for a possible joint inspection scheme in the 
Mediterranean Sea and provides technical assistance to GFCM Members.622  
 
 
 
3.3.2 The monitoring, control and surveillance over EU fishing 
vessels and waters 
 
Since January 2005, all EU fishing vessels above 15 meters length overall have in-
stalled a Vessel Monitoring System. 623 The system is also compulsory for EU 
fishing vessels above 12 meters since 1 January 2012.624 However, the Vessel 
Monitoring System cannot achieve the expected effect if the Vessel Monitoring 
System installed on a particular vessel is switched off or malfunctioning.625 Unlike 
Vessel Monitoring Systems, the Vessel Detection System does not need the coop-
eration of fishermen. The Joint Research Centre of the European Commission 
(JRC) has been running Vessel Detection System campaigns for several years. 
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According to the study of the JRC, the Vessel Detection System can provide an 
image of almost any area on the earth every one to three days and to detect nearly 
all vessels subject to a Vessel Monitoring System under most weather conditions. 
Thus, the Vessel Detection System has been proven an established technological 
instrument to monitor fishing vessels.626  
The Parliament issued Resolution P7_TA(2011)0516 of 17 November 2011 on 
Combating Illegal Fishing at the Global Level - the Role of the EU.627 The Resolu-
tion calls on the Commission and EU Member States to cooperate to establish a 
“European coastguard” for improving common monitoring and inspection capaci-
ty, as well as combating the problems at sea, such as terrorism, piracy, IUU fish-
ing, trafficking and marine pollution.628 Although the European coastguard has not 
been established yet, the European Coast Guard Functions Forum has been created 
as a non-binding, voluntary, independent and non-political forum. Membership of 
the European Coast Guard Functions Forum includes the Heads of the Coast 
Guards or equivalent of each EU maritime State and associated Schengen coun-
tries, the European Commission and its institutions and agencies with related 
competencies in Coast Guard Functions.629 The European Coast Guard Functions 
Forum aims to study, contribute to and promote understanding and development 
of maritime issues of importance and of common interest related to Coast Guard 
Functions across borders and sectors, both civil and military, and to contribute to 
the progress of various Coast Guard Function activities.630 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3 Sightings at sea and followed investigation 
 
In order to implement the provisions of fishing vessel sighting at sea adopted by 
several RFMOs that the EU participates in, a Member State’s authority responsi-
ble for inspection at sea when it sights a fishing vessel engaged in IUU fishing 
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shall issue a report of the sighting.631 The flag Member State shall start an investi-
gation into the vessel as well as notify the results and actions taken to the Com-
mission. Except for the flag Member States, other concerned Member States 
“shall… verify whether the sighted fishing vessels reported have carried out activ-
ities in maritime waters under their jurisdiction or if fisheries products stemming 
from those vessels have been landed or imported into their territory and shall in-
vestigate their record of compliance with relevant conservation and management 
measures”.632 
 
 
 
3.3.4 Control of EU nationals and legal persons 
 
The IUU Regulation requires Member States to identify nationals who support or 
are engaged in IUU fishing, including “by engagement on board or as operators 
or beneficial owners of fishing vessels included in the Community IUU vessel list” 
and to take appropriate actions.633 In order to prevent nationals being engaged in 
IUU fishing, Member States shall “encourage nationals to notify information per-
taining to legal, beneficial, or financial interests in, or control of, fishing vessels 
flagged to a third country which they hold and the names of the vessels con-
cerned”. In addition, nationals are required “not to sell or export any fishing vessel 
to operators involved in the operation, management or ownership of fishing ves-
sels included in the Community IUU vessel list”.634 Member States shall not grant 
any public aid under national aid regimes or under Community funds to such op-
erators. 635 Furthermore, Member States shall obtain information of the arrange-
ments between nationals and third countries allowing reflagging of fishing vessels 
flying Member States' flag to such third countries and inform such information to 
the Commission. 636  Nevertheless, the control of nationals by Member States 
should not prejudice the primary responsibilities of the flag State.637 
According to the investigations into flags of convenience (FOC) by the Envi-
ronmental Justice Foundation in 2012, 12 per cent (100 vessels) of 841 large-scale 
fisheries vessels in 2011 flagged to the top 13 FOC registries that were owned by 
EU companies.638  Trygg Mat has conducted an analysis of the fishing vessels 
flagged to the first eight countries that have been identified as potential non-
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cooperating third countries by the Commission and what companies have been in-
volved as owners or operators of them. According to the research, 27 per cent of 
the vessels with known owners and 24 per cent of the vessels with foreign opera-
tors are operated by EU based companies from 14 EU Member States. 639 There 
are more vessels controlled by EU based companies than by any other single 
State.640  
    The European Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Commissioner, Maria Damanaki, 
has stated that the Commission has requested Member States to carry out enquiries 
to identify European beneficial owners of vessels flagged to FOC countries ac-
cording to the requirement of Article 40 of the IUU Regulation. 641  However, 
Member States have not submitted relevant information to the Commission in this 
respect.642 
 
 
 
3.4 External implementation 
 
3.4.1 Implementation of port State measures 
 
3.4.1.1 Port access and transhipment 
 
Port State measures adopted by the IUU Regulation are mainly consistent with the 
provisions of the FAO Port State Measures Agreement, including designating 
ports, prior notice, authorization, recording of landing or transhipment opera-
tions.643 More practically, Commission Regulation No 202/2011 provides forms 
for prior notification for third country fishing vessels.644 The Implementing Regu-
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lation of the IUU Regulation enumerates forms for pre-landing declarations and 
pre-transhipment declarations.645 EU’s port State measures concentrate on not only 
fishing vessels flying the flag of third countries but also EU fishing vessels. IUU 
fishing vessels flying the flag of a Member State shall only be authorized access to 
their home ports and to no other Community port.646  
With the implementation of the IUU Regulation, the visit of IUU listed vessels 
to EU ports has been decreasing. From January 2004 to December 2009, there 
were 97 visits by RFMOs IUU listed vessels to ports in 15 Member States of the 
EU, among which five were made to Estonia, four to Malta, eight to Lithuania, 16 
to Germany, two to the UK and one to Sweden.647 According to an independent 
review of the IUU Regulation made by the Institute for European Environmental 
Policy (IEEP) in 2011, no vessel on the Community IUU vessel list had been 
found in the ports of those six EU countries after the IUU Regulation entered into 
force.648 The independent review does not reveal the situation of the other Member 
States because they did not respond to the questionnaires, in particular Spain, 
which had the most port visits by IUU listed vessels from the beginning of 2004 
till the end of 2009. The data of the above mentioned 6 countries refers to the 
strict port control and inspection prohibiting for IUU listed vessels from entering 
the EU’s ports. However, the catches from these IUU listed vessels still can access 
Member States ports by reefers. Therefore, the strict control on transhipment 
should be a priority too. 
The IUU Regulation has made stricter restrictions on the transhipments than the 
FAO Port State Measures Agreement. On the one hand, when a third country’s 
fishing vessel is a part of the transhipment, it is prohibited to tranship in Commu-
nity waters. The transhipment can only take place in the port. On the other hand, 
fishing vessels flying the flag of a Member State are prohibited to tranship catches 
from third country fishing vessels at sea outside Community waters, unless the 
                                                          
645 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1010/2009, Annex IIA, IIB, IIIA, IIIB. 
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fishing vessels are registered as carrier vessels under the auspices of a RFMO.649 
Therefore, transhipment at sea is mainly prohibited by the IUU Regulation.  
As to the transhipments between third countries’ fishing vessels outside Com-
munity waters, it may be authorized to tranship at sea, for instance, in countries 
like Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ghana and Gabon.650 
Lack of a ban on transhipments at sea in certain developing countries is mainly 
because their ports cannot accommodate large reefers.651 However, their authoriza-
tion to tranship at sea cannot guarantee sufficient monitoring by their authorities, 
which leaves a large loophole to transport such IUU catches to the EU market and 
launder fish under a different identity.652 For example, illegal transhipments at sea 
by Korean flagged vessels in violation of coastal States laws and regulations were 
taking place along the West African coast from Angola to Guinea Bissau during 
four years.653 Thus, it is recommended that the EU only authorize consignments 
that are positively confirmed that the transhipment has been monitored by coastal 
States and the flag States of both the fishing vessel and the reefer.654 
    
 
 
3.4.1.2 Port inspection     
 
The IUU Regulation and its implementing regulations specify the general princi-
ples and procedures of inspection. EU Member States are required to carry out in-
spections in their ports on at least 5 per cent of landing and transhipment opera-
tions by third country fishing vessels each year.655 The Implementing Regulation 
of the IUU Regulation and the Commission Regulation No 202/2011 elaborate on 
the benchmarks for sampling.656 In addition, the following fishing vessels shall be 
inspected in all cases: fishing vessels that have been sighted and suspected to have 
conducted IUU fishing, fishing vessels reported in the framework of a notification 
made under the Community Alert System, fishing vessels listed on the Communi-
ty IUU vessel list, and fishing vessels contained in the IUU vessel lists of RFMOs 
in which the EU has participated.657 If the results of the inspection provides evi-
dence and shows that a fishing vessel has been engaged in IUU fishing, the com-
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petent authority of the port Member State shall not authorize the landing or tran-
shipment of catches.658 In cases where the infringements have occurred on the high 
seas, the port Member State is required to cooperate with the flag State in conduct-
ing an investigation. 659 Where the breach happened in the maritime waters of a 
third country, the port Member State is required to cooperate with the coastal State 
to carry out the investigation.660 However, critics assert that the IUU Regulation 
does not provide for the prevention of unnecessary delay of inspection and does 
not create a system for compensation and complaint if unnecessary delay hap-
pens.661  
From 1 January 2010 till the end of 2012, the Commission investigated more 
than 200 cases with vessels from 27 countries. Consequently, certain flag States 
(Comoros, Lithuania, Republic of Korea and Spain among others) and coastal 
States (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau) have imposed sanctions against 
a large number of vessels.662 The aim of the EU’s endeavour is to persuade flag 
and/or coastal States to sanction the infringements committed. For example, EU’s 
investigations lead to sanctions of 4.2 million EUR in a case involving 16 Korean 
vessels and a Panamanian vessel fishing off West Africa. Although these vessels 
are not included in the Community IUU vessel list, “the culture of compliance 
continues spreading”.663 Additionally, the Commission has also conducted audits 
and verification missions in four EU Member States to encourage them to rein-
force port inspection since the IUU Regulation entered into force.664 
    However, the enforcement of port State control in the EU still needs to be im-
proved. Due to the lack of customs control, inspectors and resources, as well as 
more important priorities such as terrorism and human trafficking, certain big 
ports are a paradise for IUU fishing to enter the EU’s market.665 For example, Las 
Palmas in Spain is the most notorious port of convenience in the EU through 
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which millions of euros worth of illegal catches enter Europe. Las Palmas had five 
inspectors in 2011.666 A vessel inspection of one container can take hours, so it is 
unsurprising that illegal catches can enter the port. The situation leads to increas-
ing personnel to conduct vessel inspections in certain Member States, such as 
Germany and the UK.667  
Nevertheless, even if Member States increase personnel to inspect vessels, in 
practice it is impossible to inspect each vessel that visits ports. So attention should 
be paid to fish caught from certain “high risk areas” and to certain species with 
high commercial value. West African waters suffer the most from IUU fishing in 
the world.668 Most illegal catches from that area are exported to the EU market. 
From the IUU Regulation entered into force till 31 July 2012, the Environmental 
Justice Foundation recorded ten vessels conducting illegal fishing in southern Si-
erra Leone, among which nine vessels exported their catches to Europe. 669 Thus, 
the Environmental Justice Foundation recommended Member States of the EU to 
adopt “a proactive risk-based approach to port controls and verifications, ensur-
ing that consignments from high risk areas, such as West Africa, are priori-
tized”.670 In February 2013, the Department for Environment Food & Rural Affairs 
of the UK (DEFRA) issued a letter to stakeholders informing them that the port 
health officers would pay more attention to consignments of tuna coming from the 
coast of West Africa.671 This is a sign that the Member States of the EU have start-
ed to focus more on port inspections of vessels operating in the waters of West Af-
rica. 
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3.4.2 Trade-market measures 
 
3.4.2.1 Catch Certification Scheme 
 
The Catch Certification Scheme is the heart of the IUU Regulation. The core of 
the Catch Certification Scheme is the certification of fish caught according to ap-
plicable laws, regulations and international conservation and management 
measures.672 Any fish imported in the EU’s market must be accompanied with a 
catch certificate, containing detailed information about the fishing vessel, the 
catches, transhipments, importation and other required information. It should be 
validated by the flag State of the fishing vessel. However, if the importing Mem-
ber State has doubts about the authenticity of a catch certificate or suspects non-
compliance of a fishing vessel, a fishing company or any fishing operator, compe-
tent authorities of the Member State may carry out verifications.673 If the catch cer-
tificate cannot fulfil the requirements of the IUU Regulation, fish and fish prod-
ucts cannot be imported in the EU.  
    As to the importation of fish products processed in a third country other than the 
flag State, the importer is required to submit to the authorities of the importing 
Member State a statement established by the processing plant in that third country. 
The statement should contain a description of the unprocessed and processed 
products and their respective quantities.674 It also needs to indicate that the pro-
cessed products have been processed in that third country from catches accompa-
nied by catch certificate(s) validated by the flag State.675 The statement must be 
accompanied by the original catch certificate(s) or a copy of the original catch cer-
tificate(s).676 
The requirements of catch certificates and related documents are consistent with 
the main international and regional fisheries agreements. Catch documents as well 
as re-export certificates validated by the catch documentation scheme of a RFMO 
in which the EU participates, can be accepted as the catch certificate and the 
statement of the processing plant.  
As of 26 April 2013, there were 93 States that had decided to implement the 
IUU Regulation, including many EU’s major fish suppliers, such as Norway, Chi-
na and the US.677 This shows that most of the EU’s fisheries partners would like to 
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comply with the EU’s Catch Certification Scheme. As mentioned previously, al-
most 16 per cent of the EU’s imports of fish are from IUU fishing. Data from the 
State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2010 and 2012 of the FAO showed that 
the EU’s fish imports from third countries had been increasing since 2009.678  
On the one hand, IUU catches have been prohibited from the EU market and 
have been transferred to other markets that have fewer restrictions. On the other 
hand, fraud has weakened the role of Catch Certification Scheme. According to 
Carlos Dominguez Diaz, the Secretary General of Fisheries of the Ministry of Ag-
riculture, Food and Environment in Spain, there were only 7 consignments that 
were rejected among 42,000 requests for import of fishing products in 2011; how-
ever, the number of rejection was even higher than that of other Member States.679  
Compared with the percentage of IUU imports, the number of rejections is very 
small. It is unknown how much IUU catches have been transferred to other mar-
kets, but it is pretty unquestionable that the validation by certain flag States is a 
big issue that hinders the effectiveness of the Catch Documentation Scheme. Gha-
na is an example that has validated catch certificates without real verifications and 
checks of information submitted, so that several importations of fishery products 
caught illegally by Ghanaian vessels have been rejected by several EU Member 
States.680 However, it is indisputable that there are still importations with unveri-
fied catch certificates that have not been found by EU Member States.  
Falsified documents also make the verification difficult. Korean-flagged vessels 
have used falsified coastal State administrative documents to import into the EU 
fisheries products caught under illegal conditions in the coastal State jurisdictional 
waters. 681 Moreover, they have also used falsified or invalid documents for obtain-
ing validation of catch certificates from the Korean authorities and importation of 
the products into the EU.682  
The case of Seta No. 73 is an example that fraud exists in the validation of flag 
States. A large consignment of fish illegally caught by Korean-flagged trawlers in 
waters of several West African countries was transported by the Panama-flagged 
Seta No 73 refrigerated cargo vessel to the Spanish port of Las Palmas. After re-
ceiving the alert of the Environmental Justice Foundation, which investigated 
these activities, the Commission worked with Spain’s Ministry of Environment, 
Rural and Marine Affairs (MARM) to seize the fish. The MARM carried out veri-
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fication under Article 17 of the IUU Regulation and requested the assistance from 
Korea as the flag State, which accredited the catches were legal. In addition, the 
Commission also conducted investigations and contacted Panama as the flag State 
of the Seta No. 73 and the West African coastal States. However, although receiv-
ing information from the Commission that Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and 
Guinea Bissau had confirmed the vessels concerned had breached their laws, the 
MARM ignored the information of these coastal States and released the fish. The 
MARM made this decision based on the validation of catch certificates by Korea 
as the flag State. In fact, even though such vessels did not install Vessel Monitor-
ing Systems, the catch certificates were still validated by the flag State. Therefore, 
when there was evidence that shows the possibility of IUU fishing and lack of ef-
fective flag State control, the MARM should have suspected the authenticity of 
those catch certificates. 
Thus, in order to implement effectively the Catch Certification Scheme, authori-
ties of Member States should not only rely on the validation of flag States. Except 
for the validation of flag States, a robust Vessel Monitoring System and an elec-
tronic logbook should be accompanied with required information.683 Other authors 
have called upon the compulsory utilization of electronic catch certificates in or-
der to reduce the possibilities of fraud brought by paper certifications.684 Until 
March 2013, Norway, the US, New Zealand, South Africa, Canada, Faroe Islands 
respectively used their own electronic system to replace the EU’s catch certificate 
and re-export certificate; and, Iceland uses the Icelandic catch certificate and the 
European Community re-export certificate. 685  On the other hand, EU Member 
States should improve their communication with coastal States from where the 
fish is caught.  
The functioning of the EU’s Catch Certification Scheme is limited, even if it is 
effective. The European Parliament encourages the Commission to develop a 
global catch documentation scheme.686 Maria Damanaki also believes, “a world-
wide catch certification system remains…the best solution to ensure traceability 
and transparency”.687 The EU’s plan is very ambitious, which aims to implement 
the catch certification system both at global level and for all species entering in-
ternational trade. At present, the CCAMLR Dissostichus spp. Catch documenta-
tion scheme and the ICCAT bluefin tuna Catch Documentation Programme have 
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been recognized as complying with the requirements of the IUU Regulation. 688 
Additionally, the CCBST Catch Documentation Scheme is also recognized by the 
EU subject to additional conditions.689 As mentioned previously, several States al-
so have their own electronic traceability system. It seems that the first step to es-
tablish a global catch documentation system should start with the coordination and 
integration of existing catch documentation schemes and electronic traceability 
systems. In addition, the success of the global catch documentation system needs a 
strict port control; otherwise illegal catches still enter international trade easily 
through ports of convenience. Therefore, the coordination between trade-market 
measures and port State measures is imperative for the success of those measures. 
 
 
 
3.4.2.2 IUU vessels lists 
 
If the information obtained according to Article 25 of the IUU Regulation shows 
that a fishing vessel may be engaged in IUU fishing, the Commission shall notify 
the flag State by an official request and the flag State should make an enquiry into 
the alleged IUU fishing of its flagged vessel.690 If the flag State does not comply 
with the official requests, the fishing vessel will be included in the Community 
IUU vessel list.691 As to fishing vessels included in the Community IUU vessel 
list, Member States shall refuse or withdraw fishing authorization, not provide as-
sistance to fish processing operations or transhipments or joint operations, refuse 
port services, refuse the granting of the flag, prohibit the importation, exportation 
and re-exportation.692 After achieving conditions provided in Article 28 of the IUU 
Regulation, identified IUU fishing vessels can be removed from the Community 
IUU vessel list.693  
After the IUU Regulation entered into force, the Commission has adopted 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 468/2010 of 28 May 2010 establishing the EU 
list of vessels engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (2010) to es-
tablish the EU IUU vessel list.694 Each year, the Commission adopts an imple-
menting Regulation to amend the Annex of the Commission Regulation No 
468/2010, which contains an annual update of IUU vessels. At present, Commis-
sion Implementing Regulation No 724/2011,695 Commission Implementing Regu-
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lation No 1234/2012,696 and Commission Implementing regulation No 672/2013697 
have been adopted. 
According to the recent Community IUU vessel list published by the Commis-
sion, vessels listed on the Community IUU vessel list are all from IUU vessel lists 
adopted by RFMOs in which the EU participates.698 Like most RFMOs, the Com-
mission updates its Community IUU vessel list annually. On one hand, the close 
cooperation with RFMOs on IUU vessel lists reduces the opportunities for IUU 
fishing vessels to get port services. Sunny Jane, a Belize flagged fishing vessel 
owned by a UK-registered company, encountered a series of port State actions in 
the EU Member States’ ports, such as being refused to fuel at Las Palmas in 
Spain, being denied to land frozen tuna at Puebla del Caraminal, and being includ-
ed in the NEAFC lists.699 This vessel was finally removed from the NEAFC B-list 
until it had been immobilized and scrapped in a Spanish port.700  
However, the effectiveness of current RFMOs IUU vessel lists has been criti-
cized because those lists are too slowly updated and the containing or removal of a 
vessel is utilized as a bargaining chip during negotiations in RFMOs.701 In facing 
this situation, it is recommended to establish the EU’s own list according to Arti-
cle 27 of the IUU Regulation and to update the list more frequently.702 However, 
the EU has not established its own IUU vessel list yet. According to Mr. Damien 
Desquiens, a policy officer of DG MARE of the Commission, only when identi-
fied vessels do not pay for imposed sanctions will they be put on the EU IUU ves-
sel list. Currently, adequate sanctions have been imposed on identified vessels, so 
it is not necessary to include such vessels on the EU IUU vessel list because the 
listing of those vessels would be a double sanction.703 Therefore, the EU IUU ves-
sel list played more a role of threat than an actual enforcement. 
    RFMOs’ IUU vessel lists are based on multilateral negotiations, accepted ac-
cording to WTO provisions and encouraged by the IPOA-IUU. The establishment 
of the EU’s own IUU vessel list should avoid unilateral action. Before the EU in-
cludes a vessel in its own IUU vessel list, it shall provide the owner and the opera-
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tor of the fishing vessel the opportunity of being heard and being able to defend. 
In addition, the EU needs to request the flag State to enquire the alleged IUU fish-
ing of their flagged vessels. When the flag State does not comply with the EU’s 
official requests, the EU can include vessels concerned in the EU’s own IUU ves-
sel list.  
    However, the scheme of IUU vessel list still has disadvantages. When looking 
at the Community IUU vessel list, it can be seen that most of the vessels on the list 
do not have an International Maritime Organization ship identification number. 
Without unique vessel identification, vessels can avoid being identified through 
changing names or flags.704 Thus, the effectiveness of the Community IUU vessel 
list must be ensured by the unique vessel identification number. Given there is no 
Global Record of fishing vessels, which assigns each industrial fishing vessel a 
unique vessel identification, the Environmental Justice Foundation recommended 
that the EU requires all large-scale industrial vessels exporting to its market to ob-
tain an International Maritime Organization number.705 
 
 
 
3.4.2.3 Non-cooperating third countries 
 
Chapter VI of the IUU Regulation provides the procedures for identifying, includ-
ing and removing non-cooperating third countries and measures in respect of non-
cooperating third countries.  
Under Article 31(3) of the IUU Regulation, “any third country may be identified 
as a non-cooperating third country if it fails to discharge the duties incumbent up-
on it under international law as flag, port, coastal, or market State, to take action 
to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing”. The list of non-cooperating third 
countries aims to utilize trade-market measures to encourage coastal, flag, port, 
processing or marketing States to take their duties in the fight against IUU fishing. 
The IPOA-IUU and its implementing instruments do not have any provision for 
the list of non-cooperating third countries against IUU fishing. However RFMOs, 
such as ICCAT, have implemented such measures already.706 Such a measure may 
be challenged as WTO-incompatible if a non-party to the RFMO complains that 
another member implementing such a measure is infringing its WTO rights, alt-
hough this has not happened yet.707  
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The EU list of non-cooperating third countries goes further because it is an uni-
lateral action outside RFMO processes.708 Although Paragraph 66 of the IPOA-
IUU explicitly recommends “unilateral trade-related measures should be avoid-
ed”, unilateral measures might be “justified”.709 The IUU Regulation implicitly 
stipulates the consistency with WTO obligations.710 However, in order not to be 
challenged to the WTO, the EU should avoid implementing this measure in a 
manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries or a disguised restriction on international trade. Through a re-
view of the implementation of the EU list of non-cooperating third countries, the 
consistency between EU trade-market measures and WTO obligations can be ex-
trapolated.   
EU decision-making process concerning the list of non-cooperating third coun-
tries is transparent and the decisions to apply trade measures were taken after oth-
er alternative measures have failed. A Decision on notifying Belize, Cambodia, Fi-
ji, Guinea, Panama, Sri Lanka, Togo and Vanuatu of the possibility of being 
identified as non-cooperating third countries was issued on 15 November 2012.711 
On 26 November 2013, the Commission communicated the same kind of notifica-
tion to Curaçao, the Republic of Ghana and the Republic of Korea.712 This review 
mainly uses the first eight countries as examples to demonstrate under what condi-
tions the EU considers identifying a country as a non-cooperating third country 
because the identification of the first eight countries has already had specific re-
sults.  
The notifications mentioned above were of a preliminary nature and were based 
on the criteria laid down in Article 31 of the IUU Regulation. Third countries con-
cerned were given the opportunity to submit evidence in order to refute or com-
plete that facts invoked in the notifications and to take a plan of action to im-
prove.713 Fiji, Panama, Sri Lanka, Togo and Vanuatu made credible progress in 
close cooperation with the Commission, including motioning new legislation and 
improving their monitoring, control and inspection systems, so the EU extended 
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the dialogue with these countries.714 For Belize, Cambodia and Guinea, progress 
was not satisfactory, so the Commission identified them as non-cooperating third 
countries on 26 November 2013.715 The three countries were officially included in 
the list of non-cooperating third countries on 28 March 2014.716  
The identification usually begins with a mission carried out by the Commission 
to the concerned third State in the context of administrative cooperation provided 
by Article 20 (4) of the IUU Regulation. The Commission mainly examined four 
aspects. The first aspect is the recurrence of IUU vessels and IUU trade flows. Be-
lize, Cambodia, Guinea, Panama, Sri Lanka, Togo and Vanuatu all failed to take 
the duties incumbent upon them under international law as flag States over IUU 
vessels and IUU fishing conducted or supported by fishing vessels flying their flag 
or by their nationals. They did not take sufficient measures to deal with document-
ed and recurring IUU fishing by vessels previously flying their flag.717 Moreover, 
Guinea did not fulfil its duties as a coastal State.718 Ghana failed to discharge the 
duties incumbent upon it under international law as market State to prevent access 
of fisheries products stemming from IUU fishing to its market, which was also one 
of the reasons why Ghana was notified.719 It should be pointed out that there was 
no evidence showing that Fiji flagged fishing vessels were contained in any IUU 
lists, and there was no evidence of past infringements of Fiji flagged IUU ves-
sels.720 The Commission therefore concluded “it is not necessary to evaluate com-
pliance of Fiji’s action to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing, with its duties 
under international law as a flag State in respect of IUU vessels and IUU fishing 
carried out or supported by fishing vessels flying its flag or by its nationals”.721 
This is because a third State may be included in the non-cooperating third coun-
tries list due to the failure of discharging other flag State duties.  
The second aspect taken into account is whether the IUU fishing activities men-
tioned in the first aspect violate the obligations incumbent on the relevant State 
according to international law. Fiji neither had fishing vessels listed on IUU lists 
nor was there past infringement of Fiji flagged vessels. Attention was paid to the 
lack of national legal provisions against IUU fishing or over Fiji flagged fishing 
vessels on high seas, which was considered as failing to discharge the duties as a 
                                                          
714 Europa (2013) European Commission intensifies the fight against illegal 
fishing. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1162_en.htm. Accessed 6 Feb-
ruary 2014. 
715 Commission Implementing Decision 2013/C 346/02, p. 2. 
716 Council Implementing Decision 2014/170/EU, para. 36. Council Implement-
ing Decision 2014/170/EU is a result of investigation and dialogue procedures. 
717 Commission Decision 2012/C 354/01, paras. 29, 81, 164, 240, 300, 356, 
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719 Commission Decision 2013/C 346/03, para. 92. 
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flag State in respect of cooperation and enforcement.722 Without the found in-
fringements of RFMO measures, the EU could not consider Fiji as a non-
cooperating third country only relying on the lack of legislation, because domestic 
legislation belongs to a country’s national jurisdiction. Although Cambodia has 
not signed or ratified any international fisheries agreements, the Commission still 
maintained that Cambodia had infringed the obligations as a flag State on the high 
seas as codified by Article 91, 94, 117 and 118 of the UNCLOS because those 
provisions were already customary international law.723 
Furthermore, when the Commission identifies whether the third countries dis-
charge their duties in cooperating and enforcing their duties in combating IUU 
fishing, it examines the participation of such third countries in international fisher-
ies instruments according to the Article 31 (6) (a) of the IUU Regulation. Normal-
ly, the Commission analyses whether the third countries have complied with inter-
national fisheries instruments ratified or accessed to as flag, coastal, port and 
market States. Additionally, the Commission also examines the implementation of 
IPOA-IUU by such third countries. However, the IPOA-IUU is a non-legally 
binding instrument, so implementation is not mandatory. Therefore, it is disputa-
ble that the EU considers the implementation of IPOA-IUU as a criterion to decide 
whether to identify countries as non-cooperating third countries. Consequently, 
the EU stated in the Commission Implementing Decision 2013/C 346/02 “the lack 
of compliance with non-binding recommendations and resolutions has been con-
sidered only as supporting evidence and not as a basis for the identification”.724 
 The third aspect that needs to be considered is the failure to implement interna-
tional rules by third countries. The Commission examines whether third countries 
comply with management and conservation measures adopted by RFMOs that the 
third countries participate in or whether their fishing vessels operate in accordance 
with RFMOs measures under the conventional areas of RFMOs of which they are 
not parties. Except for existing IUU fishing activities, failing to submit or delaying 
submitting necessary information and reports to concerned RFMOs is a major rea-
son that those countries are believed to have not discharged flag State duties. This 
is mainly why Fiji was considered to not comply with its flag State duties. The 
Commission is not satisfied with these countries because: they have failed to es-
tablish a rebuilding programme for particular species; they have not complied with 
Vessel Monitoring System standards; they have not complied with the requirement 
for non-national observers; they have overharvested their quotas for particular 
species; the transhipping at sea; being FOC; they have not developed national 
plans of action against IUU fishing.725 
The last element that the Commission takes into consideration is the constraints 
of developing countries, which is compatible with the WTO. Belize, Fiji, Panama, 
Sri Lanka are lower or upper middle income countries. The EU has provided spe-
cific technical assistance to Fiji, Panama and Sri Lanka. The EU held that the four 
                                                          
722 Commission Decision 2012/C 354/01, paras. 114-116. 
723 Commission Decision 2012/C 354/01, para. 72. 
724 Commission Implementing Decision 2013/C 346/02, para. 21. 
725 Commission Decision 2012/C 354/01, paras. 41, 43, 91, 96, 97, 128. 
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countries could not be considered to have constraints directly due to the level of 
their development. The remaining countries are all belonging to lesser developed 
countries. Cambodia, Togo and Vanuatu all lack specific provisions in their na-
tional legal framework referring to international instruments to combat IUU fish-
ing. The three countries also failed to establish a sanction system for infringe-
ments of international management and conservation measures in respect of high 
seas fishing. The EU deemed that this absence and failure was not directly due to 
the level of their development.726 Despite financial or technical assistance the EU 
has provided to Guinea, Togo and Vanuatu, those countries failed to take concrete 
corrective actions or to make progress in combating IUU fishing.  
Although some criteria are open for questions, three countries are identified as 
non-cooperating third countries because they have failed to submit sufficient evi-
dence and their plans of action have not been fully implemented. As a result, ac-
tions in respect of Belize, Cambodia and Guinea are listed in Article 38 of the IUU 
Regulation, mainly including the prohibition of importation.  
 
 
 
3.4.2.4 Traceability and the Community Alert System 
 
As early as in 2000, the Commission launched the “TraceFish” project, short for 
“Traceability of Fish Products”, which established a set of international standards 
to ensure the traceability of seafood products from catcher to retailer. 
    In recent years, the role of techniques in traceability is emphasized by the EU. 
The Parliament calls on the Commission and Member States to support the utiliza-
tion of techniques in traceability, such as “satellite tracking of fishing and support 
vessels and electronic tags to track fish, as well as the establishment of global fish 
DNA and other genetic databases to identify the fish products and their geograph-
ical origin”.727 
If the information obtained refers to the non-compliance by fishing vessels or 
fishery products from certain third countries, the Commission shall publish an 
alert notice on its website and the Official Journal of the European Union to warn 
operators and to ensure that Member States take appropriate measures in respect 
of such third countries.728 This regulation also provides specific actions to be fol-
lowed by Member States, such as the verification of the catch certificate, enquir-
ies, investigations or inspections at sea, in ports or any other landing places, as 
well as the actions taken by the Commission in case of the annulment of an alert 
or ensuring non-compliance.729 At present, the Community Alert System has not 
been established and the reason for the delay is not clear.  
                                                          
726 Commission Decision 2012/C 354/01, paras. 100, 356 and 436. 
727 European Parliament Resolution P7_TA(2011)0516, para. 57. 
728 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, Art. 23. 
729 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, Art. 24. 
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3.4.2.5 Cooperation with other fish markets 
 
Cooperation plays a significant role in combating IUU fishing. For the EU, its co-
operation mechanism is to verify the compliance of countries and evaluate the ob-
ligations of flag, port, coastal or market State under international law and RFMOs, 
and their implementation of the EU’s Catch Documentation Scheme.730 In addi-
tion, the Commission carried out on the spot evaluations in a number of countries 
and regions in 2012, including Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Ivory Coast, Vi-
etnam, Vanuatu, Fiji, Indonesia and Korea.731 The EU’s examination is aimed at 
calling upon these countries to solve problems when implementing the interna-
tional and regional law, as well as the IUU Regulation. Until the end of 2012, 15 
evaluation missions had been carried out in third countries. Such evaluation mis-
sions not only ensure a reliable traceability system from fishing to the EU’s mar-
ket, but also impel the reform in legislation and administration in third countries, 
for instance, by amending their national law to combat IUU fishing or involving in 
the compliance of international and regional fisheries instruments.732 
    The EU does not consider combating IUU fishing as its own work, but creates a 
wider network with major seafood importers, such as the US and Japan, which are 
the third and second seafood importers in the world. In 2011 and 2012, the EU is-
sued two bilateral statements with the US and Japan respectively.733 The EU, the 
US and Japan have promised that they will not import seafood coming from illegal 
fishing.734 However, the two statements do not specifically mention the prohibition 
of exporting illegal fishing. It deems that these statements are only focusing on the 
                                                          
730 Stylianos M (2013) Update on the implementation of the EU IUU fishing 
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releases/2011/08/20110907_en.htm. Also see: European Commission Website, 
‘European Union and Japan join forces against illegal fishing’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/damanaki/headlines/press-
releases/2012/07/20120711_en.htm. 
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importation, rather than the exportation. The bilateral cooperation has already tak-
en effects. The US identified six States whose fishing vessels engaged in IUU 
fishing in 2011. According to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act of 2006, if a nation fails to address the illegal fishing or bycatch, 
this nation’s fishing vessels may be prohibited from entering the US ports and im-
ports of fish and fish products from that nation into the US may be denied.735 After 
two-year consultations and corrective actions, all the six States received positive 
certification in the 2013 Report to Congress.736 This is a progress made by the US 
as a port and market State in combating IUU fishing. 
As China is one of the EU’s main fisheries products suppliers, the Parliament 
has expressed the urgency of a discussion between the EU and China on using 
trade-market measures to prohibit IUU fish from entering their markets. At the 8th 
International Forum on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Mr. Stylian-
os Mitolidis from the Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries of 
the Commission, mentioned that the Commission had visited China two times for 
examining the situation of IUU fishing in China. 737 Maria Damanaki, the Com-
missioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, has also stated that the EU has 
reached out to the US, Canada, Russia, Norway and the focus will be on China 
and Asia in general.738 What the Commission and the Ministry of Agriculture of 
China will discuss is not publicly accessible now. As the largest fish and fisheries 
products producer, it can be foreseen that if China joins the EU policy, it will 
boost the combat of IUU fishing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
735 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act was fist 
enacted in 1976 and amended in 1996. Available via NOAA Fisheries. www. 
nmfs.noaa.gov/msa2005/.  
736 NOAA Fisheries (2013) Improving international fisheries management, Re-
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3.5 Other issues 
 
3.5.1 Information publicity, transparency and exchange 
 
The Commission states that most information concerning the combating of IUU 
fishing can be found on the DG Mare website or in the Official Journal of the Eu-
ropean Union (OJ). Except for legislation and documents in this respect already 
published in the OJ, activities of the Commissioner, as well as meetings and 
events, are also publicly available on the DG Mare website. The communication 
between Member States and the Commission is through internet.  
However, information about implementation is not publicly accessible to a large 
extent. The DG Mare states that all documents about the Community IUU vessel 
list are published in the OJ and internet; while, information about investigations 
into countries that may be considered as non-cooperating third countries is confi-
dential. 739  
Article 55 of the IUU Regulation requires Member States to transmit a report to 
the Commission on the application of this Regulation every two years, not later 
than 30 April of the following calendar year. However, such reports are still not 
available on the DG Mare website. This Article also addresses that the Commis-
sion shall submit a report that is based on the Member States reports to the Par-
liament and to the Council every three years, which means that the Commission 
should have reported on the implementation of the IUU Regulation by the end of 
2013. However, together with an evaluation of the impact of this Regulation, the 
Commission report has yet to be published. 
 
 
 
3.5.2 Sanctions 
 
The Control Regulation and the IUU Regulation mainly provide administrative 
sanctions, not only for legal persons but also for natural persons. Most of those 
sanctions are temporary measures.  
Article 42 (1) of the IUU Regulation describes three situations of serious in-
fringements. They include conducting activities prescribed in Article 3 of the IUU 
Regulation, 740 conducting business directly connected to IUU fishing, and the fal-
sification of documents or the use of false or invalid documents.  
                                                          
739 Lutchman et al. (2011) Independent review of the EU Illegal Unreported and 
Unregulated Regulations, table 1. 
740 Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 provides: “1. A fishing 
vessel … has: (a) fished without a valid license, authorization or permit issued by 
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In order to stop serious infringements conducted by a natural person or a legal 
person and to allow the authorities to complete an investigation, Member States 
can take the following immediate enforcement measures: “(a) the immediate ces-
sation of fishing activities; (b) the rerouting to port of the fishing vessel; (c) the 
rerouting of the transport vehicle to another location for inspection; (d) the order-
ing of a bond; (e) the seizure of fishing gear, catches or fisheries products; (f) the 
temporary immobilization of the fishing vessel or transport vehicle concerned; (g) 
the suspension of the authorization to fish”.741 All those immediate enforcement 
measures are administrative measures that immediately stop IUU fishing and pre-
vent the infringements from continuing. 
Sanctions for serious infringements include administrative sanctions and crimi-
nal sanctions. The fine as sanction is to multiply the value of fishery products ob-
tained by committing such serious infringements. The maximum administrative 
sanctions are at least eight times the value of such fishery products.742 In addition, 
other sanctions can be applied, including “(a) the sequestration of the fishing ves-
sel involved in the infringement; (b) the temporary immobilization of the fishing 
vessel;743 (c) the confiscation of prohibited fishing gear, catches or fishery prod-
ucts; (d) the suspension or withdraw of authorization to fish; (e) the reduction or 
withdraw of fishing rights; (f) the temporary or permanent exclusion from the 
right to obtain new fishing rights; (g) the temporary or permanent ban on access 
                                                                                                                                     
the flag State or the relevant coastal State; or (b) not fulfilled its obligations to 
record and report catch or catch-related data…; or (c) fished in a closed area, 
during a closed season, without or after attainment of a quota or beyond a closed 
depth; or (d) engaged in directed fishing for a stock which is subject to a morato-
rium or for which fishing is prohibited; or (e) used prohibited or non-compliant 
fishing gear; or (f) falsified or concealed its marking, identity or registration; or 
(g) concealed, tampered with or disposed of evidence relating to an investigation; 
or (h) obstructed the work of officials… or observers… in the exercise of their du-
ties; or (i) taken on board, transhipped or landed undersized fish in contravention 
of the legislation in force; (j) transhipped or participated in joint fishing opera-
tions with, supported or re-supplied other fishing vessels identified as having en-
gaged in IUU fishing under this Regulation, in particular those included in the 
Community IUU vessel list of a [RFMO]; or (k) carried out fishing activities in 
the area of a [RFMO] in a manner inconsistent with or in contravention of the 
conservation and management measures of that [RFMO] and is flagged to a State 
not party to that [RFMO], or not cooperating with the [RFMO]…; or (l) no na-
tionality…. 2. The activities set out in paragraph 1 shall be considered as serious 
infringements in accordance with Article 42 depending on the gravity of the in-
fringement in question which shall be determined by the competent authority of 
the Member State, taking into account the criteria such as the damage done, its 
value, the extent of the infringement or its repetition”. 
741 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, Article 43. 
742 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, Art. 44. 
743 This includes detention or inspection of fishing vessels. 
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to public assistance or subsides; (h) the suspension or withdraw of the status of 
approved economic operator…”.744  
In addition, legal persons have liabilities for serious infringements that have 
been committed for their benefit by any natural person, acting either individually 
or as part of an organ of the legal person, and having a determining position within 
the legal person. 745  Liability of a legal person does not exclude proceedings 
against natural persons who are perpetrators, instigators or accessories in the in-
fringements concerned.746 In the worst case, an EU importing company’s top man-
agement can face criminal charges and even jail sentencing.747 In addition, perma-
nent sanctions such as withdrawal of licenses and denial of access to port facilities 
are also called upon in case of serious infringements.748 The Environmental Justice 
Foundation suggests the EU to establish a blacklist of companies that have repeat-
edly conducted illegal fishing.749  
 
 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
The EU has clearly divided the role of decision-making and enforcement in fisher-
ies management and conservation among its institutions. The Treaty of Lisbon 
confirms the EU’s competence over fisheries. Although the Treaty of Lisbon 
states that the EU has exclusive competence to ratify treaties only in the area of 
conservation of marine biological resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, 
the EU indeed enjoys a broader exclusive competence to ratify treaties beyond 
conservation of marine biological resources with third States. Conversely, the 
power of an individual Member State to conclude treaties has been reduced in re-
cent years.  
The EU’s increasing exclusive competence is reflected in the EU’s active role 
in major international fisheries instruments, no matter whether they are legally 
binding or non-legally binding. The EU’s legal framework in this respect is main-
ly based on the international legal framework. It has transposed major FAO 
measures against IUU fishing into its Community law and policies, such as the 
IUU Regulation, the Council Regulation No 1006/2008 and the Control Regula-
tion. 
                                                          
744 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008, Art. 45. 
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As to the combating of IUU fishing, adopting flag State measures to conserve 
and manage marine biological resources mainly lie within the EU’s exclusive 
competence. However, fishing vessel registration, flag State duties over masters 
and other officers of fishing vessels, as well as the exercise of jurisdiction over its 
vessels on the high seas, belong to the competence of the Member States. In the 
beginning, adopting port State measures lied within the shared competence of the 
EU and Member States. Nevertheless, adopting port State measures has become 
the exclusive competence of the EU, particularly reflected in ratifying the FAO 
Port State Measures Agreement. Therefore, port State measures are mostly pro-
moted in the international society by the EU for the purpose of combating IUU 
fishing. This is because not only port State measures are efficient and cost-
effective, but also the EU can adopt comprehensive and uniform measures for its 
Member States. As to coastal State measures and trade-market measures, there is 
no official document showing the divisions of competence between the EU and its 
Member States. However, the EU has adopted regulations on those measures that 
are directly applicable in all Member States and entirely binding.  
The EU has adopted ambitious port and trade-market measures to combat IUU 
fishing. Since the IUU Regulation entered into force, the implementation of such 
measures has achieved certain progress. However, several important measures 
have not been implemented or completely implemented, which weakens the effec-
tiveness of those measures. The role of the EU in combating IUU fishing is be-
coming critical not only at the regional level but also at the international level. The 
EU is using its port State measures and trade-market measures to influence third 
countries to conserve and manage fisheries resources. The EU also actively en-
courages major fish markets to join in its work. It can be anticipated that EU’s port 
and trade-market measures will be more effective with the suggested improve-
ments. 
The EU also provides strict coastal and flag State measures to control fishing 
activities within the waters of the Community or conducted by EU fishing vessels. 
However, the implementation of such measures in waters of the EU’ Member 
States is much better than that in waters of third countries. The EU needs urgently 
to implement further measures to control the nationals of its Member States en-
gaged in IUU fishing in third country waters. 
It takes time for the EU’s various measures to take effect. As a pioneer in com-
bating IUU fishing in the international society, the EU’s endeavour is also an ex-
ample whether international fisheries law is applicable and effective because the 
EU’s measures are mostly in accordance with international fisheries law. In addi-
tion, the EU’s implementation will immensely influence other countries, especial-
ly those with fisheries relationship with the EU. In the next Chapter, China’s legis-
lation and implementation in this respect will be discussed.  
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 Chapter 4 Chinese Law  
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
Map 4.1 The China Sea 
 
 
Howstuffworks: http://geography.howstuffworks.com/oceans-and-seas/the-china-
sea.htm 
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China is a coastal State with 18,000 km coastline off its mainland and 6,536 is-
lands with a surface larger than 500 m2.750 The total area claimed under China’s ju-
risdiction is almost 3,000,000 km2, covering an internal sea - the Bohai Sea - and 
three semi-enclosed seas - the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South Chi-
na Sea (hereinafter called the China Sea) (cf. Map. 4.1). The wide sea area has 
provided China with abundant marine living resources and has promoted the rapid 
development of marine fisheries. China has become one of the major fishing coun-
tries with more than 9 million people engaged as fishermen, accounting for 24 per 
cent of the world’s total.751 However, due to heavy overfishing, IUU fishing and 
the deteriorating of the marine environment, fisheries resources in China’s marine 
area are continuously declining. In order to conserve and to manage fisheries re-
sources, China adopted a marine fishing vessel reduction plan for 2003-2010, 
which did achieve a reduction by 2008 close to the target, but after that both the 
number of vessels and the total combined power has started to increase again.752  
The resource shortage intensified due to the implementation of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the establishment of 200-
nautical-mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which has resulted in fishing con-
flicts between China and its neighbouring States and many incidents of IUU fish-
ing. In China, IUU fishing is generally called illegal fishing. IUU fishing takes 
various forms like: fishing without a license, fishing with a license but in a manner 
that violates national fisheries laws and regulations. 
    In order to alleviate the scarcity of resources, China actively promotes the de-
velopment of its distant water fisheries. China’s distant water fisheries began in 
1985. Now China has the largest number of distant water fishing vessels in the 
world, although its production capacity and industrial scale is much smaller than 
that of developed countries.753 As a consequence of the implementation of the 
UNCLOS and certain post-UNCLOS international fisheries agreements, China’s 
high seas fisheries are all under the management of regional fisheries bodies while 
fishing in waters within the jurisdiction of other countries are also under fisheries 
agreements with relevant countries. The international legal framework for combat-
ing IUU fishing requires China to be a responsible fishing State.  
                                                          
750  Wikipedia (2013) China coastline (in Chinese). 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_coastline. Accessed 16 October 2013;  Baidu 
Encyclopedia (2013) China’s islands. http:  baike.baidu.com view 1106813.htm. 
Accessed 16 October 2013. 
751 FAO (2012) The state of world fisheries and aquaculture 2012. FAO, Rome, 
p. 43. 
752 FAO (2012) The state of world fisheries and aquaculture 2012, p. 11. 
753 Research group on “Supporting and strengthening distant water fisheries” 
(2010) Supporting distant water fisheries as a strategic industry (in Chinese). 
Available via National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjshujia/zggqgl/t20101018_402676860.htm. Accessed 18 
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Additionally, China puts a lot of emphasis on aquaculture and its fisheries pro-
cessing industry. China is the world’s largest fish processor and exporter. In 2010, 
China contributed to almost 12 per cent of the world’s exports of fish and fisheries 
products that were worth about 13.3 billion USD, and increased further to 17.1 bil-
lion USD in 2011.754 Additionally, China became the third-largest importer of fish 
and fisheries products in the world in 2011.755 Thus, China plays a significant role 
in combating IUU fishing as a fish market.  
This Chapter aims to study the Chinese performance in combating IUU fishing 
and how China transforms international fisheries laws into domestic fisheries 
laws. The implementation of such laws is discussed as well. First, the Chapter in-
troduces China’s legislative bodies and administrative bodies in the field of fisher-
ies law. Then we discuss the adoption and ratification of international fisheries in-
struments, particularly the reasons why China has not ratified certain instruments. 
After that, the Chapter focuses on China’s domestic legislation and policies on the 
issue of combating IUU fishing. Finally, measures adopted and implemented by 
China against IUU fishing are analysed.  
 
 
 
4.2 Legal framework  
 
4.2.1 Institutions 
 
4.2.1.1 Lawmaking institutions 
 
In order to ensure a high level of centralization and to maintain the unity of the en-
tire legal system, the Law on Legislation of the People’s Republic of China codi-
fies that the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee have 
legislative authority to make law (falü) according to the Constitution.756 In the 
field of fisheries-related law, the Fisheries Law of the People’s Republic of China 
is the fundamental law that was adopted by the Standing Committee of the NPC in 
1986.757 
                                                          
754 FAO (2012) The state of world fisheries and aquaculture 2012, p. 70. 
755 FAO (2012) The state of world fisheries and aquaculture 2012, p. 16. 
756 The Law on Legislation of the PRC, Art. 7, adopted at the third Session of 
the Ninth National People’s Congress and promulgated by Decree 31 of the Presi-
dent of the PRC on 15 March 2000, and entered into force on 1 July 2000. 
757 Adopted at the 14
th
 Meeting of the Standing Committee of the NPC and 
promulgated by Decree No 34 of the President of the PRC on 20 January 1986, 
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Additionally, the State Council, which is the highest administrative authority, 
can adopt administrative rules and regulations (xingzheng fagui) in accordance 
with the Constitution and laws,758 such as the Detailed Rule of Implementing Fish-
eries Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Regulation of the PRC on the 
Administration of Traffic Safety on Fishing Port Waters.  
The ministries and commissions of the State Council can issue rules (bumen 
guizhang) within the limits of their power in accordance with laws as well as ad-
ministrative regulations, decisions and orders of the State Council,759 such as the 
Provisions on the Administration of Fishery Licensing adopted by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Notices on Prohibiting the Use of Large-scale Drift Fishing on 
High Sea enacted by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1993. Administrative rules and 
regulations adopted by the State Council as well as the rules issued by the Minis-
try of Agriculture occupy a predominant position in China’s fisheries legislation. 
This is because laws adopted by the NPC or its Standing Committee are general 
and to certain extent vague; while local government and its agencies know more 
specific information and consider more practical issues than legislatures, which 
ensures higher effectiveness of the lawmaking.760 However, the involvement of the 
State Council as well as its ministries and commissions, especially its departments 
at the local level, results in “departmentalism” (bumenzhuyi), which means gov-
ernment and its agencies expand on organizational interests and avoid responsi-
bilities through lawmaking.761 However, the purpose of lawmaking should be the 
fulfilment of common interests. Although the achievement of common interests 
needs the government and its agencies, the interests of the government does not 
always represent common interests.762 For example, certain fisheries departments 
control loosely the closed fishing season or region in order to temporarily increase 
the economic interests of local governments.763 Another disputed issue is that the 
                                                                                                                                     
revised by Decree No 38 of the President of the PRC on 31 October 2000, by De-
cree No 25 of the President of the PRC on 28 August 2004, by Decree No 18 of 
the President of the PRC on 28 August 2009 and by Decree No 8 of the President 
of the PRC on 28 December 2013 respectively. All amendments are available via 
Pkulaw.cn. http://en.pkulaw.cn.eproxy1.lib.hku.hk/. Accessed 10 April 2014. 
758 The Law on Legislation of the PRC, Art. 56. 
759 The Law on Legislation of the PRC, Art. 71. 
760 Tang Y, Zhu Y (2007) Surmounting departmental legislation (in Chinese). 
Outlook Weekly 4, p. 47. 
761 Cho YN (2006) The politic of lawmaking in Chinese local people’s con-
gresses. The China Quarterly 187, p. 596; Paler L (2005) China’s Legislation Law 
and the making of a more orderly and representative legislative system. The China 
Quarterly 182, p. 309. 
762 Xu Y, Han L (2007) Departmental interests – non- erasable trace depart-
mental legislation (in Chinese). Journal of Shan Xi Police Academy 15 (3), p. 30. 
763 Yan X, Huang S (2009) Preliminary study of China’s fishery administrative 
system reformation (in Chinese). Journal of Shanghai Ocean University 18 (2), 
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government is both a lawmaking institution and an administrative body. This al-
lows the government and its agencies to make laws with few limitations. Avoiding 
the abuse of power by the government and its agencies is the big challenge in Chi-
na’s lawmaking.  
Because China’s fisheries legislation system is a hierarchical system, the peo-
ple’s congresses or their standing committees of the provinces, autonomous re-
gions and municipalities directly under the Central Government can establish local 
regulations that do not contradict the Constitution, the laws and the administrative 
regulations.764 In cases where contradiction happens, certain State and local or-
gans, including the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme 
People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the standing committees 
of the people’s congresses of the provinces, autonomous regions and municipali-
ties directly under the Central Government, may submit to the Standing Commit-
tee of the NPC written requests for examination and suggestions.765 Local gov-
ernments can establish rules to implement the provisions of law, administrative 
regulations and local regulation or to govern special administrative matters per-
taining to their respective administrative areas.766  
 
 
 
4.2.1.2 Administrative bodies 
 
The Chinese fisheries administration system is a decentralized system. Article 6 of 
the Fisheries Law of the PRC provides the general principle for this system: 
     “The department of fishery administration under the State Council shall be in 
charge of the administration of fisheries throughout the State. Departments of 
fishery administration under people’s governments at or above the country level 
shall be in charge of fisheries in their respective areas. These departments shall 
be authorized to set up fishery superintendence agencies in important fishing are-
as and fishing ports”.  
     The Ministry of Agriculture is the major central governmental agency in charge 
of the fisheries administration in China. It determines the total allowances for sea 
catches in areas within the jurisdiction of China, approves Chinese vessels, na-
tionals and enterprises fishing in sea waters of other countries and manages issues 
                                                                                                                                     
p.219. Also see: Zhang J (2002) On reformation of fishery administration in new 
position (in Chinese). Chinese Fisheries Economics (5), p. 20. 
764 The Law on Legislation of the PRC, Art. 63. 
765 The Law on Legislation of the PRC, Art. 90. 
766 The Law on Legislation of the PRC, Art. 73. 
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referring to fishing licenses at national level.767 The Fisheries Bureau of the Minis-
try of Agriculture (Fisheries Bureau) represents the State when it exercises admin-
istrative and supervisory authority over internal affairs and external relationships 
pertaining to fisheries and fishing ports. Its specific roles include the registration 
and superintendence of fishing vessels at national level, permitting foreigners and 
foreign fishing vessels to fish in China’s jurisdictional waters768 as well as issuing 
catch certificates and endorsing statements of the processing plant. 
At the First Session of the 12
th
 NPC, a report was delivered by the State Coun-
cillor Kai Ma concerning restructuring of the National Oceanic Administration. 
The plan for institutional reform and functional transformation of the State Coun-
cil was approved by a decision of the First Session of the 12
th
 NPC on 14 March 
2013. The restructured National Oceanic Administration of the Ministry of Land 
and Resources, which is also called the National Maritime Police Administration, 
integrates the Marine Surveillance of the Ministry of Land and Resources, the 
Coast Guard Forces of the Public Security Ministry, the Fisheries Law Enforce-
ment Command of the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Maritime Anti-smuggling 
Police of the General Administration of Customs (cf. Fig. 4.1). The purpose of the 
move is to enhance the efficiency in maritime law enforcement, to improve con-
servation and management of marine resources, and to safeguard the country’s 
maritime rights and interests.769  
The Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, which was an organ of the Fisheries 
Bureau, was established to enforce law under China’s national jurisdiction, includ-
ing “protecting Chinese fishing vessels and personnel, resolving disputes in fish-
ing activities, preventing illegal fishing and protecting maritime resources”.770 At 
regional level, the Ministry of Agriculture set up three bureaus of fisheries admin-
istration for the Yellow and Bohai Seas, the East China Sea and the South China 
Sea. The three bureaus of fisheries administration are also integrated into three 
branches of the National Oceanic Administration in three marine areas respective-
ly.771 Thus China’s maritime law enforcement is highly concentrated in the hands 
                                                          
767 Fisheries Law of the PRC, Arts. 8, 22 and 23; Administrative Provisions for 
Distant Water Fisheries, Art. 3; and Provisions on the Administration of Fishery 
Licensing, Art. 5.  
768 Fisheries Law of the PRC, Art. 8. Also see: Measures of the PRC on the 
Registration of Fishing Vessels, Art. 3.  
769 Deng S (2013) China to restructure oceanic administration, enhance mari-
time law enforcement. Available via English.news.cn. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-03/10/c_132221768.htm. Accessed 
10 March 2013. 
770 Sinodefence (2009) China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC). 
http://www.sinodefence.com/navy/fisheries/fisheries-law-enforcement.asp. Ac-
cessed 14 March 2009. 
771 Email communication with Mr. Shuxian Sun, the Chief Engineer of China’s 
National Oceanic Administration. 
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of the National Oceanic Administration, which is supposed to resolve conflicts of 
administrative functions among different administrative bodies. It can be expected 
that integrating the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command into the National Oce-
anic Administration will also enhance the ability to combat IUU fishing in China’s 
maritime waters. According to Article 5 of the Provisions on the Administration of 
Fishery Licensing,772 the three bureaus are also in charge of the management and 
implementation of fishing licenses in their respective areas. However, it is still un-
known whether this function of the three bureaus will be transferred to the Nation-
al Oceanic Administration. 
Except for the fisheries administrative functions discussed above, departments 
of fishery administration under governments of coastal provinces, autonomous re-
gions and centrally-administered municipalities remain in charge of marine fisher-
ies administration in their respect administrative divisions.  
In addition, fisheries organizations and associations also engage in fisheries 
management through authorization of law and regulations. For example, the China 
Aquatic Products Processing and Marketing Association (CAPPMA) and the Chi-
na Distant Water Fisheries Association (CDWFA) are commissioned by the Fish-
eries Bureau to examine preliminarily catch certificates and statements by the pro-
cessing plant, including coordination, contact, receiving and sending documents 
and other relevant issues. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
772 Adopted at the ninth executive meeting of the Ministry of Agriculture on 9 
May 2002, promulgated by Decree No 19 of the Ministry of Agriculture on 23 
August 2002 and entered into force on 1 December 2002, revised by Decree No 
38 of the Ministry of Agriculture on 1 July 2004, by Decree No 6 of the Ministry 
of Agriculture on 8 November 2007 and by Decree No 5 of the Ministry of Agri-
culture on 31 December 2013. Available via Pkulaw.cn. 
http://222.178.216.125/rewriter/BDFB/http/dm9ojtk-
v9bm/display.aspx?cgid=216559&lib=law. Accessed 13 April 2014. 
163 
 
 
Fig. 4.1 Major administrative bodies of fisheries management in China 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2.2 China and international law 
 
Article 3 of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Procedure of the 
Conclusion of Treaties773 provides for the treaty-making capacity of entities in 
China. The State Council concludes treaties and agreements with foreign States. 
But the ratification and abrogation of treaties and important agreements can only 
be decided by the Standing Committee of the NPC. Then, the President of the 
People’s Republic of China ratifies or abrogates treaties and important agreements 
in accordance with decisions of the Standing Committee of the NPC, which is 
merely a procedure without any substantive or procedural review.774  
 
                                                          
773 Adopted at the 17
th
 Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh NPC 
on 28 December 1990, promulgated by Decree No 37 of the President of the PRC 
and entered into force on 28 December 1990. Available via Pkulaw.cn. 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1213&CGid=. Accessed 
14 April 2014. 
774 Xie X (2012) China’s procedure of the conclusion of treaties and the treaty 
capacity – the review of China’s Law of the Procedure of the Conclusion of Trea-
ties (in Chinese). Journal of the East China University of Politics Science and Law 
(1), p. 48. 
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4.2.2.1 China’s participation in the UNCLOS 
 
China signed the UNCLOS on 10 December 1982 when the Convention was 
opened for signature and ratified it on 6 June 1996. However, bordering three 
semi-enclosed seas puts China at a disadvantage under the Convention because 
China has to deal with overlapping boundaries with its neighbours opposite or ad-
jacent to its own coast and within 400 nautical miles.775 For example, no distance 
between opposing coastlines in the Yellow Sea exceeds 400 nautical miles; and 
most of the East China Sea is less than 400-nautical-mile width. In the South Chi-
na Sea, the situation is more complicated. China (including Taiwan) is adjacent to 
or opposite five neighbouring countries, including Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Brunei Darussalam and Indonesia. Most of them have contested sovereignty 
or sovereign rights to different parts in this area.776  
Fisheries issues within national jurisdiction cannot be separated from the 
agreement on the boundary delimitation. China has merely signed one maritime 
delimitation agreement with its neighbouring States. It is the Agreement on the 
Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic Zones and Continental 
Shelves in the Gulf of Tonkin between the People’s Republic of China and Vi-
etnam.777 Meanwhile, China and Vietnam have signed the Agreement of fisheries 
cooperation in the Gulf of Tonkin between the People’s Republic of China and 
Vietnam (Sino-Vietnamese Fisheries Agreement).778 The difficult achievement of 
the boundary delimitation in other areas in the China Sea results in obstacles for 
responsible fisheries. China and its neighbouring countries, including Japan779 and 
South Korea, 780  have signed joint fishery management agreements instead of 
reaching a compromise on boundary delimitation. Those agreements not only 
                                                          
775 Xue G (2008) China and the Law of the Sea: an update. In: Carsten MD (ed) 
International law and military operations. International law studies, vol 84. Naval 
War College, Newport, Rhode Island, p. 98. 
776 Xue (2008), p. 99. 
777 Signed on 25 December 2000 in Beijing and entered into force on 30 June 
2004. Authentic texts are in Chinese and Vietnamese. Law of the Sea Bulletin 56, 
p. 137; 63, p. 72. 
     778 Signed on 25 December 2000, entered into force on 30 June 2004. An unof-
ficial translation see: Zou K (2005) Law of the Sea in East Asia. Routledge, Lon-
don and New York, Appendix II. 
779 Fisheries Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and Japan (Si-
no-Japanese Fisheries Agreement), ratified in November 1997, entered into force 
on 1June 2000. For an unofficial translation of the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agree-
ment, see: Zou (2005) Law of the Sea in East Asia, Appendix I. 
780 Fisheries Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and Republic 
of Korea (Sino-Korean Fisheries Agreement), ratified on 3 August 2000, entered 
into force on 30 June 2001. Available via China Fisheries 2001 (5): 5-7. 
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govern the joint fishery management but also function as provisional arrangements 
for the future delimitation of the EEZs and continental shelves between China and 
its two neighbours.781 Nevertheless, when implementing these fisheries manage-
ment agreements, fisheries conflicts and illegal fishing usually happen due to the 
unclear delimitation. In marine areas where there is no fisheries management 
agreement, such as most areas of the South China Sea, conflicts are more intense.  
In order to implement the UNCLOS, China adopted the Law on the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the People’s Republic of China782 in 
1998 and then amended the Fisheries Law of the PRC two times in 2000 and 2004 
respectively in accordance with the UNCLOS.783 With regard to the boundary de-
limitation of EEZ, the UNCLOS does not provide specific standards. Alternative-
ly, Article  4 (1) of the Convention vaguely requires that “the delimitation of the 
EEZ between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agree-
ment on the basis of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution”.784 
Given the vague provisions, the Law on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of the 
PRC maintains that the delimitation of its EEZ should be determined by China 
with respect to the overlapping claims by agreement with the States with opposite 
or adjacent coasts in accordance with the equitable principle and on the basis of 
international law.785 This Law also codifies China’s sovereign rights over its 200-
nautical-mile EEZ for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and man-
aging the natural resources.786 In addition, Article 14 of this Law provides that 
“provisions in this Law shall not affect the rights that China has been enjoying ev-
er since the days of the past”. Although the Law does not specify what provisions 
might affect what rights, the disputes between China and its neighbours in the 
South China Sea show that these rights refer to traditional fishing rights in the 
South China Sea. 787  According to Xue (2008), China’s attitude towards the 
                                                          
781 Zou K (2005) Implementing the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea in East Asia: issues and trends. Singapore Year Book of International Law 
and Contributors 9, p. 40. 
782 Adopted at the 3
rd
 Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 9
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 NPC, 
promulgated by Decree No 6 of the President of the PRC and entered into force on 
26 June 1998. Available via LawinfoChina. 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=20220. Ac-
cessed 2 December 2013. 
783 Qu B (2009) On the application of the UNCLOS in China (in Chinese). Pub-
lic Administration & Law (1), p. 92. 
784 Liu Z (2008) The negative influence of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (in Chinese). Foreign Affairs Review 103, p. 84. 
785 The Law on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of the PRC, Art. 2. 
786 The Law on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of the PRC, Art. 3. 
787 Li J, Li D (2003) The dotted line on the Chinese map of the South China 
Sea: a note. Ocean Development & International Law 34, p. 292. 
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UNCLOS is to ensure its national interests with accompanying commitments at 
the same time.  
Additionally, China actively participates in four RFMOs that manage highly 
migratory species, including: 
 
 the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT),788 
 the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC),789 
 the Western and central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC),790 and  
 the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC).791  
 
China also participates in two RFMOs that manage fish stocks by geographical 
area, including: 
 
 the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR),792   
                                                          
788 The ICCAT is responsible for the conservation of tunas and tuna-like spe-
cies in the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas. It was established by the Interna-
tional Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic, which was concluded at Rio 
de Janeiro on 14 May 1966 and entered into force on 21 March 1969, UNTS 673, 
p. 63. 
789 The IOTC was established by the Agreement for the Establishment of the 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, which was concluded at Rome on 25 November 
1993, UNTS 1927, p. 329. 
790 The WCPFC was established by the Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean, which was concluded at Honolulu on 5 September 2000 and entered into 
force on 19 June 2004, UNTS 2275, p. 43. 
791 The IATTC was established by the 1949 Convention for the Establishment 
of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission between the United States of 
America and the Republic of Costa Rica, signed at Washington on 31 May 1949, 
UNTS 1041, p. 3. The 1949 Convention was replaced by the Convention for the 
Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Established by 
the 1949 Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of 
Costa Rica (Antigua Convention), which was signed at Washington on 13 Decem-
ber 2004 and entered into force on 10 October 2008. Available via IATTC. 
http://www.iattc.org/IATTCdocumentationENG.htm. Accessed 6 March 2014. 
The IATTC is responsible for the conservation and management of tuna and other 
marine resources in the eastern Pacific Ocean. 
792 The CCAMLR was established in 1982 with the objective of conserving 
Antarctic marine life under the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Ma-
rine Living Resources, which was concluded at Canberra on 20 May 1980, UNTS 
1329, p. 47. 
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 the Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission (APFIC).793 
 
In addition, China takes an active role in many other RFMOs, such as: 
  the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization (SPRFMO); 
and  
  the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCBSP). 
 
With regard to means of conflict settlement codified by the UNCLOS, China 
has shown little interest in utilizing international adjudication and prefers political 
negotiation.794 China has not made any declaration to choose the means of settle-
ment of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS ac-
cording to Article 287 of the UNCLOS. So China shall be deemed to have accept-
ed arbitration in accordance with Annex VII. In addition, on 25 August 2006, 
China made an announcement that: “The Government of the People’s Republic of 
China does not accept any of the procedure provided for in Section 2 of Part XV 
of the Convention with respect to all the categories of disputes referred to in par-
agraph 1 (a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea”.795 This means China does not accept the compulsory dispute set-
tlement for disputes over the sovereign rights with respect to the living resources 
in China’s EEZ provided by Article 297 (3) (a) of the UNCLOS nor the law en-
forcement activities in regard to the exercise of such sovereign rights.796 China 
consistently and expressly maintains that conflicts should be resolved through 
friendly consultation and direct negotiation between the countries concerned; 
while, concerned countries may also have recourse to other dispute settlement 
means if they agree.797  
     
 
                                                          
793 The APFIC was established under the APFIC Agreement, which entered in-
to force on 9 November 1948. Available via APFIC. Text of the APFIC Agree-
ment. http://www.apfic.org/apfic-agreement.html. Accessed 25 October 2013. 
794 Xue (2008), p. 101. 
795 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2013) China 
made an announcement with regard to Article 298 of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (in Chinese).  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn//gxh/zlb/tyfg/t270754.htm. Accessed 10 July 2013. 
796 More discussion on exceptions to compulsory dispute settlement can be 
found in Section 2.2.1.1. 
797 Chen D (2009) Recent international law of the sea (in Chinese). Ocean 
Press, Beijing, p. 541.  
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4.2.2.2 Major international legally-binding fisheries agreements not 
ratified by China and possible reasons 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implemen-
tation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement)798 and 
the 1993 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation 
and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (FAO Compli-
ance Agreement)799 are the major legally-binding fisheries agreements that regu-
late high seas fishing, particularly providing for flag State duties over high seas 
fishing vessels. China participated in the negotiation that contributed to the con-
clusion of the FAO Compliance Agreement; and, from 1993 to 1995 it attended all 
six conferences during the negotiation of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.800 China 
stated that “the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which is an important development of 
the UNCLOS, will significantly influence the conservation and management of 
marine living resources, in particular high seas fisheries resources, and promote 
international fisheries cooperation”.801 As China maintained positive attitudes to-
wards the UN Fish Stocks Agreement during the negotiation, it signed the Agree-
ment on 6 November 1996.802 However, China has not ratified this Agreement yet. 
Additionally, China is not a Party to the FAO Compliance Agreement. This sec-
tion tries to provide possible reasons why China has changed its attitude towards 
the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and why China has not officially adopted the FAO 
Compliance Agreement. 
    Firstly, participating in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement cannot guarantee that 
State Parties get quotas of fish stocks under the management of certain RFMOs. 
Given the exhausted inshore fisheries resources, China’s policy encourages the 
development of distant water fisheries. However, China did not start its distant 
water fisheries until 1985, which is much later than other developed distant-water-
                                                          
798 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement was concluded at New York on 4 August 
1995 and entered into force on 11 December 2001, UNTS 2167, p. 88. 
799 The FAO Compliance Agreement was adopted at Rome on 24 November 
1993 and came into force on 24 April 2003, UNTS 2221, p. 91. 
800 Fisheries Bureau of China (1998) The development of international coopera-
tion on fisheries (in Chinese). China Fisheries 10, p. 1. 
801  The Statement of PRC on Relevant Provisions of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement (in Chinese), promulgated and entered into force on 4 August 1995. 
Available via Chinalawedu.com. 
http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/1200/23155/23156/23170/2006/4/zl00321818
20152460026642-0.htm. Accessed 14 April 2014. 
802 Ocean & Law of the Sea (2014) Table recapitulating the status of the Con-
vention and of the related Agreements.  
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fishing States did, such as certain EU Member States, the US, the former Soviet 
Union, Japan and South Korea.803 Some developed distant-water-fishing States 
wanted to protect their interests and prevented new Parties from joining relevant 
RFMOs for quotas.804 China’s State interest lies in joining RFMOs to obtain quo-
tas for certain species. However, quotas cannot be automatically granted upon par-
ticipating in the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Thus, directly joining RFMOs brings 
distant-water-fishing States more benefits than participating in the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement. 
     China’s other concern regards certain provisions for the high seas enforcement 
by non-flag States codified by the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. In the Statement of 
the People’s Republic of China on Relevant Provisions of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement (China’s Statement on Relevant Provisions of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement), China imposes limitations on the application of Article 21 (7) of this 
Agreement.805 The Chinese government maintains that, because the inspection au-
thorized by a flag State involves the sovereignty and domestic legislation of the 
flag State, the inspecting State can merely investigate an alleged violation in such 
a way and within the scope as specified by the concerned flag State.806 In addition, 
this Statement also reflects China’s dissatisfaction with the use of force in high 
seas enforcement by non-flag States. China states that only when it is justified by 
the dangers to the safety of inspectors and when the execution of their duties may 
become obstructed, can authorized inspectors use reasonable force against crew or 
fishermen who act violently.807  
    Unlike the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which not only limits high seas fishing 
States but also provides coastal States with benefits, the FAO Compliance Agree-
ment mainly focuses on flag State duties towards fishing activities on the high 
seas, rather than providing them with any rights. The narrow acceptance of the 
FAO Compliance Agreement at a global level shows that the FAO Compliance 
                                                          
803 Bonfil R, Munro G, Sumaila UR et al (1998) Impacts of distant water fleets: 
an ecological, economic and social assessment. In: The footprint of distant water 
fleets on world fisheries. WWF’s Endangered Seas Campaign, WWF Internation-
al, Godalming, Surrey, pp. 11-111. 
804 Cui L (2012) Adapting to new marine regime and promoting sustainable 
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Available via Chinalawedu.com. 
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20152460026642-0.htm. Accessed 14 April 2014. 
806 China’s Statement on Relevant Provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agree-
ment, Art. 1. 
807 China’s Statement on Relevant Provisions of the UN Fish Stocks Agree-
ment, Art. 2. 
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Agreement is much less acceptable than the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. These are 
the major reasons why China has not participated in the FAO Compliance Agree-
ment. 
    Nevertheless, the implementation of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and the 
FAO Compliance Agreement indeed influence China’s distant water fisheries. 
With the increasing emphasis on flag State duties at a global level, many RFMOs 
have established stricter measures and have required flag States to take responsi-
bility over fishing vessels that fish in conventional areas of relevant RFMOs. For 
example, according to China’s Report on the Implementation of the 2012 Interim 
Measures for Pelagic Fisheries for the year 2012 to the SPRFMO for the Chilean 
jack mackerel fishery in conventional areas of the SPRFMO: China managed its 
fishing effort in accordance with its level of total gross tonnage adopted in the 
2012 Interim Measures. It controlled the catch of its fishing vessels within the to-
tal catch adopted in the 2012 revised Interim Measures. It provided verified data 
such as active fishing vessels in 2012, authorized fishing vessels in 2013, a month-
ly catch report, a quarterly Vessel Monitoring System and transhipment data and a 
national report to the SPRFMO in accordance with the 2012 Interim Measures and 
SPRFMO data standard. Finally it also monitored Chinese vessels through observ-
ers and vessels monitoring systems.808 Under the regime of RFMOs of which Chi-
na is a member or cooperating non-Party, China has indeed taken flag State duties 
even through it is not a Party to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement or the FAO Com-
pliance Agreement. More specific discussions can be found in the Section 4.3.1. 
    Additionally, Mr. Xiaobing Liu, who is the Director of the Division of Interna-
tional Cooperation of Fisheries Bureau of China, affirmed the significant role of 
RFMOs during a European Commission Conference - RFMOs ‘Fit for the Future’ 
held in Brussels on 1 June 2012.809 He particularly emphasized the achievement of 
IUU vessel lists and Catch Documentation Schemes in the substantial reduction of 
IUU fishing vessels and vessels with FOC. He further suggested RFMOs to ex-
pand the application of Catch Documentation Schemes to other species. China’s 
positive attitudes towards RFMOs prove that China actively participates in the 
conservation and management of fisheries resources at regional level. 
China has also been expanding fisheries cooperation with coastal States. The 
most official cooperation is between governments, in the form of fisheries agree-
ments signed by both governments. Examples can be found in the fisheries agree-
                                                          
808 SPRFMO (2013) China’s Report on the implementation of the 2012 Interim 
Measures for Pelagic Fisheries for the year 2012. 
http://www.southpacificrfmo.org/home/SearchForm?Search=China&action_result
s=Search. Accessed 10 January 2013. 
809 European Commission (2012) RFMOs ‘Fit for the Future’. 
http://webcast.ec.europa.eu/eutv/portal/archive.html?viewConference=15690. Ac-
cessed 1 June 2012. 
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ments between China and Seychelles810 as well as that between China and Mauri-
tania. 811 Cooperation can also involve private associations: for instance, together 
with China Distant Water Fisheries Association, the Fisheries Bureau in China has 
signed an exploratory fishing agreement with the Ministry of Marine Resources of 
Cook Islands, allowing 17 Chinese vessels to fish in the EEZ of the Cook Islands 
for three years from 2012 on.812  
China’s distant water fishing vessels have been fishing in 3  countries.813 How-
ever, unlike the EU, which has published all current fisheries agreements with 
third countries on its official website or in the official journal, there is no publicly 
consultable database of access agreements between China and coastal States in 
whose EEZs Chinese fishing vessels have been fishing.814 Thus, to the public, the 
activities of Chinese distant water fishing vessels and their catches may be undoc-
umented and unreported to some extent, even though such fishing is totally legiti-
mate.815 
Neither the UN Fish Stocks Agreement nor the FAO Compliance Agreement is 
legally binding to China, but China has indeed taken its flag State duties through 
adjusting and enacting its domestic legislation with regard to distant water fisher-
ies.816 Examples can be found in the Administrative Provisions on Distant Water 
Fisheries adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture, including provisions referring to 
the registration of fishing vessels, the authorization to fish on the high seas or 
within other States’ EEZs and the mark of vessels.817 As Hosch has indicated that 
“ratification per se is not necessarily the best indicator to establish in how far 
binding international provisions have been integrated into national legal frame-
                                                          
810 Republic of Seychelles Website (2006) China and Seychelles signed fisher-
ies agreement. http://sc.mofcom.gov.cn. Accessed 18 May 2006.  
811 Zhang X (2011) Mauritania hails cooperation agreement with China in fish-
ing sector. Available via China View.  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2011-08/15/c_131050906.htm. 
Accessed 14 April 2014. 
812  Baird Maritime (2011) Cook Islands sign exploratory fishing agreement 
with China. http://www.bairdmaritime.com. Accessed 5 December 2011. 
813 European Commission (2012) RFMOs ‘Fit for the Future’.  
814 Pauly D, Belhabib D, Blomeyer R et al (2013) China’s distant-water fisher-
ies in the 21st century. Fish and Fisheries. dol: 10.1111/faf.12032, p. 2. 
815 Pauly et al. (2013), p. 2. 
816 Xue G (2006) China’s distant water fisheries and its response to flag state 
responsibilities. Marine Policy 30, p. 655. 
817 Adopted at the eighth executive meeting of the Ministry of Agriculture on 
14 April 2003, promulgated by Decree No 27 of the Ministry of Agriculture on 18 
April 2004, entered into force on 1 June 2003 and revised by Decree No 38 of the 
Ministry of Agriculture on 1 July 2004. Available via Pkulaw.cn. 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=4527&CGid=. Accessed 
5 November 2013. 
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works”,818 China has put flag State measures in place although it has not ratified 
the two agreements concerning flag State duties.   
China has actively participated in the development of the 2009 FAO Agreement 
on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (FAO Port State Measures Agreement) as well. 819  For ex-
ample, China participated in the FAO/APFIC/SEAFDEC regional workshop on 
port State measures to combat IUU fishing in Bangkok in 2008. The Workshop’s 
aim was to develop national capacity and to promote bilateral, sub regional and/or 
regional coordination so that countries would be better placed to strengthen and 
harmonize port State measures and, as a result, to implement the 2001 Internation-
al Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregu-
lated Fishing (IPOA-IUU)820 and the 2005 FAO Model Scheme on Port State 
Measures to Combat IUU Fishing (FAO Model Scheme).821 One of the goals of 
this Workshop was to contribute to the development of the FAO Port State 
Measures Agreement.822 This Workshop indicated that China has inadequate spe-
cific port inspection measures and regulations, so China should develop these 
measures and regulations by using related international law and management 
measures.823 However, the Agreement has not entered into force. China has not 
signed this Agreement. 
 
                                                          
818 Hosch G (2009) Analysis of the implementation and impact of the FAO 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries since 1995, FAO Fisheries and Aqua-
culture Circular No 1038. FAO, Rome, p. 28. 
819 The FAO Port State Measures Agreement was adopted by the FAO Confer-
ence at its 36
th
 Session in Rome on 22 November 2009. Available via FAO. 
www.fao.org/fileadmin user upload legal docs 2 03 t-e.pdf . Accessed 22 Octo-
ber 2013. 
820 The IPOA-IUU was adopted by consensus at the 24
th
 Session of Committee 
on Fisheries (COFI) in Rome on 2 March 2001 and endorsed by the 120
th
 Session 
of the FAO Council on 23 June 2001. Available via FAO Fisheries and Aquacul-
ture. http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.HTM. Accessed 22 Octo-
ber 2013. 
821 The FAO Model Scheme was endorsed by the 26
th
 Session of the FAO 
COFI in Rome in 2005. Available via FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0985t/a0985t00.HTM. Accessed 22 October 
2013. 
822 Doulman DJ, Swan J (2012) A guide to the background and implementation 
of the 2009 FAO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Elimi-
nate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Circular No 1074. FAO, Rome p. 100. 
823 FAO (2008) Report of the FAO/APFIC/SEAFDEC Regional Workshop on 
Port State Measures to Combat IUU Fishing, Bangkok, Thailand, 31 March – 4 
April 2008. FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Report No 868. FAO, Rome, p. 58, 
Annex B. 
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4.2.2.3 China and non-legally binding fisheries instruments  
 
Compared to legally binding fisheries agreements, non-legally binding fisheries 
instruments are more acceptable to China. One obvious example is that China’s 
domestic fisheries legislation is mainly consistent with the 1995 Code of Conduct 
for Responsible Fisheries (Code of Conduct)824 even though China has not accept-
ed the FAO Compliance Agreement,825 which is a part of the Code of Conduct. 
China has incorporated certain provisions of the Code of Conduct and its imple-
menting instrument – IPOA-IUU into its fisheries legislation. For example, ac-
cording to the requirements of the Code of Conduct about fisheries management, 
the Fisheries Law of the PRC established a total allowable catches system and 
limitations to fishing methods, gears, period and areas, which is in accordance 
with the requirements of the Code of Conduct.826 
     The FAO has been requested by the Committee on Fisheries (COFI) to provide 
biennial progress reports on the implementation of the Code of Conduct and its 
implementing instruments, including the IPOA-IUU. These progress reports are 
based on the analysis of self-assessment questionnaires completed by FAO Mem-
bers. China responded to the questionnaires in 2000, 2006, 2010 and 2011 respec-
tively.827 The responses of individual countries are not publicly available. Howev-
er, China’s implementation of the Code of Conduct can be gauged from previous 
research that shows China’s fisheries legislation is largely consistent with the 
Code of Conduct. 828 With regard to stopping illegal fishing, China’s domestic 
                                                          
824 The Code of Conduct was unanimously adopted by the Conference of the 
FAO in Rome on 31 October 1995. Available via FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM. Accessed on 22 October 
2013. 
825 The FAO Compliance Agreement was negotiated under Article XIV of the 
FAO Constitution. Article XIV Agreements are first approved by the Conference 
(which is broadly equivalent to signature) and then open for “acceptance”,  which 
has the same function as ratification or accession. 
826 Fisheries Law of the PRC, Art. 22 and 30.  
827 FAO COFI Documents (2012) Regional statistical analysis of responses by 
FAO Members to the 2011 questionnaire on the Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries implementation, COFI/2012/SBD.1. http://www.fao.org/cofi/33132-
0abf8a3d0457871b8f80814b0f8963dbf.pdf. Accessed 5 November 2013. 
828 Discussions see: Cheng J, Cai W, Cheung W et al (2006) An estimation of 
compliance of the fisheries of China with Article 7 (Fisheries Management) of the 
UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing. 19 pages in: Pitcher TJ, Kalikoski 
D and Pramod G (eds) (2006) Evaluations of compliance with the FAO (UN) 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Fisheries Centre Research Reports, 
vol 14 (2). University of British Columbia, Vancouver, p. 24. Also see: Hosch G, 
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fisheries legislation has introduced the fishing licensing system,829 has regulated 
the minimum mesh size and fishing gear limits, has limited the proportion of 
young fish in the catch and has prohibited trade illegal catch in the banned fishing 
areas and seasons.830 According to the self-assessment questionnaires developed 
by Hosch et al and answered by the Chinese national fisheries sector, China has 
adopted and formally implemented a national plan of action to prevent, deter and 
eliminate IUU fishing (NPOA-IUU).831 However, China has not adopted a particu-
lar instrument as its NPOA-IUU. With regard to measures against IUU fishing, 
China pays more attention to the management of fishing vessels and fishing gears 
than catches, port State measures or trade-market measures. China’s interests are 
its sovereignty and sovereign rights as well as its distant water fisheries, rather 
than preventing IUU fishing entering its fish markets. This is why China has not 
yet adopted port State measures against IUU fishing. China’s attitudes towards the 
IPOA-IUU can also be seen from China’s participation in international meetings: 
viz. the Expert Consultation on IUU Fishing in Sydney in May 2000, which pre-
liminary drafted the IPOA-IUU;832 the Technical Consultation on IUU Fishing in 
Rome in October 2000, which revised the draft of IPOA-IUU; 833  the Second 
Technical Consultation on IUU Fishing in February 2001, which resulted in the 
IPOA-IUU;834 and the FAO Regional Workshop on the elaboration of NPOA-IUU 
for the Southeast Asia Subregion in Penang in Malaysia in October 2004, which 
assisted countries to develop capacity in order to be better placed to elaborate 
NPOA-IUU.835 
      
                                                                                                                                     
Ferraro G and Failler P (2011) The 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries: adopting, implementing or scoring results? Marine Policy 35:189-200. 
829 Fisheries Law of the PRC, Art. 23. 
830 Fisheries Law of the PRC, Art. 30. 
831 Hosch et al. (2011), pp.192-195. 
832 The Expert Consultation on IUU Fishing, organized by the Government of 
Australia in cooperation with FAO, was held in Sydney, Australia, 15-19 May 
2000. 
833 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture (2000) Report of the technical consultation 
on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/005/x8623e.htm. Accessed 5 November 2013. 
834 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture (2001) Report of the second technical con-
sultation on illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/003/Y0772E.htm. Accessed 5 November 
2013. 
835 FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture (2005) Report of the FAO regional work-
shop on the elaboration of national plans of action to prevent, deter and eliminate 
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing for Southeast Asia subregion. 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/009/a0211e/a0211e00.htm. Accessed 5 November 
2013. 
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4.2.3 Domestic legal acts and policies 
 
For long time China has focused on inland interests and has therefore paid less at-
tention to its marine interests. Due to conflicts between China and its neighbour-
ing countries, coastal sovereignty and sovereign rights have become China’s prior-
ity. In addition, China also promotes the development of distant water fisheries to 
alleviate the pressure on coastal fisheries. As China has not officially adopted 
most international fisheries instruments, China has not endorsed any special na-
tional legislation for the combat of IUU fishing. Domestically, IUU fishing is gen-
erally called illegal fishing. Measures that are used for dealing with IUU fishing 
are located in numerous instruments. Based on the Fisheries Law of the PRC, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Fisheries Bureau have adopted many implement-
ing rules, measures and provisions in managing fisheries. In addition, the Standing 
Committee of the NPC also adopted two laws to establish the framework of Chi-
na’s sovereignty and sovereign rights, including the 1992 Law of the People’s Re-
public of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 836 and the 1998 
Law on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of the PRC. 
 
 
 
4.2.3.1 The Fisheries law of the PRC and its detailed implementing 
rule  
 
The Fisheries Law of the PRC is the fundamental law in the field of fisheries. It 
was adopted at the 14
th
 Meeting of the Standing Committee of the NPC in 1986 
and was revised in 2000, 2004, 2009 and 2013 respectively.837 This Law does not 
specifically codify provisions for combating IUU fishing. The Fisheries Law of 
the PRC is a general law concerned with marine and inland fisheries, aquaculture 
as well as the increase and protection of fisheries resources. 
                                                          
836 Adopted at the 24
th
 Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh NPC, 
promulgated by Decree 55 of the President of the PRC and entered into force on 
25 February 1992. Available via LawinfoChina. 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=670&CGid=. Accessed 2 
December 2013. 
837 Adopted at the 14
th
 Meeting of the Standing Committee of the NPC and 
promulgated by Decree No 34 of the President of the PRC on 20 January 1986, 
revised by Decree No 38 of the President of the PRC on 31 October 2000, by De-
cree No 25 of the President of the PRC on 28 August 2004, by Decree No 18 of 
the President of the PRC on 28 August 2009 and by Decree No 8 of the President 
of the PRC on 28 December 2013 respectively. All amendments are available via 
Pkulaw.cn. http://en.pkulaw.cn.eproxy1.lib.hku.hk/. Accessed 10 April 2014. 
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    Although Article 22 of the Fisheries Law of the PRC states that China deter-
mines the total catch allowance and implements a fishing quota system in accord-
ance with the principle that the fishing amount shall be lower than the increasing 
amount of fisheries resources, China has not implemented its total allowable 
catches and its fishing quota system for its inshore fisheries.838 Alternatively, Chi-
na has been using banned fishing periods and the control of fishing vessels to 
manage its inshore fisheries. Lack of available total catch allowance and a fishing 
quota system for its inshore fisheries is the major reason for overfishing in China. 
The Fisheries Law of the PRC mainly relies on the management of a fishing li-
cense system. Fishing activities must be operated in accordance with requirements 
of the fishing license as to type of operation, location, time limit, quantity of fish-
ing facilities and fishing quota. 839 The 1986 Fisheries Law merely requires the 
fishing license system to be applied to inland fisheries and marine fisheries in wa-
ters under China’s national jurisdiction. Due to the development of China’s fisher-
ies relationship with its neighbouring States and China’s distant water fisheries, as 
well as the influence of the UNCLOS, it is imperative to implement international 
fisheries instruments that China has accepted, management and conservation 
measures of RFMOs in which China has participated, as well as fisheries agree-
ments China has signed with other States.840 This resulted in the 2000 Fisheries 
Law making the fishing license system also applicable to fishing operation on the 
high seas, on the mutually administered fishing areas determined by agreements 
concluded between China and a neighbouring country, and fisheries within other 
countries’ EEZs.  
In general, in the field of marine fishing, the Fisheries Law of the PRC provides 
general requirements concerning the bodies of fisheries administration and super-
intendence, a fishing quota system, a fishing license system as well as the admin-
istrative and criminal liabilities when violation of this Law occurs. This Law 
mainly lays down certain general flag and coastal State duties according to the in-
                                                          
838 Bai Y (2012) Inspiration for China fisheries provided by fishing quota sys-
tem of New Zealand (in Chinese). World Agriculture 8, p. 87. 
839 Fisheries Law of the PRC, Art. 25. Although China has not implemented a 
quota system for its inshore fisheries, quota systems apply to fishing activities in 
areas within the jurisdiction of RFMOs and waters of other countries. 
840 According to Article 2 of the Administrative Provisions for Distant Water 
Fisheries adopted by the Ministry of Agriculture, distant water fisheries refer to 
fishing activities such as marine fishing and the auxiliary processing, supplemen-
tary supply and product transport, which are carried out by the citizens, legal per-
sons and other organizations of China on the high seas and in the sea areas under 
the jurisdiction of any other country, excluding the fishery activities carried out in 
the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Fishing activities in 
the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea are excluded from 
distant water fisheries due to unresolved boundary delimitation in those areas.  
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ternational fisheries instruments, which is not comprehensive. Port State measures 
and trade-market measures are not mentioned in this Law.  
In order to implement the Fisheries Law of the PRC, the 1987 Detailed Rule of 
Implementing the Fisheries Law of the People’s Republic of China was adopted 
by the State Council.841 Except for the Fisheries Law of the PRC, the Detailed 
Rule of Implementing the Fisheries Law of the PRC is the highest in China’s fish-
eries legislation hierarchy. This Rule details the procedures for applying for dif-
ferent fishing licenses as well as the conditions under which it is forbidden to issue 
a fishing license.842 It also provides for inspectors of the Fisheries Law Enforce-
ment Command to have the power to inspect the identifications of a fishing vessel, 
the fishing vessel itself, fishing facilities, catches and fishing method.843 However, 
although the Fisheries Law of the PRC has been revised four times, this Rule has 
never been revised since it was promulgated in 1987. Moreover, some provisions 
are no longer in accordance with the requirements of the Fisheries Law of the 
PRC. For example the sanctions in case of violation provided by the Rule are 
much lower than those provided in the Fisheries Law of the PRC. However, in 
terms of hierarchy, the Fisheries Law of the PRC is higher than the Detailed Rule 
of Implementing the Fisheries Law of the PRC. Fines provided by the Fisheries 
Law of the PRC should be applied. Thus, the Fisheries Law of the PRC and its de-
tailed Rule need to be amended in accordance with the international law and the 
reality of China’s fisheries.  
 
 
 
4.2.3.2 Rules of administrative sanctions on fisheries  
 
Except for the Fisheries Law of the PRC and its Detailed Implementing Rule, the 
1998 Rules of Administrative Sanctions on Fisheries, which were adopted by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, are the major rules that provide administrative sanctions 
on illegal fishing in China.844  
                                                          
841 Adopted by the State Council on 14 October 1987, promulgated and entered 
into force on 19 October 1987. Available via Chinalawinfo (in Chinese). 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com.auth.lib.bit.edu.cn/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gi
d=3139. Accessed 3 December 2013. 
842 The Detailed Rule of Implementing Fisheries Law of the PRC, Arts. 15 and 
17. 
843 The Detailed Rule of Implementing Fisheries Law of the PRC, Art. 7. 
844 Adopted on 23 December 1997, promulgated by Decree No 36 of the Minis-
try of Agriculture and entered into force on 5 January 1998. Available via Chi-
nalawinfo (in Chinese). 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com.auth.lib.bit.edu.cn/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gi
d=19871. Accessed 3 December 2013. 
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The Rules of Administrative Sanctions on Fisheries provide various categories 
of administrative sanctions on fisheries. However, they have not been revised 
since they were adopted in 1998, while the Fisheries Law of the PRC has been re-
vised four times. The severity of the Rules of Administrative Sanctions on Fisher-
ies is not consistent with the Fisheries Law of the PRC and the current situation. 
For example, in order to punish any fisherman who violates the provisions of the 
fishing license as to type of operation, location, time limit, quantity of fishing fa-
cilities, Article 9 of the Rules imposes a maximum fine of 20,000 Yuan and other 
sanctions, while Article 42 of the Fisheries Law of the PRC imposes a maximum 
fine of 50,000 Yuan. Additionally, the maximum administrative sanctions are 
fixed rather than set according to value of IUU catches, which may indirectly en-
courage IUU fishing activities. Since the Fisheries Law of the PRC is higher in hi-
erarchy than the Rules of Administrative Sanctions on Fisheries, and the Fisheries 
Law of the PRC is more recent, provisions in the Rules of Administrative Sanc-
tions on Fisheries that are inconsistent with the Fisheries Law of the PRC should 
be regarded as redundant. 
 
 
 
4.2.3.3 Measures of the PRC on the registration of fishing vessels  
 
In 2012, the Ministry of Agriculture adopted new Measures of the PRC on the 
Registration of Fishing Vessels, which was revised in 2013.845 They mainly focus 
on issues of the ownership, the nationality and the port of registry of fishing ves-
sels and other related legal relationship.846 The registration is aimed at fishing ves-
sels owned by Chinese citizens or Chinese legal persons as well as fishing vessels 
bareboat chartered overseas by Chinese citizens or Chinese legal persons.847 Spe-
cifically it includes: the checking and approval of the name of a fishing vessel, the 
registration of the ownership and nationality of a fishing vessel, the registration of 
a ship’s mortgage, the registration of the bareboat charter, alteration and deletion 
registration. 
 Although the Measures of the PRC on the Registration of Fishing Vessels do not 
mention any terminology of “IUU fishing”, they indeed closely connect to the 
                                                          
845 Adopted at the tenth executive meeting of the Ministry of Agriculture in 
2012, promulgated by Decree No 8 of the Ministry of Agriculture on 22 October 
2012 and entered into force on 1 January 2013, revised by Decree No 5 of the 
Ministry of Agriculture on 31 December 2013. Available via Chinalawinfo (in 
Chinese). 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=217228. Ac-
cessed 14 April 2014. 
846 Measures of the PRC on the Registration of Fishing Vessels, Art. 1. 
847 Measures of the PRC on the Registration of Fishing Vessels, Art. 2. 
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ownership of a vessel with the Chinese nationality, providing a principal standard 
of a genuine link, which is discussed in detail below.  
 
 
 
4.2.3.4 Provisions on the administration of fishery licensing  
 
In order to conserve and reasonably utilize fisheries resources, control fishing in-
tensity, maintain the fishery production order and safeguard the legitimate rights 
and interests of fishery producers, the Provisions on the Administration of Fishery 
Licensing was adopted.848  
The Provisions on the Administration of Fishery Licensing apply to Chinese cit-
izens, Chinese legal persons and other Chinese organizations that engage in fish-
ery activities as well as foreigners engaging in fishery activities within the waters 
under the national jurisdiction of China.849 This instrument contains six chapters, 
including the general provisions, the classification of fishing vessels and operating 
places, control quotas for vessel and net devices, the management of fishing li-
censes, the issuer system and supplementary provisions. The management of fish-
ing licenses mainly deals with the combat of IUU fishing, which is specifically 
discussed below.  
 
 
 
4.2.3.5 Chinese law concerning general coastal State sovereignty and 
sovereign rights  
 
4.2.3.5.1 The law of the PRC on the territorial sea and the contiguous 
zone  
 
China ratified the UNCLOS in 1996 and adjusted its territorial sea regime to com-
ply with the UNCLOS framework. China adopted the 1992 Law of the PRC on the 
                                                          
848 Promulgated by Decree No 19 of Ministry of Agriculture on 23 August 2002 
and entered into force on 1 December 2002, amended by Decree No 38 in 2004, 
by Decree No 6 in 2007 and by Decree No 5 in 2013. Available via Pkulaw.cn. 
http://222.178.216.125/rewriter/BDFB/http/dm9ojtk-
v9bm/display.aspx?cgid=216559&lib=law. Accessed 13 April 2014. 
849 Provisions on the Administration of Fishery Licensing, Art. 2. 
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Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 850 which does not have any provisions 
for fisheries. According to the spirit of the UNCLOS, coastal States have absolute 
sovereignty with respect to the fishing activities in their territorial seas. Thus, fish-
ing activities in China’s territorial seas are subject to China’s domestic legislation. 
 
 
 
4.2.3.5.2 The law on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of the PRC  
 
After it ratified the UNCLOS in 1996, China proclaimed its EEZ in the same year. 
Then in 1998 China adopted the Law on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of the 
PRC to ensure that China may exercise its sovereign rights and jurisdiction over 
its EEZ and its continental shelf and to safeguard its national marine rights and in-
terests.851 
Article 2 of the Law on the EEZ and the Continental Shelf of the PRC expressly 
proclaims that China has a 200-nautical-mile EEZ. In case of overlapping claims 
by States with opposite or adjacent coasts, China always maintains that the delimi-
tation of such claims adheres to the equitable principle and is based on interna-
tional law. This assertion constitutes the basis of China’s fisheries agreements 
with its neighbouring States. 
 
    
 
4.2.3.5.3 Provisions on the Administration of Fishery Administrative 
Cruising within Exclusive Economic Zones 
 
The amended Provisions on the Administration of Fishery Administrative Cruis-
ing within Exclusive Economic Zones was promulgated by the Fisheries Bureau 
                                                          
850 Adopted at the 24
th
 Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh NPC, 
promulgated by Decree 55 of the President of the PRC and entered into force on 
25 February 1992. Available via LawinfoChina. 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=670&CGid=. Accessed 2 
December 2013. 
851 Adopted at the 3
rd
 Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 9
th
 NPC, 
promulgated by Decree No 6 of the President of the PRC and entered into force on 
26 June 1998. Available via LawinfoChina. 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gid=20220. Ac-
cessed 2 December 2013, Art. 1. 
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and entered into force on 14 November 2005.852 According to Article 2 of the Pro-
visions, Fishery Administrative Cruising within EEZ refers to “the law enforce-
ment acts whereby the fishery law enforcement organs, according to the relevant 
laws and regulations of the State, send out fishery administrative ships for carry-
ing out supervision and inspection over and impose administrative penalties upon 
Chinese and foreign ships and persons that engage in fishery production or survey 
of biological materials or any other fishery activities within the exclusive econom-
ic zones of China”.853 The instrument mainly stipulates China’s coastal enforce-
ment measures, such as supervision, inspection as well as imposing administrative 
penalties. 
 
 
 
4.2.3.5.4 Interim provisions for the fishery activities of foreigners or for-
eign vessels in the sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Re-
public of China 
 
In order to manage fishing activities or activities for the investigation of fishery 
resources by foreigners or foreign vessels in sea areas under China’s jurisdiction, 
the Ministry of Agriculture adopted the Interim Provisions for the Fishery Activi-
ties of Foreigners or Foreign Vessels in the Sea Areas under the Jurisdiction of the 
People’s Republic of China in 1999 and revised it in 2004.854 This instrument stip-
ulates China’s coastal State measures to control foreign fishing. 
In order to implement this instrument, the Ministry of Agriculture promulgated 
an Announcement of the Ministry of Agriculture on the Procedure in Dealing with 
Illegal Activities of Foreigners or Foreign Vessels on 3 September 1999.855 The 
                                                          
852  Promulgated by Decree No 85 of Fisheries Bureau of the Ministry of 
Agriculture of the PRC and entered into force on 14 November 2005. Available 
via LawinfoChina. 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=4855&CGid=. Accessed 
4 December 2013. 
853 Provisions for the Administration of Fishery Administrative Cruising within 
Exclusive Economic Zones, Art. 2. 
854 Adopted at the executive meeting of the Ministry of Agriculture on 21 June 
1999, promulgated by Decree No 18 of the Ministry of Agriculture and entered in-
to force on 24 June 1999, revised by Decree No 38 of the Ministry of Agriculture 
on 1 July 2004. Available via Chinalawinfo (in Chinese). 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com.auth.lib.bit.edu.cn/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gi
d=26701. Accessed 4 December 2013. 
855 Promulgated by the Ministry of Agriculture and entered into force on 3 Sep-
tember 1999. Available via 110.com (in Chinese). 
http://www.110.com/fagui/law_141491.html. Accessed 4 December 2013. 
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Announcement mainly details the specific procedures in dealing with illegal activ-
ities of foreigners or foreign vessels in the waters within China’s jurisdiction, such 
as: the legal documents that need to be filled out; the information required to deal 
with issues that should be reported to the Ministry of Agriculture; reporting proce-
dures before illegal activities are dealt with by fisheries bureaus below the provin-
cial level, reporting procedures after illegal activities have been dealt with; and re-
porting procedures after cases have been settled. 
 
 
 
4.2.3.6 Chinese port State control over fisheries 
 
China adopted the following regulations and measures regarding port State con-
trol:  
 
 the 2011 Regulation of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of 
Traffic Safety on Fishing Port Waters adopted by the State Council;856  
 the 199  Measures for the Visas for the Vessels of the People’s Republic of 
China to Enter and Exit Fishery Ports by the Ministry of Agriculture;857 and 
 the 2000 Provisions for the People’s Republic of China on Superintendence and 
Administrative Sanctions of the Navigation in Fishery Ports adopted by the Minis-
try of Agriculture.858 
 
The Regulation of the PRC on the Administration of Traffic Safety on Fishing 
Port Waters has a higher legal order than the other two instruments. However, the 
                                                          
856 Adopted at the 40th executive meeting of the State Council on 5 May 1989, 
promulgated by Decree No 38 of the State Council on 3 July 1989, came into 
force on 1 August 1989 and revised by Decree No 588 of the State Council on 8 
January 2011. Available via Chinalawinfo. 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com.auth.lib.bit.edu.cn/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gi
d=4341. Accessed 5 December 2013. 
857 Promulgated by Decree No 11 of the Ministry of Agriculture and entered in-
to force on 26 January 1990, revised by Decree No 39 of the Ministry of Agricul-
ture on 25 December 1997. Available via Chinalawinfo (in Chinese). 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com.auth.lib.bit.edu.cn/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gi
d=72315. Accessed 5 December 2013. 
858 Adopted at the sixth executive meeting of the Ministry of Agriculture on 9 
May 2000, promulgated by Decree No 34 of the Ministry of Agriculture and en-
tered into force on 13 June 2000. Available via the Central People’s Government 
of the People’s Republic of China (in Chinese). 
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2001/content_61250.htm. Accessed 5 De-
cember 2013. 
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Regulation does not refer to IUU fishing related issues. Although the Measures for 
the Visas for the Vessels of the PRC to Enter and Exit Fishery Ports require safety 
checks after a vessel enters port,859 it does not require the checking of fishing facil-
ities, catches, fishing methods and other elements that may prove IUU fishing. 
This is mainly because vessel security and marine pollution have been China’s 
priorities in the field of maritime issues.   
The Provisions for the PRC on Superintendence and Administrative Sanctions 
of the Navigation in Fishery Ports applies to fishing vessels with Chinese national-
ity and their crew, owners and operators as well as other vessels, crew, operators 
and facilities that navigate, berth or operate in China’s ports or in fishing port wa-
ters and owners.860 This instrument is aimed at the safety management of fishing 
vessels and the sanctioning of pollution of fishery ports and fishing port waters. 
Article 10 (3) of the Provisions for the PRC on Superintendence and Administra-
tive Sanctions of the Navigation in Fishery Ports prohibit fishing activities within 
passages, harbour basins, anchorages or berths of harbours that endanger maritime 
traffic safety. In addition, they stipulate administrative sanctions by the port man-
agement against transgressions such as not holding vessels certificates according 
to legal rules and regulations or not having a valid vessel name, number or vessel 
certificates.861 However, such port management is only aimed at vessels and vessel 
certificates rather than at fishing facilities, catches or fishing methods that may 
prove IUU fishing. 
Clearly the instruments introduced above authorize fisheries bureaus to check 
vessels and vessel certificates rather than fishing related factors. The absence of 
port inspections of fishing catches result in weak monitoring and enforcement of 
transhipments in ports. Although Article 9 of the Interim Provisions for the Fish-
ery Activities of Foreigners or Foreign Vessels in the Sea Areas under the Juris-
diction of the PRC prohibits foreigners or foreign vessels from transhipping catch-
es and fish products or supplies between vessels at sea in waters within China’s 
jurisdiction, unless permitted by the Fisheries Bureau. It is difficult to monitor 
transhipment at sea without port inspection. Additionally, there is no RFMO in the 
China Sea to share data between China and its neighbouring countries.862  
 
 
 
                                                          
859 The Regulation of the PRC on the Administration of Traffic Safety in Fish-
ing Port Waters, Art. 6. 
860 The Provisions for the PRC on Superintendence and Administrative Sanc-
tions of the Navigation in Fishery Ports, Art. 2. 
861 The Provisions for the PRC on Superintendence and Administrative Sanc-
tions of the Navigation in Fishery Ports, Arts. 15-20. 
862 Xu H (2009) Measures against IUU fishing and Fisheries Law of the PRC 
(in Chinese). Ocean Development and Management 26 (8), p. 27. 
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4.2.3.7 Chinese legislation for distant water fisheries 
 
The Fisheries Law of the PRC expressly encourages the development of distant 
water fisheries.863 Even though it has neither ratified the Compliance Agreement 
nor the Fish Stocks Agreement, China indeed has legislation to manage and con-
trol its distant water fisheries and to exercise its responsibility over its fishing ves-
sels, viz.: 
 
 the 1993 Notices on Prohibiting the Use of Large-scale Drift Fishing on High 
Sea promulgated by the Ministry of Agriculture;864 
 the 1997 Circular of the Ministry of Agriculture on the Issues of Nationality 
Certificates to Distant Water Fishing Vessels;865 
 the 2003 Administrative Provisions for Distant Water Fisheries adopted by the 
Ministry of Agriculture;866 and 
 the 2010 Circular of the General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture on Im-
plementing Vessel Monitoring System over Distant Water Fishing Vessels.867 
 
In the field of distant water fisheries (with the exception of the Administrative 
Provisions for Distant Water Fisheries, which is a rule of ministries), all are nor-
mative legal documents that have the lowest legal effect among national legisla-
tion. The Administrative Provisions for Distant Water Fisheries is the major doc-
ument that deals with IUU fishing. The Administrative Provisions apply to all 
                                                          
863 Fisheries Law of the PRC, Art. 21. 
864 Promulgated by the Ministry of Agriculture and entered into force on 12 
February 1993. Available via Findlaw (in Chinese). 
http://china.findlaw.cn/fagui/p_1/289207.html. Accessed 5 December 2013. 
865 Promulgated by Decree No 30 of the Ministry of Agriculture and entered in-
to force on 5 July 1993, revised by Decree No 39 of the Ministry of Agriculture on 
25 December 1997. Available via Chinalawinfo (in Chinese). 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com.auth.lib.bit.edu.cn/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gi
d=66170. Accessed 5 December 2013. 
866 Adopted at the eighth executive meeting of the Ministry of Agriculture on 
14 April 2003, promulgated by Decree No 27 of the Ministry of Agriculture on 18 
April 2004, entered into force on 1 June 2003 and revised by Decree No 38 of the 
Ministry of Agriculture on 1 July 2004 Available via Chinalawinfo 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com.auth.lib.bit.edu.cn/NewLaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=c
hl&Gid=45795. Accessed 5 December 2013. 
867  Promulgated by the General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture 
concerning Fisheries on 20 April 2010, entered into force on 1 January 2011. 
Available via Chinalawinfo (in Chinese). 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com.auth.lib.bit.edu.cn/NewLaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=c
hl&Gid=129314. Accessed 5 December 2013. 
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Chinese nationals and vessels conducting fishing or fisheries-related activities on 
the high seas or in waters within the national jurisdiction of other States. But the 
instrument does not apply to fishing or fisheries-related activities in the Yellow 
Sea, the East China Sea or the South China Sea because fisheries in these areas are 
managed under bilateral fisheries agreements with China’s neighbouring coun-
tries. It should be mentioned that excluding the fishing activities in the Yellow 
Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea is a major reason why China’s 
published quantity of catches of distant water fisheries is much lower than certain 
scientists have estimated.868  
The Administrative Provisions for Distant Water Fisheries manage distant water 
fisheries mainly through the management of the following aspects: the application 
for and the examination and approval of distant water fishery projects, the accredi-
tation of distant water fishery enterprises’ qualifications, the confirmation of pro-
jects as well as the management of distant water fishing vessels and crew. 
     
 
 
4.2.3.8 The latest development in China’s fisheries law 
 
In 2013, China’s State Council promulgated Several Opinions on Promoting the 
Sustainable and Healthy Development of Marine Fisheries, which deal with ma-
rine fisheries in particular. 869 This instrument expressly indicates that China shall 
strictly combat IUU fishing to ensure the conservation of fisheries resources.870 On 
the one hand, China shall stimulate the enforcement of its fisheries law, including 
strictly combating fishing without fishing license, vessel registration certificate or 
vessel inspection certificate, paying special attention if the actual power of a ves-
sel is higher than that indicated as well as combating various illegal fishing.871 On 
the other hand, China shall stimulate the management of foreign-related fishing. 
Specifically, China shall promote bilateral and multilateral fishery cooperation, 
and participate in the conclusion of international fishery treaties, agreements and 
                                                          
868 China has been found over-reported its domestic catch, substantially under-
reported its distant water catch. In:  Pauly et al. (2013), p. 10. 
869 Promulgated by the State Council and entered into force on 8 March 2013. 
Available via the Central Peoples’ Government of the People’s Republic of China 
(in Chinese). http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-06/25/content_2433577.htm. Ac-
cessed 3 December 2013. 
870 Several Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Sustainable and 
Healthy Development of Marine Fishery, para. 5. 
871 Several Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Sustainable and 
Healthy Development of Marine Fishery, para. 16. 
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standard regulations.872 China shall also establish and improve the distant water 
fishery management system in accordance with international fishery management 
rules.873 Additionally, China shall improve the education and management of fish-
ermen and fishery enterprises as well as strictly adhere to relevant laws, regula-
tions and international treaties.874 This instrument reflects the development trend 
in China’s fisheries laws in the near future. It shows that China still focuses on its 
coastal State sovereignty and sovereign rights but will also take responsibility over 
its fishing vessels. 
 
 
 
4.2.4 Concluding remarks 
 
China’s legal system is highly centralized. In the field of fisheries, the Fisheries 
Law of the PRC, which was adopted by the Standing Committee of the NPC, is 
the fundamental law.  The State Council, which is the highest administrative au-
thority, can adopt fisheries administrative rules and regulations. The ministries and 
commissions of the State Council can issue fisheries rules within the limits of their 
powers in accordance with the law as well as the administrative regulations, deci-
sions and orders of the State Council. The Fisheries Law, fisheries administrative 
rules and regulations, as well as fisheries rules of ministries and commissions and 
other normative documents constitute China’s legal framework for fisheries. Fish-
eries administrative rules and regulations adopted by the State Council as well as 
Fisheries rules issued by the Ministry of Agriculture occupy a predominant posi-
tion in China’s fisheries legislation, which results in “departmentalism”. 
Together with its Fisheries Bureau, the Ministry of Agriculture is the major 
central governmental agency in charge of the fisheries administration in China. 
Since 2013, the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command, which was a department 
of the Fisheries Bureau, has been transferred to the National Oceanic Administra-
tion. Therefore, the National Oceanic Administration is now in charge of protect-
ing Chinese fishing vessels and personnel, resolving disputes in fishing activities, 
preventing illegal fishing and protecting marine resources under China’s national 
jurisdiction. The transfer of these functions is still in process so that it is unknown 
which ministry has certain specific responsibility.  
                                                          
872 Several Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Sustainable and 
Healthy Development of Marine Fishery, para. 17. 
873 Several Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Sustainable and 
Healthy Development of Marine Fishery, para. 17. 
874 Several Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the Sustainable and 
Healthy Development of Marine Fishery, para. 17. See Section 4.2.2.1 for interna-
tional treaty and RFMOs in which China has participated. 
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 Among all the legally binding international fisheries agreements introduced in 
Chapter 2, China has only signed and ratified the UNCLOS. On the one hand, the 
UNCLOS authorizes States to establish a 200-nautical-mile EEZ, while on the 
other hand the EEZ create for States, like China and its neighbours, complicated 
boundary issues which result in fisheries conflicts in the China Sea.  
Without explicitly defining the maritime boundaries in most areas of the China 
Sea, China has signed several bilateral fisheries agreements with its neighbouring 
States. However, these undefined maritime boundaries usually result in fisheries 
conflicts and illegal fishing. In marine areas where there are no fisheries agree-
ments, conflicts are more intense. Besides bilateral cooperation, China has also 
played an active role in regional fisheries management and conservation according 
to requirements of the UNCLOS. But in cases where conflicts happen, China pre-
fers bilateral political negotiations over international adjudication.  
China has actively participated in the negotiations of other international fisher-
ies agreements. Although it has not ratified the UN Fish Stocks Agreement nor the 
FAO Compliance Agreement, China has legislation with flag State measures for 
its fishing vessels and has actively participated in regional fisheries management 
and conservation initiatives, as well as cooperated with coastal States. However, 
the information exchange on fisheries agreements between China and coastal 
States in whose EEZs Chinese fishing vessels have been fishing is not sufficiently 
transparent, which may aggravate unreported fishing even through such fishing is 
totally legitimate. With regard to the FAO Port State Measures Agreement, this 
Agreement has not yet entered into force. This, however, does not exclude the 
possibility that China will join this Agreement or adopt new port State measures in 
future. China’s attitude towards non-legally binding fisheries instruments with re-
gard to combating IUU fishing is more positive. China has implemented part of 
the Code of Conduct and the IPOA-IUU, while it has not yet adopted the FAO 
Model Scheme. 
China has not specifically established any national legislation pertaining to the 
combat of IUU fishing. Measures used to deal with IUU fishing are located in 
numerous instruments. Based on the Fisheries Law of the PRC, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and the Fisheries Bureau have adopted many implementing rules, 
measures and provisions in managing fisheries, covering such aspects as the ad-
ministrative sanctions on fisheries, the registration of fishing vessels, the admin-
istration of fishery licensing, coastal State sovereignty and sovereign rights, and 
responsibilities over distant water fishing vessels. Although China has established 
several regulations and measures for port control, these instruments merely au-
thorize fisheries bureaus to check vessels and vessel certificates rather than fishing 
related factors. China pays more attention to fishing activities in waters within its 
national jurisdiction and its fishing vessels rather than to port State measures or 
trade-market measures. This is mainly due to China’s interest in its sovereignty 
and sovereign rights as well as its distant water fisheries, rather than in preventing 
IUU fishing catches entering its fish markets. Additionally, China’s current Fish-
eries Law and its implementing rules, measures and provisions need to be amend-
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ed to make them more consistent and to accord them with the development of 
fisheries.  
 
 
 
4.3 Flag State duties and coastal State measures 
 
4.3.1 Flag State duties and coastal State rights in implementing 
fisheries agreements with Japan and South Korea 
 
4.3.1.1 Background 
 
Historically, China shares marine fisheries resources with its neighbouring coun-
tries Japan and South Korea in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea. In 1996, all 
three countries officially ratified the UNCLOS. 
The UNCLOS allows a State to establish a 200-nautical-mile EEZ. However, 
the Yellow Sea and most of the East China Sea is nowhere more than 400 nautical 
miles in width. This means that there are overlapping areas in the EEZs claimed 
by China, Japan and South Korea. The ambiguity of the provisions of the 
UNCLOS pertaining to boundary delimitation cannot help resolve the boundary 
problems in the East Asian region.875 Therefore, regional cooperation in the East 
Asian region is crucial for the development of fisheries. But, due to the Di-
aoyu/Senkaku dispute between China and Japan, the Dok-do/Takeshima dispute 
between South Korea and Japan, as well as the complicated situation on the Kore-
an Peninsula and the relationships across the Taiwan Straits, regional cooperation 
is difficult.876  
According to Article 297 (3) of the UNCLOS, disputes concerning the interpre-
tation or application of the provisions of the UNCLOS with regard to fisheries 
shall be excluded from compulsory procedures provided by Section 2 of the Part 
XV of the UNCLOS. The complexity of fisheries relationships in the East Asia re-
sults in negotiations rather than resorting to compulsory dispute settlements. In or-
der to maintain and develop its marine fisheries under these complicated circum-
stances, States in this Area have cooperated bilaterally. China reached interim 
                                                          
875 Paik JH (1996) UNCLOS and boundary delimitation in East Asia. In: Kim 
D, Park C, Lee SH el al (eds) UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and East 
Asia. The Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, p 183-203. 
876 Xue G (2004) China’s response to international fisheries law and policy: na-
tional action and regional cooperation. Dissertation, University of Wollongong, 
pp. 182-184. 
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fishery agreements with Japan in 1997 and with South Korea in 2000, viz. the 
Fishery Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and Japan (Sino-
Japanese Fishery Agreement)877 and the Fishery Agreement between the People’s 
Republic of China and South Korea (Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement) re-
spectively.878 These provisional arrangements are believed to allow the peaceful 
development of fisheries resources in disputed waters.879 Whether these fishery 
agreements function as expected is analysed below. 
 
 
 
4.3.1.2 States’ duties under fisheries agreements  
 
The aims of the two fishery agreements are to resolve fishery issues in the EEZ 
even if boundary delimitations are still in question. The provisions for the prompt 
release in the two fishery agreements are in accordance with Article 73 of the 
UNCLOS.880 In addition, the parties of the two agreements have agreed not to im-
pose imprisonment or other forms of corporal punishment. Thus, any form of cor-
poral punishment is expressly prohibited when implementing these agreements. 
The Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement establishes a “Provisional Measures 
Zone” in the East China Sea where the EEZ claims of China and Japan overlap 
(cf. Map 4.2). Additionally, this Agreement also indicates that the sea area south 
of 27° N and west of 125°30′ E (with exception of the EEZ of China in the South 
China Sea) is excluded from the scope of the regulation of the Agreement (cf. 
Map 4.3).881 Due to the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands dispute and the relation with 
Taiwan, the current fishing pattern is maintained in this sea area. In addition, Chi-
nese traditional squid fishing has been allowed in a squid fishing zone in Japanese 
waters for five years.882  
    The Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement has also adopted a similar Provi-
sional Measures Zone in the Yellow Sea and expressly provided a Current Fishing 
Pattern Zone. The Agreement has established two Transitional Zones located on 
the eastern and western sides of the Provisional Measures Zone (cf. Map 4.2). Ad-
                                                          
877 Signed on 11 November 1997 and entered into force on 1 June 2000. For an 
unofficial translation of the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement, see: Zou (2005) 
Law of the Sea in East Asia, Appendix I. 
878 Signed on 3 August 2000 and entered into force on 30 June 2001. Available 
via China Fisheries (5): 5-7. 
879 Wu H, Zhang D (2010) Territorial issues on the East China Sea: a Chinese 
position. Journal of East Asia & International Law 1, p. 144. 
880 Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement, Art. 5. And Sino-South Korean Fishery 
Agreement, Art. 5. 
881 Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement, Art. 6. 
882 Huang S, Tang Y (2010) Fisheries regulation and fisheries management (in 
Chinese). China Agriculture Press, Beijing, p. 84. 
190  
ditionally, the Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement regulates other zones that 
are not officially mentioned in the Agreement, including the Restriction Zone of 
South Korea, the Special Zone of South Korea and the Fishery Management Zone 
at the Mouth of the Yangtze River (cf. Map 4.2). 
 
 
 
 
Map 4.2 Agreed zones of Sino-Japanese / Sino-South Korean Fishery Agree-
ments 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Xue G (2004) China’s response to international fisheries 
law and policy: national action and regional cooperation, Map 6.1. 
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Map 4.3 Water zones provided by the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement. China Fisheries, 2000 
(3). 
 
 
 
    Different management measures apply to different zones. Within the Provision-
al Measures Zones, each Party shall take administrative and other necessary 
measures for its nationals and fishing vessels. Moreover, each Party may not im-
pose administrative or other measures on nationals and fishing vessels of the other 
Party in this zone. In cases where a Party discovers that a national or a fishing ves-
sel of the other Party has breached the operational regulations decided by the Si-
no-Japanese Fishery Joint Committee or the Sino-South Korean Fishery Joint 
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Committee, it may call the said national or fishing vessel’s attention to the trans-
gression and notify the other Party of the facts. The other Party, with due regard to 
the notification, shall inform the former of the result after necessary measures 
have been taken.883 This means that in cases where illegal fishing occurs within 
the Provisional Measures Zones, the flag State jurisdiction applies rather than the 
coastal State jurisdiction.884 
The Transitional Zones in the Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement were es-
tablished to transform the management and conservation measures into those un-
der EEZ regime within four years. Fishery activities within the Transitional Zones 
fell under the EEZ regime after 2005. The two parties agreed to take management 
and conservation measures in the Transitional Zones similar to those applied to the 
Provisional Measures Zone, which means flag State jurisdiction applies to the 
Transitional Zones. The Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement allows the two 
parties to jointly supervise and inspect, viz. taking the same patrol vessel, ordering 
vessels to stop and doing joint boarding and inspection.885 In addition, each party 
provides fishing licenses to its vessels for operating in the other party’s Transi-
tional Zone and provides a list of such vessels to the other party.886 
Additionally, since the Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement entered into 
force, Chinese fishing vessels shall not enter the Restriction Zone of South Korea 
and the Special Zone of South Korea to conduct fishing operations; while fishing 
vessels of South Korea shall not enter China’s Fishing Management Zone at the 
Mouth of the Yangtze River.887 
In order to strengthen the management of fishery activities in the Provisional 
Measures Zone and the Transitional Zones, the Ministry of Agriculture in China 
promulgated Interim Measures for the Administration of the Provisional Measures 
Zone in the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement in 1999 (revised in 2004) and 
Measures for the Administration of the Provisional Measures Zone and the Transi-
tional Zone in the Sino-South Korean Agreement in 2001 respectively. Both 
Measures stipulate the administrative authorities with regard to fishing activities in 
the Provisional Measures Zones, fishing capacity, conditions of access for fishing, 
procedures of application for fishing in the Provisional Zones and requirements of 
fishing logs. 
It should be pointed out that the two fishery agreements do not have particular 
provisions for dispute settlement. As China, Japan and South Korea are all parties 
to the UNCLOS, the dispute settlement mechanism of the UNCLOS may apply to 
                                                          
883 Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement, Art. 7 (3); Sino-South Korean Fishery 
Agreement, Art. 7 (3). 
884 Zou K (2003) Sino-Japanese joint fishery management in the East China 
Sea. Marine Policy 27, p. 134. 
885 Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement, Art. 8 (3). 
886 Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement, Art. 8 (4). 
887 Huang and Tang (2010), p. 88. 
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such fisheries disputes where the fishery agreements apply.888 Particularly, in cas-
es where a vessel and its crew are detained by a coastal State, the dispute of 
prompt release may be submitted to the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism 
by the flag State. China, South Korea and Japan have chosen not the take recourse 
to the provided settlement of disputes mechanism under Article 287 of the 
UNCLOS.889 Disputes of the prompt release between China and South Korea or 
between China and Japan that cannot be resolved by diplomatic means may be 
submitted to the ITLOS in accordance with Article 291 of the UNCLOS. 
 
 
 
4.3.1.3 Fisheries conflicts and IUU fishing  
 
In the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea, Chinese fishing vessels have conducted 
more IUU fishing in Japanese waters and South Korean waters than its neigh-
bours’ fishing vessels have done in Chinese waters. This is partly because fisher-
ies resources near South Korea and Japan are more abundant, and because Chinese 
fishing vessels have historically been more used to operating in the waters of Chi-
na’s neighbours than fishing vessels of Japan and South Korea have in Chinese 
waters. The illegal fishing conducted by Chinese vessels in South Korean waters 
is particularly serious. Between 2002 and 2011, there were 4,175 Chinese fishing 
vessels seized due to illegal fishing in South Korean waters, while only two South 
Korean fishing vessels were seized in Chinese waters for infringements of Chinese 
fisheries laws.890 Compared to South Korean waters, illegal fishing has happened 
much less frequently in Japan’s waters. Although the exact number of seized Chi-
nese fishing vessels by the Coast Guard of Japan is not made public, the total 
number of all foreign illegal fishing vessels in Japanese waters is 7 in 2012 and 11 
in 2011.891 It is therefore safe to assume that there is much less Chinese illegal 
fishing in Japanese waters.  
There are three reasons why Chinese fishing vessels have conducted more ille-
gal fishing in South Korean waters than in Japanese waters. Firstly, most Chinese 
fishing vessels fishing in the East China Sea operate in the Provisional Measures 
                                                          
888 See: Chapter 2, 2.2.1.1. 
     889 Oceans & Law of the Sea (2014) Settlement of disputes mechanism.  
890 Kim SK (2012) Illegal Chinese fishing in the Yellow Sea: a Korean officer’s 
perspective. Journal of East Asia & International Law 5 (2), 466.  
891 Japan Coast Guard (2013) The situation of the combat of maritime crimes in 
2012 (in Japanese). 
http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/kouhou/h25/k20130319/k130319-2.pdf. Ac-
cessed 19 March 2013. Also see: Japan Coast Guard (2012) The situation of the 
combat of maritime crimes in 2011 (in Japanese). 
http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/info/kouhou/h24/k20120302/k120302-1.pdf. Ac-
cessed 2 March 2012. 
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Zone of the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement. They rarely venture into the Japa-
nese waters due to the long distance. Secondly, the physical closeness of the Chi-
nese and South Korean coasts makes reaching South Korean fishing grounds and 
transporting catch back easy.892 Thirdly, the zones established by the Sino-South 
Korean Fishery Agreement are more complicated than those established by the Si-
no-Japanese Fishery Agreement.  
This section mainly uses the illegal fishing conducted by Chinese fishing ves-
sels in South Korean waters as an example to explain the reasons for IUU fishing 
in this area and the possible measures to deal with it. 
The major reasons why South Korean Coast Guard seizes and punishes Chinese 
fishing vessels are: a. entry without fishing license; b. cross-border fishing in the 
Restriction Zone of South Korea; c. entry without notification; d. entry before the 
informed time; e. not having capacity plans or not having a capacity plan with the 
stamp or seal of the applicant; f. the mesh size of the cod-end of the trawl does not 
meet the requirements; g. not having filled in the fishing logs or having filled in 
the fishing logs incorrectly.893  
The conflicts have intensified in recent years. Both Chinese crew and the Kore-
an Coast Guard have had resorted to violence. For example, conflicts took a very 
serious turn on 12 December 2011. After the coast guard threw flash bombs at the 
Chinese fishing vessel, Lu Wen Yu, its Captain Dawei Cheng wielded a knife and 
killed a Korean Coast Guard officer. Later on 17 January 2012, the Korean Coast 
Guard forcefully boarded the Chinese fishing vessel, Zhe Tai Yu Yun, and gave 
the crew a serious beating. Another tragedy happened on 16 October 2012: a Chi-
nese fisherman was fatally shot by the Korean Coast Guard. With more and more 
serious conflicts, the illegal fishing issue between China and South Korea has be-
come a diplomatic problem.  
The current fisheries problems between China and South Korea are inseparably 
related to the implementation of the Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement. This 
Agreement has not taken into account China’s traditional fishing rights in South 
Korean waters as the South Korean-Japan Fishery Agreement has done for South 
Korean traditional fishing in Japanese waters. 894  After the Sino-South Korean 
Fishery Agreement entered into force, more than 18,100 Chinese fishing vessels 
that used to fish in the Provisional Measures Zone, the Transitional Zone and 
South Korean waters had to leave those waters.895 However, Chinese crew do not 
                                                          
892 Kim (2012), p. 473. 
893 Yu X (2002) Implementation of the Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement: 
an interview with Niu Yushan who is the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries Ad-
ministration for the Yellow and Bohai Seas (in Chinese). China Fisheries (8): p. 
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really understand why the Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement can deprive 
them of their traditional fishing rights. Additionally, the design of the various 
zones and the different laws applied in each case has also increased the difficulty 
for Chinese crew to understand. Chinese government have disseminated the Sino-
South Korea Fishery Agreement and its relevant laws to Chinese fishermen, par-
ticularly China’s Measures for the Administration of the Provisional Measures 
Zone and the Transitional Zone in the Sino-South Korean Agreement as well as 
other fisheries laws of South Korea. China should also educate its crew as to the 
severity of illegal fishing infraction in South Korean waters and the possible pun-
ishment Chinese crew might be exposed to in case of violations. For example, alt-
hough almost two thirds of illegal Chinese fishing vessels have fishing authoriza-
tion, they still undermine South Korean fisheries law.896 The most common non-
compliance phenomena include: the mesh size of the fishing vessel does not meet 
the requirements; and the fishing logs have not or not correctly been filled in. As 
the concept of IUU fishing does not exist in China, unreported fishing is generally 
called illegal fishing, which particularly confuses fishermen that cannot under-
stand why they are being punished while holding proper fishing authorization. 
There are two reasons why the Sino-South Korean fisheries conflicts are so 
abundant. One is that Chinese crew violently resist the Korean Coast Guard in the 
Korean EEZ. South Korea used to impose a maximum fine of 100 million KRW 
(89,956 USD) on foreign illegal fishing vessels in its EEZ. Once a Chinese fishing 
vessel and its crew are detained by the Korean Coast Guard, the fine may leave the 
owner of the vessel bankrupt. On 14 May 2012, South Korea revised its Act on the 
Exercise of Sovereign Rights on Foreigners Fishing, etc., within the Exclusive 
Economic Zone to double the existing 100 million KRW fine to 200 million KRW 
(179,912 USD). Additionally, if Chinese crew do not follow the instructions from 
the Korean Coast Guard to stop, they might be subjected to 100 million KRW fi-
ne, again a doubling.897 Together with higher investments in enforcement equip-
ment and stricter enforcement, the substantial increase of the fines is believed by 
South Korea to discourage illegal Chinese fishing vessels from entering its waters. 
In 2012, 467 illegal Chinese fishing vessels were detained by South Korea, which 
is a decrease by 13 per cent compared to 2011. Among those vessels, 32 fishing 
vessels entered the territorial sea of South Korea, 119 were not authorized to fish, 
while the rest had fishing authorization but undermined the relevant laws and reg-
ulations of South Korea.898 According to Suk Kyoon Kim, the Commissioner Gen-
eral of the Korean Coast Guard, “even with this decrease in the number of illegal 
                                                          
896 Xiong and Che (2009), p. 9166. 
897 Kim TG (2012) Will higher fines deter Chinese fishing boats? Available via 
The Korea Times. 
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2013/07/123_111057.html. Accessed 
15 May 2012. 
898 Li D (2013) South Korea announces that it will combat illegal Chinese fish-
ing vessels thoroughly (in Chinese). Available via Huanqiu Website. 
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fishing vessels, the rate of unpaid fine had increased by 10.5 per cent where the 
number of crew arrested had also more than doubled. In other words, the in-
creased fine had discouraged Chinese fishing vessels from engaging in illegal 
fisheries. However, even though the fine itself has actually increased,  because 
most of the crew is unable to pay such high amounts cases which fail to pay the fi-
ne and the number of people getting arrested has also gone up.”899 Thus South 
Korean measures have only played a limit role in preventing illegal fishing by 
Chinese fishing vessels. There were still many Chinese fishing vessels detained 
and crew arrested due to illegal fishing. The increased fine and stricter enforce-
ment may result in more resistance by Chinese crew.  
 Another factor intensifying the fisheries conflicts between China and South Ko-
rea is the violence used in enforcement measures by Korean Coast Guard. Since 
the death of a Korean Coast Guard officer on 25 August 2008, the Korean Coast 
Guard has begun to undertake stronger measures against illegal Chinese fishing 
vessels, particularly allowing coast guard officers to use firearms.900 As introduced 
in Chapter 2, Article 73 (3) of the UNCLOS, in the absence of agreements to the 
contrary by the States concerned, does not permit coastal State penalties for viola-
tions of fisheries laws and regulations in the EEZ to include imprisonment or any 
other forms of corporal punishment. So South Korea should not unilaterally allow 
its coast guard officers to use firearms against Chinese crew. The language obsta-
cle between Chinese crew and Korean Coast Guard officers usually causes further 
misunderstanding. In order to reduce the possibilities of fisheries conflict resulting 
from misunderstanding, to prevent Chinese fishing vessels illegally operating in 
the EEZ of South Korea and to prevent the abuse of enforcement by Korean Coast 
Guard officers, China and South Korea have decided to jointly patrol the Provi-
sional Measures Zone to combat illegal fishing.901  
Joint patrols play an important role in fishery cooperation between China and 
other countries. Since 1994, China and the US are cooperating in the North Pacif-
ic. The Chinese coast guards’ management of nearly 300 squid fishing boats in the 
North Pacific has clearly achieved positive results.902 Although the joint enforce-
ment between China and South Korea has not been implemented, it is expected to 
ease the fisheries conflicts.  
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900 Yang Z (2012) The present and future of the Sino-South Korean fisheries 
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%20NewsArticles/Print.aspx?tabid=99&tabmoduleid=94&articleId=690441&mod
uleId=405&PortalID=0. Accessed 29 December 2011. 
197 
In addition, China should also exercise its flag State duties to monitor the fish-
ing activities of vessels flying its flag. As the zones covered by the Sino-South 
Korean Fishery Agreement are complicated, sometimes Chinese fishermen may 
not be aware that they have crossed the boundary without the use of a GPS. There-
fore, China and South Korea have made progress by deciding in 2012 that Chinese 
fishing vessels operating in the EEZ of South Korea shall install GPS, the Fishing 
Vessel Identification System, Vessel Monitoring Systems and the Automatic Iden-
tification System.903 
Whether to keep the Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement is also disputed in 
both China and South Korea. As the Agreement has passed its first five-year term, 
either party may terminate this Agreement at any time by giving the other party 
six months’ written notice.904 Currently, this Agreement brings more benefits to 
South Korea than to China. Because the number of fishing vessels in South Korea 
is much lower than that in China, reducing fishing vessels is easier for South Ko-
rea. With the problem of overfishing and pollution in China’s coastal waters, fish-
eries conflicts may not be halted if China cannot successfully resolve the reduction 
of fishing vessels. China installed a marine fishing vessel reduction plan for 2003-
2010, which did achieve a reduction by 2008 close to the target, but after that both 
the number of vessels and the total combined power has started to increase 
again.905 So China has indeed to put another fishing vessel reduction plan into 
place.  
In order to help vessels and fishermen that have had to leave the South Korean 
waters due to the Agreement, China can on the one hand relocate those vessels 
and fishermen to fish overseas; on the other hand, China should focus more on 
marine aquaculture and seafood processing and other fisheries industries.906 If one 
of the parties terminates the Agreement, the Provisional Measures Zone and the 
previous Transitional Zone will become heavily disputed areas again. Chinese 
fishing vessels entering the Provisional Measures Zone and the previous Transi-
tional Zone on South Korea’s side may have a higher chance of becoming imped-
ed by South Korea because the latter also claims sovereign rights over such wa-
ters. Although Chinese fishing vessels historically were accustomed to fishing in 
waters beyond the territorial sea of South Korea, since the application of the EEZ 
regime Chinese vessels cannot fish in South Korea’s EEZ without the latter’s au-
thorization. Thus, even though China terminates the Agreement, Chinese fishing 
vessels cannot freely enter the EEZ of South Korea anymore. To end its disadvan-
tageous fishery relationship with South Korea, the solution for China is to first 
                                                          
903 Phoenix Television (2012) China and South Korea will jointly enforce to 
combat IUU fishing and improve the management of fishing vessels (in Chinese). 
Available via Sina. 
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904 Sino-South Korea Fishery Agreement, Art. 14 (2).  
905 FAO (2012) The state of world fisheries and aquaculture 2012, p. 11. 
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clearly delineate its boundaries, before negotiating with South Korea again in or-
der to achieve a more reasonable agreement. 
     
 
 
4.3.1.4 A broader view on fisheries disputes among China, Japan and 
South Korea 
 
States prefer to cooperate bilaterally instead of multilaterally in the field of fisher-
ies in the Yellow Sea and the South East Sea. Such bilateral arrangements usually 
undermine the rights of third countries. For example, the EEZ claimed by South 
Korea overlaps with the Provisional Measures Zone of the Sino-Japanese Fishery 
Agreement (cf. Map 4.2). So vessels of South Korea still fish in such waters. As 
the Middle Waters of the South Korean- Japanese Fishery Agreement overlap with 
the Provisional Measures Zone of the Sino-Japanese Fishery Agreement, there is 
no agreement between South Korea and China in those waters. Chinese fishing 
vessels can also fish in the Middle Waters of the East China Sea under the South 
Korean-Japanese Fishery Agreement (cf. Map 4.2).907  
In practice, those bilateral fisheries agreements make the situation in the Yellow 
Sea and the East China Sea more complicated. Firstly, various zones established 
by those fishery agreements means that different laws and regulations apply. 
When there are boundary disputes among States, it is impossible to avoid bounda-
ry crossings by fishermen. Secondly, bilateral agreements cannot influence the in-
terests of a third State. If there is another State involved in the fisheries relation-
ship, why do concerned States not negotiate multilaterally? As the boundary 
delimitation cannot be resolved in a short period, it is highly recommended to es-
tablish a multilateral fishery regime in those waters. Compared to the situation of 
the South China Sea as will be discussed below, it is much easier to establish a 
multilateral fishery regime in the Yellow Sea and the East China Sea as only Chi-
na, Japan and South Korea are involved. As certain RFMOs have played an effec-
tive role in combating IUU fishing in other waters, establishing a RFMO only for 
conservation and management of fisheries resources in the Yellow Sea and the 
East China Sea can make the fisheries relationships easier among those States. On 
the one hand, rules and regulations under a RFMO are less complicated to under-
stand and easier to enforce. Boundary disputes may be temporarily put aside. On 
the other hand, patrolling under the legal framework of a RFMO can reduce the 
possibility of abuse of enforcement rights. However, in the Yellow Sea and East 
China Sea, fisheries issues are not the main concern. Security is the priority, thus 
it will be a daring attempt to put part of the sovereign rights under joint manage-
ment. Although there is no joint development in the field of fisheries in the Yel-
low Sea or the East China Sea, the 2008 China-Japan Principled Consensus on the 
East China Sea Issue is an example for concerned States to temporarily ease the 
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maritime disputes and to jointly develop resources, particularly oil and gas, in a 
part of the East China Sea.908 
 
 
 
4.3.2 China’s coastal State measures and flag State responsibility 
in the South China Sea 
 
4.3.2.1 Fisheries conflicts in the South China Sea 
 
The fisheries conflicts in the South China Sea are much more complicated than 
that in the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea. There are six countries bordering 
this sea area, viz. Brunei Darussalam, China (including the People’s Republic of 
China and Taiwan), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. It should 
be pointed out that all of the States bordering the South China Sea have a one-
China policy and Taiwan maintains similar claims to the Beijing government so 
that we do not refer to Taiwan’s policy and claims separately. However, many of 
the States have disputes over sovereignty or sovereign rights to different parts of 
the South China Sea. Disputes mainly focus on the Paracel Islands and the Spratly 
Islands. The Paracel Islands (Xisha Qundao) are under China’s control. Although 
they are contested by the Vietnamese, China does not consider the Paracel Islands 
under dispute. More complicated is the dispute over the Spratly Islands (Nansha 
Qundao) that already lasts for a long time and involves five States (China (includ-
ing Taiwan), Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines and Brunei), which could result 
in security issues that may influence the peace in the East Asian region and even 
in the world.909  
China has dispatched fishery administration vessels to patrol the waters around 
the Paracel and Spratly Islands for illegal fishing. However, other countries in-
volved in both disputes suspect that China uses “the fisheries as an excuse to as-
sert control over the South China Sea through civilian instead of direct military 
                                                          
908  Announced on 18 June 2008. The text is available via China View. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-06/18/content_8394206.htm. Accessed 
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The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 21 (1), p. 86. 
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means”.910 In fact, most of the fisheries conflicts in the South China Sea are indeed 
disputes over islands and sovereign rights over fisheries resources. For example, 
on 10 April 2012, two Chinese maritime surveillance vessels prevented an attempt 
by Philippine officials to arrest Chinese fishermen for “fishing illegally” in the ar-
ea of the Scarborough Shoal, which resulted in a serious standoff between the two 
States in the South China Sea.911  
Map 4.4 shows that the U-shape line (Nine-Dash Line) of China covers most of 
the disputed islands and overlaps with the EEZ claims of Vietnam, Malaysia, Bru-
nei and the Philippines.912 Compared with the military fields or boundary delimita-
tion, fisheries are more “neutral” areas and therefore easier to cooperate in.913 
However, China’s attitudes towards fisheries and other issues related to sovereign-
ty and sovereign rights are unshakable. China signed the Declaration on the Con-
duct of Parties in the South China Sea with the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations in 2002. This Declaration mainly emphasizes resolving the territorial and 
jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means.914 It specifically mentions cooperation 
in the fields of marine environmental protection, marine scientific research, safety 
of navigation and communication at sea, search and rescue operations, and com-
                                                          
910 Mallory TG (2012) The Sea’s Harvest: China and Global Fisheries. Availa-
ble via Saisphere. http://media.sais-
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ality as to serve as potential maritime delimitation lines.” 
913 Franckx E (2012) Fisheries in the South China Sea: a centrifugal or centripe-
tal force? Chinese Journal of International Law 11 (4), 728. 
914 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed on 
4 November 2002 in Phnom Penh, the Kingdom of Cambodia. Available via As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations. http://www.asean.org/asean/external-
relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea. 
Accessed 28 August 2013. 
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bating transnational crime. However, it does not mention fisheries, gas and oil or 
other issues closely related to sovereignty and sovereign rights. China maintains 
that the Declaration is aimed at keeping the South China Sea peaceful rather than 
resolving the disputes over territory and sovereign rights.915 In the next section, 
fisheries cooperation between China and Vietnam is discussed to demonstrate a 
successful example of cooperation in the South China Sea, which may provide a 
possibility for cooperation in the South China Sea between China and other States. 
 
 
 
 
Map 4.4 Territorial claims in the South China Sea 
 
 
 
Source: X (2012) China’s nine-dashed line in South China Sea. Via China Daily 
Mail. http://chinadailymail.com/2012/05/25/chinas-nine-dashed-line-in-south-
china-sea/. Accessed 25 May 2012. 
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4.3.2.2 State’s duties under fisheries agreements between China and 
Vietnam 
 
The fisheries relationship between China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin (the 
Beibu Gulf in Chinese, and the Bac Bo Gulf in Vietnamese) is different from that 
between China and the other two States in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea. 
The fisheries cooperation between China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin is 
based on the resolved demarcation in that marine area. Together with the Agree-
ment between the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of Vi-
etnam on the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas, Exclusive Economic Zones and 
Continental Shelves of the two countries in the Gulf of Tonkin (the Sino-
Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Ton-
kin), 916  the Fishery Cooperation Agreement between the People’s Republic of 
China and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in Gulf of Tonkin (the Sino-
Vietnamese Fishery Agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin) was signed on 25 Decem-
ber 2000.917 The two agreements were not ratified until the conclusion of subse-
quent resolutions of remaining issues respecting fisheries management. On 29 
April 2004, the Additional Protocol of the Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement in 
the Gulf of Tonkin918 and the Provisions for Fisheries Conservation and Manage-
ment in the Common Fishery Zone of Gulf of Tonkin919 were signed. Then all four 
documents entered into force at the same time on 30 June 2004. Clear delimitation 
of marine boundaries and long-term negotiation of fisheries issues ensure that the 
smallest possibility of any fishing conflict in the Gulf of Tonkin is easily resolved. 
Like the two fisheries agreements China signed with Japan and South Korea, the 
Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement also establishing different management 
zones, including a Common Fishery Zone, a Transitional Fishery Zone and a 
Buffer Zone (cf Map 4.5). Unlike the two fisheries agreements, the management 
zones established by the Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement are based on a clear 
delimitation. The three zones are all divided by delimitation lines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
916 Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs 
(2005) Law of the Sea Bulletin No 56. United Nations, New York, p 137-138. 
917 An unofficial translation see: Zou (2005) Law of the Sea in East Asia, Ap-
pendix II. 
918 Available via China Fisheries 2004 (7): 6-10. 
919 Available via China Oceans Law Review 2005 (1): 219-223. 
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Map 4.5 Delimitation line and joint fishing zones in the Gulf of Tonkin 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Thao NH (2005) Maritime Delimitation and Fishery Coop-
eration in the Tonkin Gulf. Ocean Development & International Law 36, Figure 1. 
 
 
 
The Common Fishery Zone lasts for twelve years and afterwards it automatical-
ly extends for another three years. China and Vietnam jointly take measures for 
the conservation, management and sustainable utilization of the living resources in 
the Common Fishery Zone.920 Each Party carries out a licensing system for fishing 
activities conducted by its own fishing vessels and notifies the other Party of the 
names of the fishing vessels with fishing licenses.921 In addition, the Agreement 
requires fishing vessels entering the Common Fishery Zone to be appropriately 
marked and to correctly fill in the fishing logs.922 
Based on the determined EEZ, coastal State control rather than flag State con-
trol applies in the Common Fishery Zone.923 According to Article 9 of the Agree-
ment, each Party shall monitor and inspect the nationals and fishing vessels of 
both Parties in their own water areas of the Common Fishery Zone. In cases where 
                                                          
920 The Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement, Art. 5. 
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922 The Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement, Arts. 7 (2) and 8. 
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the competent authorities of one Party finds any breach of the regulations agreed 
on by the Sino-Vietnamese Joint Committee for Fishery in the Gulf of Tonkin in 
its own water area of the Common Fishery Zone, the competent authorities shall 
have the right to deal with such breach according to the regulations laid down by 
the Sino-Vietnamese Joint Committee for Fishery in the Gulf of Tonkin and shall 
promptly notify the other Party of the relevant circumstances and the outcome. 
The detained fishing vessels or crew shall be released promptly after the appropri-
ate bond or other kind of security has been posted. Article 20 of the Provisions for 
Fisheries Conservation and Management in the Common Fishery Zone of Gulf of 
Tonkin defines illegal fishing in the Common Fishery Zone and specifies the pen-
alties. Furthermore, each Party can penalize fishing activities without fishing au-
thorization in their own water areas of the Common Fishery Zone according to its 
domestic legislation.924 
The function of the Transitional Fishery Zone is similar to the Transitional Zone 
established in the Sino-South Korean Fishery Agreement. Since the Transitional 
Fishery Zone in the Gulf of Tonkin expired in 2008, fishing vessels of each Party 
have left the waters of the other Party. In order to manage the fisheries in this area, 
the Additional Protocol of the Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement in the Gulf of 
Tonkin was adopted in 2004. Within four years, coastal State control was applied 
in the Transitional Zone as well. Article 4 of the Additional Protocol provides that 
a Party has the right to penalize fishing vessels without fishing authorization that 
fish in its own waters of the Transitional Fishery Zone according to its domestic 
law. However, coastal State control in the Transitional Zone is limited. For exam-
ple, Article 3 of this Additional Protocol requires a Party to inform the other Party 
in cases where fishermen of the other Party do not fill in the fishing logs according 
to requirements, but the Party may not penalize such fishermen merely on the 
grounds that they have  not filled in the fishing logs.  
A Buffer Zone is established to avoid conflicts due to incautious entering of the 
territorial sea of the other Party. Once a Party finds that small fishing vessels of 
the other Party conduct fishing activities in its waters in the Buffer Zone, the Party 
may send a warning and take necessary measures to order them to leave the area. 
But the Party shall not detain the fishing vessels, arrest the crew, penalize or resort 
to force. In cases where fishing conflicts happen in the Buffer Zone, the Party 
shall report to the Sino-Vietnamese Joint Committee for Fishery in the Gulf of 
Tonkin for settlement.925 
China has issued several documents to implement the Sino-Vietnamese Fishery 
Agreement and its related documents, including an Urgent Circular on the Prepa-
ration for the Implementation of the Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement for the 
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Fishery Zone of Gulf of Tonkin, Art. 16. 
925 The Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement, Art. 12 (2). 
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Gulf of Tonkin 926and Twelve New Rules for Vessels Fishing in the Agreed Zones 
of Sino-Vietnamese Agreement in the Gulf of Tonkin.927 The Circular confirms 
that the Bureau of Fisheries Administration for the South China Sea and the fish-
ing administration vessels from Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan, together with 
the border defence and the navy, are in charge of monitoring at sea. The Twelve 
New Rules provide requirements for fishing in the Common Fishery Zone and the 
Transitional Fishery Zone, viz. procedures for applying for a fishing permit; in-
stallation of GPS or devices for vessel monitoring; carrying the required docu-
ments on board; vessel flagging and marking; prohibition of destructive fishing 
operations; filling-in and submitting of fishing logbooks; prohibition against 
catching endangered species; maintenance of orderly fishing operation and avoid-
ance of fishing conflicts; settlement of fishing disputes and vessel collision; com-
pliance and assistance with authorized boarding inspections; and procedures for 
emergency port calls. 
The Agreement also establishes joint monitoring and inspection which aims to 
deal with any breach of the regulations laid down by the Sino-Vietnamese Joint 
Committee for Fishery in the Gulf of Tonkin. Since 2006, China and Vietnam 
have conducted joint monitoring and inspection in the Common Fishery Zone 
once a year. The joint management, monitoring and inspection in the Common 
Fishery Zone promotes the coordination and cooperation between the two Par-
ties.928 More importantly, the patrol of fisheries administration vessels has indeed 
effectively combated illegal fishing in the agreed water area. From the moment the 
Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement entered into force till June 2009, the Bureau 
of Fisheries Administration for the South China Sea commissioned 238 fisheries 
administration vessels to patrol in the Common Fishery Zone, the Transitional 
Fishery Zone and the Buffer Zone for 2,379 days and also investigated 728 Chi-
nese illegal fishing vessels, expelled 445 foreign illegal fishing vessels and inves-
tigated 46 foreign illegal fishing vessels.929  
                                                          
926 The Circular was promulgated by Ministry of Agriculture on 14 June 2004 
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Illegal fishing in the Gulf of Tonkin has been reduced year after year since the 
Sino-Vietnamese Fishery Agreement came into force. Before that, illegal fishing 
frequently happened in the Gulf of Tonkin due to the unclear delimitation. Wheth-
er one side could tolerate the illegal fishing conducted by fishing vessels or fish-
ermen of the other side depended on the relationship between China and Vi-
etnam. 930  Together with its related implementing instruments, the Sino-
Vietnamese Fishery Agreement ensures a comprehensive legal framework for 
fisheries in the Gulf of Tonkin, effectively reducing illegal fishing in this area. 
Finally, the settlement of the boundary delimitation and fisheries conflicts be-
tween China and Vietnam in the Gulf of Tonkin provides an inspiration for the 
settlement of conflicts in the South China Sea. Fully analysed, most of the con-
flicts over resources in the South China Sea are finally disputes over boundary de-
limitation and sovereignty of islands. Simultaneous negotiations over the delimita-
tion and fisheries can reduce fisheries conflicts to the greatest extent. Before the 
conclusion of any agreement, both sides should maintain a peaceful settlement in 
order not to complicate or escalate a dispute. In June 2013, China and Vietnam 
agreed to establish a hotline to deal with fishery incidents in the South China 
Sea,931 which is a good start for the improvement of the relationship between Chi-
na and Vietnam in the South China Sea. 
 
 
 
4.3.2.3 Current and future developments 
 
The cases discussed in previous sections show that bilateral fisheries agreements 
are merely effective when maritime boundary delimitation is defined. Although 
China is not reluctant to agree, the trend “from bilateralism to multilateralism or 
regionalism” is not evitable in the China Sea, especially for the fisheries in the 
South China Sea.932  
The cooperation in the South China Sea is difficult but not impossible. Unlike 
oil and gas, which are relatively stationary resources, the mobility of fisheries re-
sources requires more cooperation. This thesis does not deeply discuss the disput-
ed sovereignty or sovereign rights pertaining offshore features in the South China 
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Sea or the historic rights claimed by China.933 Instead, the author will use the po-
tential cooperation between China and the Philippines for the Scarborough Shoal 
as an example to show a possible compromise and cooperation model in South 
China Sea. 
According to Article 121 of the UNCLOS, as the Scarborough Shoal is a sub-
merged reef with four to six rocks above water at high tide that cannot sustain 
human habitation or economic life, it can be entitled a territorial sea but not an 
EEZ or continental shelf. With regard to sovereignty disputes, the late Deng Xiao-
ping of China advised to set aside the sovereignty disputes and pursue joint devel-
opment.934 It is suggested that China and the Philippines set aside the sovereignty 
disputes and should jointly develop the fisheries resources in the 12-nautical-mile 
territorial sea, which will be much easier than disputes over the Spratly or the Par-
acels since these disputes involve more States.935  
Although it seems that States bordering the South China Sea have preferred to 
resolve the sovereignty disputes and boundary delimitation through political nego-
tiation rather than legal litigation, the Philippines informed China, through a note 
verbale, that it was submitting its disputes with China concerning the South China 
Sea to the compulsory dispute settlement procedures under the UNCLOS on 22 
January 2013. On 30 March 2014, the Philippines submitted to the arbitral tribunal 
constituted in accordance with Annex VII of the UNCLOS for the invalidation of 
the “nine-dash line” that China includes on maps to justify its claim to the South 
China Sea. As introduced in Section 4.2.2.1, China has made a declaration pursu-
ant to Article 298 of the UNCLOS to be excluded from the compulsory proce-
dures entailing binding decisions for all of the categories of disputes in Article 
298, including disputes concerning sea boundary delimitations or those involving 
historic bays or titles and disputes that necessarily involves the concurrent consid-
eration of any unsettled dispute concerning sovereignty or other rights over conti-
nental or insular land territory. Thus, the Philippines’ submission is unjustified.  
As Beckman has indicated, certain legal disputes pertaining the interpretation or 
application of UNCLOS provisions in the South China Sea are not within the ex-
clusion under Article 298 of the UNCLOS. For example, a coastal State may sub-
mit a dispute to challenge the right of Chinese fishermen to fish within the EEZ of 
the coastal State because they have “historic fishing rights” that must be recog-
                                                          
933 More discussion for disputed sovereignty or sovereign rights pertaining off-
shore features in the South China Sea and the historic rights claimed by China see: 
Gao and Jia (2013), pp 98-124. Also see: Beckman R (2013) The UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea and the maritime disputes in the South China Sea. The 
American Journal of International Law 107 (1): 142-163. 
934 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2014) Setting 
aside the sovereignty disputes and pursuing joint development (in Chinese). 
http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn//gxh/xsb/wjzs/t8958.htm. Accessed 24 January 2014. 
935 Beckman (2013), pp. 159-160. 
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nized by the coastal State.936 In addition, requests of prompt release of vessels and 
crew are also within the exclusion under Article 298. However, China has never 
submitted any request of prompt release when its vessels and crew have been de-
tained by other States. This is mainly because China always states that it prefers to 
resolve international disputes through negotiation. The dispute with the Philip-
pines shows that China is in a passive position due to lack of experience in legal 
litigation. China is also opposed to the advisory competence of ITLOS in Case 
21.937 China maintains that no provision in the UNCLOS authorizes the full bench 
of the advisory competence of the ITLOS.938  
Therefore, it is suggested that China should take a more active attitude towards 
the international litigation for fisheries disputes (such as prompt release, which is 
a less sensitive issue than boundary conflicts) in order to train litigators and gain 
much needed experience in international litigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
936 Beckman (2013), pp. 161-162. 
937 Case No 21 of the ITLOS concerns the request for an advisory opinion sub-
mitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), which refers to the 
following questions: 1. What are the obligations of the flag State in cases where 
IUU fishing activities are conducted within the EEZ of third party States? 2. To 
what extent shall the flag State be held liable for IUU fishing activities conducted 
by vessels sailing under its flag? 3. Where a fishing license is issued to a vessel 
within the framework of an international agreement with the flag State or with an 
international agency, shall the State or international agency be held liable for the 
violation of the fisheries legislation of the coastal State by the vessel in question? 
4. What are the rights and obligations of the coastal State in ensuring the sustaina-
ble management of shared stocks and stocks of common interest, especially the 
small pelagic species and tuna? 
938 Huang H (2013) Written statement of the People’s Republic of China re-
garding the request for an advisory opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisher-
ies Commission (SRFC). Available via ITLOS. 
https://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=252&L=0. Accessed 12 March 2014, pp. 41-
42. 
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4.3.3 China’s State responsibility for fishing on the high seas and 
within other countries’ EEZs  
 
4.3.3.1 Introduction 
 
Due to the overexploitation of coastal fisheries resources and the limited access to 
waters of China’s neighbouring States, Chinese fisheries law and policies encour-
age Chinese fishermen to fish overseas in order to relieve unemployment pres-
sures. By the end of the 20
th
 century, China had become the major distant-water 
fishing country in the world.939 With the expansion of China’s middle class and 
the increased consumption of high-value fish species,940 the scale of China’s dis-
tant water fisheries has expanded as well. For example, China permitted the con-
struction of 221 distant water fishing vessels in 2011. In 2012, the total number of 
distant water fishing vessels increased to 1,830 (excluding the Hong Kong and 
Macau Special Administrative Regions and Taiwan) belonging to 120 enterprises, 
which had obtained the qualification to be distant water fishery enterprises.941 
These vessels operated in EEZs of 38 States in the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic 
Ocean, on the high seas of the Indian Ocean and in the Antarctic.942 However, it is 
not publicly known in which EEZs Chinese fishing vessels have been operating 
for reasons of commercial confidentiality. 
Given the large scale of China’s distant water fisheries, IUU fishing conducted 
by Chinese fishing vessels has also largely been reported, in particular in waters 
off West Africa. Examples can be found in the reports of the Environmental Jus-
tice Foundation, the news and other publications.943 It should be pointed out that 
the Chinese fishing vessels here include not only Chinese flagged vessels but also 
fishing vessels belonging to Chinese enterprises but flagged in other States. As in-
                                                          
939 Pauly et al. (2013), p.2. 
940 Mallory TG (2013) China’s distant water fishing industry: Evolving policies 
and implications. Marine Policy 38, p. 100. 
941 X (2013) The sustained and stable development of China’s distant fisheries 
in 2012 (in Chinese). Available via China Distant Water Fisheries. 
http://www.cndwf.com/bencandy.php?fid=14&id=8171. Accessed 17 July 2013. 
942 X (2013) The sustained and stable development of China’s distant fisheries 
in 2012. 
943 See: EJF (2009) Dirty Fish – How EU hygiene standards facilitate illegal 
fishing in West Africa. Environmental Justice Foundation, London, Annex 1. Also 
see: Dobo A (2009) Illegal Chinese fishing in West African Waters – A study on 
Chinese IUU activities and its consequences to socio-ecological systems. Disserta-
tion, Stockholm University, pp. 28-30.   Also See: EJF (2007) Pirate fish on your 
plate – Tracking illegally-caught fish from West Africa into the European market. 
Environmental Justice Foundation, London, pp. 22-24. 
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troduced in Section 4.2.3. , China’s distant water fishing vessels are allowed to fly 
the flag of a coastal country and to operate in the sea areas under the jurisdiction 
of that country. Section 4.2.3.3 has shown that fishing vessels must obtain Chinese 
nationality in cases where Chinese citizens or legal persons bareboat charter fish-
ing vessels overseas. In these situations, China shall enforce flag State responsibil-
ity over such vessels. In addition, in the case of “flags of convenience”, the flag a 
vessel is flying has little links with the beneficial ownership of the catches.944 So a 
State shall control its beneficial owners involved in IUU fishing. Thus, this section 
mainly discusses China’s flag State responsibility over its flagged vessels and its 
control over Chinese nationals and distant water fishing companies.  
 
 
 
4.3.3.2 Case study: West Africa 
 
This Section specifies China-related IUU fishing activities in West Africa, anal-
yses the reasons for China-related IUU fishing in this area and tries to provide 
possible solutions to this problem. As introduced in Chapter 3, IUU fishing is 
most serious in the waters off West Africa. Even vessels of certain developed 
countries, such as vessels of South Korea, have been fishing illegally in this ar-
ea.945 The lack of coastal State control in West Africa makes the situation worse. 
Thus, a study of this area can pinpoint the most indispensable elements in combat-
ing IUU fishing. Another reason why West Africa is an interesting example is be-
cause this area has received much attention from NGOs, researchers and media, so 
that the information about China is accessible.   
 
 
 
4.3.3.2.1 Lack of sufficiently serious law? 
 
The most common IUU fishing activities conducted by Chinese fishing vessels in 
West Africa include: fishing in a prohibited zone; unlicensed fishing; illegal mesh 
in trawl; mesh size violation; trawling though licensed for purse seine; illegal fish-
ing methods; transhipment at sea; misreported catches and landings; false identifi-
cation; destroying fishing gear owned by local fishermen; and avoiding arrest.946 
                                                          
944 Griggs L, Lugten G (2007) Veil over the nets (unravelling corporate liability 
for IUU fishing offences). Marine Policy 31, p. 160. 
945 EJF (2009) Dirty Fish – How EU hygiene standards facilitate illegal fishing 
in West Africa, p. 22. 
946 Dobo (2009), p. 103. 
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In fact, most of these infringements are prohibited under the Fisheries Law of the 
PRC and the Administrative Provisions for Distant Water Fisheries mentioned in 
Sections 4.2.3.1 and 4.2.3.7 respectively. However, the fines imposed on Chinese 
vessels and enterprises that have engaged in IUU fishing under the Fisheries Law 
of the PRC are much lower than those imposed on illegal fishing conducted by 
foreigners and foreign vessels within China’s national jurisdiction. This phenome-
non is very common in international fisheries. For instance, as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3.1.3, South Korea has imposed very high fines on illegal foreign fishing 
vessels within its EEZ recently; while South Korean fishing vessels in West Africa 
were most involved in IUU fishing during 2011 and 2012.947 However, most West 
African coastal States lack sufficient capabilities to enforce these rights. 
 
 
 
4.3.3.2.2 Non-interference principle and China’s responsibility in West 
Africa 
 
Non-interference has been the basic principle and main feature of China’s diplo-
macy.948 In the field of fisheries, China provides financial and technical aid to 
coastal States in West Africa for fishing rights without any additional political 
conditions. However, China’s attitude towards its cooperation with West Africa is 
criticized as having funded corruption. Compared to China, the EU imposes addi-
tional conditions on its aid to West Africa. For example, the EU requests each year 
that a certain amount of its financial contribution in the fisheries partnership 
agreement with Cape Verde is used to support the implementation of Cape 
Verde’s sectoral fisheries policy that aims to achieve responsible and sustainable 
fishing.949 Each year, the EU and Cape Verde carry out an evaluation of the pro-
gress made in implementing the multiannual sectoral program. If evaluation indi-
cates that the objectives financed directly by EU’s financial contribution have not 
been satisfactorily achieved, the EU reserves the right to reduce that share of the 
financial contribution with a view to adjusting the amount allocated to the imple-
mentation of the Program in line with the results.950 Leaving aside whether the 
                                                          
947 EJF (2012) Pirate fishing exposed: the fight against illegal fishing in West 
Africa and the EU. EJF, London, p. 35. 
948 Zhang Z (2010) On the Non-interference Principle of China’s diplomacy in 
Africa (in Chinese). West Asia and Africa (1), p.11. 
949 Protocol agreed between the European Union and the Republic of Cape 
Verde setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided 
for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the two parties currently in 
force, Art. 2 (2) (b); OJ L181 of 9 July 2011, p. 2. 
950 Protocol agreed between the European Union and the Republic of Cape 
Verde setting out the fishing opportunities and the financial contribution provided 
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EU’s fisheries partnership agreements promote responsible and sustainable fishing 
in West Africa, such agreements indeed play a certain role in preventing corrup-
tion by West African governments.  
However, some West African governments heavily rely on licensing fees for 
their national budgets. They may therefore issue more licenses than sustainable 
fishing can maintain, which may also result in corruption in the process of licens-
ing.951 In view of this, such governments prefer China’s relaxed attitude that does 
not create too many obstacles for them. Besides the access fee, under the EEZ re-
gime of the UNCLOS, coastal States normally impose restrictive terms and condi-
tions for foreign fishing to access their EEZs, including fishing quotas, vessel con-
trol, gear control, observer programs, catch reports, the instalment of Vessel 
Monitoring Systems and other conditions.952 However, certain countries do not 
have the capability to effectively control fishing activities in their waters. For ex-
ample, Liberia is still recovering from its civil war, so its government does not 
have a coast guard to deal with illegal Chinese vessels;953 and Guinea lacks a Ves-
sel Monitoring System.954 Additionally, “bribe payments and intimidation from 
foreign boat owners” have also resulted in the ineffectiveness of the board observ-
er program.955 Another concern of West African countries is that the host countries 
may not impose sanctions on illegal foreign fishing activities because if they want 
to protect diplomatic relations, future loans and aid projects are linked.956 The 
price of fish is also a consideration for West African governments. For example, 
the Liberian liaison to the Chinese fishing companies has expressed the concern 
that if Liberia strengthens the control over Chinese destructive fishing methods, 
Chinese companies will leave so that the price of the fish local Liberians consume 
will increase.957 Thus, in the fisheries relationships between China and West Afri-
can States, the latter are at a disadvantage.  
As a fishing State, China should not avoid the duties over its vessels and enter-
prises in such weakly-controlled waters. Although China wants to be a responsible 
participant in marine resources management, it does not take sufficient responsi-
                                                                                                                                     
for in the Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the two parties currently in 
force, Art. 3 (4). 
951 Mallory (2012). 
952 Xue (2006) China’s distant water fisheries and its response to flag state re-
sponsibilities, p. 654. 
953 Mallory (2012). 
954 EJF (2012) Pirate fishing exposed: the fight against illegal fishing in West 
Africa and the EU, p. 5. 
955 Standing A (2008) Corruption and commercial fisheries in Africa. Available 
via U4. http://www.u4.no/publications/corruption-and-commercial-fisheries-in-
africa/. Accessed 13 September 2013. 
956 Standing (2008) Corruption and commercial fisheries in Africa. Available 
via U4.  
957 Mallory (2013), p. 104. 
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bilities over its fishing vessels or enterprises in West Africa. This is because China 
“imitates” the behaviour of developed countries when they are irresponsible.958 As 
discussed in Chapter 3, European vessels have also been involved in IUU fishing 
in waters off West Africa. However, the EU’s hesitancy in managing its fishing 
vessels in this area is also partly due to the unsustainable fishing of other major 
fishing States, such as South Korea and China.959 Thus, the unsustainable fishing 
competition among major fishing States in West Africa aggravates the IUU fish-
ing in this area.  
However, if China continues to ignore compliance with the laws of coastal 
States and allows unsustainable fishing in the waters off West Africa, China will 
face more international pressure to combat IUU fishing in the future. On the one 
hand, more and more coastal States will strengthen the regulations on governance, 
monitoring and surveillance of fishing in their coastal waters. For example, with 
an EU-funded community surveillance project, which began in January 2010, the 
operation of an Environmental Justice Foundation patrol boat and the use of Ves-
sel Monitoring Systems by the government of Sierra Leone have successfully 
helped Sierra Leone to reduce IUU fishing.960 On the other hand, with the intro-
duction of port State measures and market State measures to combat IUU fishing, 
IUU catches of Chinese flagged vessels and Chinese vessels will meet more ob-
stacles to enter major fish markets. For example, in 2011, 55 per cent of the total 
distant water catches were transported back to China, while the rest were sold 
abroad.961 The EU and Japan are major markets for China’s high-value fish. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, together with Japan and the US, the EU has put much ef-
fort into combating IUU fishing through the port and market State measures in re-
cent years. China’s behaviour has been and will be influenced by these major fish 
markets, as will be discussed in detail in the following sections. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
958 Mallory (2013), p. 99. 
959 Interview with Ms. Gorez Beatrice, Coordinator at Coalition for Fair Fisher-
ies Arrangements in Belgium at the film screening: Sandgrains in Brussels on 26 
November 2012. 
960 X (2013) IUU fishing in Sierra Leone declining. Available via Undercur-
rentnews. http://www.undercurrentnews.com/2013/04/11/iuu-fishing-in-sierra-
leone-declining/#.UkFHdn97As0. Accessed 11 April 2013. 
961 Bureau of Fisheries of Ministry of Agriculture (2012) China Fisheries Statis-
tical Yearbook (in Chinese). China Agriculture Press, Beijing, table 4.1. 
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4.3.3.3 The possible development of China’s duties over its distant wa-
ter fisheries 
 
Like other distant water fishing States, China should pay attention to responsible 
fishing in waters of other coastal States, especially States that have poor capabili-
ties to monitor and control fishing activities in their coastal waters. 
China has dispatched national observers on board China’s distant water fishing 
vessels in accordance with the management requirements of relevant RFMOs. In 
order to regulate and strengthen the work of national observers, the Ministry of 
Agriculture has promulgated the Notice of General Office of the Ministry of Agri-
culture on Strengthening the Administrative Work of National Observers in Dis-
tant Water Fisheries.962  
The Ministry of Agriculture issued Interim Measures for the Administration of 
Monitoring of Distant Water Fishing Vessels in 2012.963 Since then monitoring by 
a Vessel Monitoring System has been an essential condition for the application 
for, the examination and approval of distant water fishery projects.  
The General Office of the Ministry of Agriculture issued the Notice on Further 
Strengthening the Management of Renewing and Constructing Distant Water 
Fishing Vessels in 2013, which expressly states that individuals are not allowed to 
construct or purchase distant water fishing vessels to engage in distant water fish-
eries nor to conduct distant water fisheries through agencies.964 This means that 
with the exception of individuals that have already been allowed to conduct distant 
water fisheries through agencies, in the future only enterprises that have obtained 
the qualifications for distant water fisheries can do so. Individuals allowed to con-
duct distant water fisheries through agencies will also gradually be absorbed into 
enterprises. Therefore, China’s control over its distant water fisheries should focus 
on the behaviour of those enterprises. Meanwhile, the qualification of conducting 
distant water fisheries shall also be enhanced to ensure sustainable and responsible 
fisheries. With regard to those enterprises whose fishing vessels were involved in 
IUU fishing, appropriate sanctions shall be imposed. 
                                                          
962 Promulgated and entered into force on 11 January 2011. Available via Chi-
nalawinfo (in Chinese). 
http://vip.chinalawinfo.com.auth.lib.bit.edu.cn/newlaw2002/slc/slc.asp?db=chl&gi
d=143801. Accessed 24 January 2014.  
963 Issued and entered into force on 19 January 2012. Available via Pkulaw.cn 
(in Chinese). http://www.pkulaw.cn. Accessed 24 January 2014. 
964 The text of the Notice is not accessible. But the main content can be found: 
Fisheries Bureau (2013) The Ministry of Agriculture further strengthens the man-
agement of renewing and constructing distant-water fishing vessels. Available via 
Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China. 
http://www.moa.gov.cn/zwllm/zwdt/201309/t20130903_3594415.htm. Accessed 3 
September 2013. 
215 
The information on the control of fishing vessels and enterprises that are en-
gaged in IUU fishing is not publicly accessible. Unlike the EU, which has pub-
lished all texts of fisheries partnership agreements and protocols in its official 
journal and on the website of the European Commission for Fisheries, the Chinese 
government does not publish the texts of such fisheries partnership agreements be-
tween China and other countries. Lack of transparency in the control of distant 
water fisheries creates the impression that Chinese distant water fisheries are not 
well documented and unreported. The fisheries agreements signed between a host-
ing country and Chinese fishing companies are also closed for the public so that, 
even though Chinese distant water fishing in an EEZ may be legitimate, they may 
still be “unreported”. For example, Chinese-flagged vessels and Chinese owned 
vessels often pay frozen fish rather than cash wages to local crew and the latter de-
termine the price of their labour.965 Although China’s distant water fisheries are 
originally a State-owned sector, now 70 per cent of China’s distant water fishing 
companies are privately owned, which means that the government’s control over 
distant water fisheries is even less.966 The transparency of information, which is 
required by the EU, is not so important for the Chinese government. Finally it is 
the EU’s Member States that require the information on the EU’s competence over 
fisheries to be transparent, while the Chinese government does not have other 
States to be responsible for. However, as a flag State, making certain information 
publicly accessible can show outsiders whether China has taken its flag duties se-
riously.   
China should cooperate with coastal States to ensure sustainable and responsi-
ble fishing. When signing fisheries partnership agreements with coastal States, 
particularly with West African States, China should negotiate with such States on 
arrangements where part of the licensing fee should become used for improving 
local fisheries administration and strengthening the capabilities of monitoring, 
control and surveillance.  
China’s fisheries authorities, including the Fisheries Bureau and authorized or-
ganizations such as China Distant Water Fisheries Association, should become 
acquainted with the port State measures of other States in whose ports Chinese 
fishing vessels use port services. Such authorities, organizations and enterprises 
should strengthen the control over distant water fishing vessels. On the other, in 
cases where Chinese fishing vessels are inspected in ports aboard, those authori-
ties should make an effort to avoid undue inspection and to ensure the rights of 
those vessels and crew abroad. For example, two China-flagged vessels named 
North Ocean and West Ocean had been listed on the EU’s Community IUU vessel 
list for two years and have not been removed until 15 July 2013. In fact, the two 
vessels were first included in the list of the CCAMLR, which then became recog-
                                                          
965 Pauly et al. (2013), p. 5. 
966 Mallory (2012). 
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nized by the list of the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO),967 so 
the two vessels were included in the latter as well. These vessels were also auto-
matically included into the EU Community IUU vessel list because the EU recog-
nizes the lists of the two RFMOs. Such vessels were later removed from the list of 
the CCAMLR, but due to delayed notification, they were still on the lists of 
SEAFO and the EU for almost another year.968  
 
 
 
4.3.3.4 China and its efforts to deter the practice of large-scale high 
seas drift net fishing 
 
The cooperation between China and the US to deter the practice of large-scale 
high seas drift net fishing is a successful example of high seas enforcement. On 3 
December 1993 China and the US signed the Memorandum of Understanding be-
tween the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China on Effective Cooperation and Implementation of 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/215 of 20 December 1991 
(MOU).969 The UNGA Resolution 46/215 calls for a global large-scale high seas 
driftnet moratorium. Although China is not a Contracting Party to the North Pacif-
ic Anadromous Fish Commission, it has actively cooperated with the US to patrol 
the areas in the North Pacific Ocean under threat from high seas driftnet fishing 
for over two decades. The MOU established high seas enforcement procedures for 
law enforcement officials of either country to board and inspect US or Chinese 
flagged vessels suspected of high seas driftnet fishing. The MOU also established 
a shiprider program, which allows Chinese officials to embark on US Coast Guard 
                                                          
967 The SEAFO was established under the framework of the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources in the South East Atlantic 
Ocean, which was adopted at Windhoek on 20 April 2001 and entered into force 
on 13 April 2003, UNTS 2221, p. 189. 
968 Commission Regulation (EU) No 468/2010, Annex, Part B; Commission 
Implementing Regulation (EU) No 724/2011, Annex, Part B; Commission Imple-
menting Regulation (EU) No 1234/2012, Annex, Part B; Commission Implement-
ing Regulation (EU) No 672/2013, Annex, Part B. 
969 People.cn (1993) the Memorandum of Understanding between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of the People’s Repub-
lic of China on Effective Cooperation and Implementation of United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 46/215 of 20 December 1991 (in Chinese). 
http://law.people.com.cn/showdetail.action?id=2682028. Accessed 24 January 
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vessels or aircraft.970 Apart from China and the US, other States and regions such 
as Canada, Japan, Russia and Taiwan have also conducted high seas driftnet vessel 
sightings and apprehensions in the North Pacific since 2002. The efforts of those 
countries and regions have contributed to a low chance of large scale driftnet fish-
ing in this area.971 
     
 
 
4.4 The possible development of port State measures in China 
 
As discussed in Section 4.2.3.6, China does not have any law or regulation that 
provides port State measures against IUU fishing. This means that vessels engaged 
in IUU fishing or fishing related activities are neither forbidden to enter into Chi-
na’s ports nor prohibited from using the ports for landing, transhipping, packaging 
and processing of fish or any other port services including, inter alia, refuelling 
and resupplying, maintenance and dry-docking in cases where such a vessel is in a 
Chinese port. Moreover, there is no legal basis for Chinese port officials to inspect 
vessels in ports for the purpose of determining whether the vessels have engaged 
in IUU fishing or fishing related activities or to take any follow-up actions. This is 
mainly because port State measures against IUU fishing have not been recognized 
by the international society until recent years. Even though the EU actively pro-
motes port State measures against IUU fishing at both Community and interna-
tional level, the Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008, 
establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreport-
ed and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 
1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1093/94 and 
(EC) No 1447/1999 (IUU Regulation) 972 was implemented just a few years ago. 
However, China does not lack port State control over vessel security. It can in-
spect foreign vessels sailing, docking or operating in China’s ports, internal waters 
                                                          
970 NOAA (2012) 2012 Report of the Secretary of Commerce to the Congress 
of the United States concerning U.S. actions taken on foreign large-scale high seas 
driftnet fishing. 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/driftnet_reports/2012_driftnet_report.pdf. Ac-
cessed 26 September 2013, p. 17. 
971 NOAA (2012), p. 7. 
972 Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing 
a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and un-
regulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 
and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 
1447/1999; OJ L286 of 29 October 2008, pp. 1-36. 
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and territorial seas.973 China’s port State control mainly focuses on maritime safety 
and marine pollution; while port State measures against IUU fishing will need 
more attention by the international society. This can be seen through the analogy 
with the development of port State control over maritime safety and the protection 
of marine environment from pollution. For example, port State control initially ex-
isted merely in Europe, the US, Australia and other developed States and regions, 
while now it has been implemented worldwide.974 Currently a port State without 
sufficient port State measures against IUU fishing is not considered irresponsible. 
With the gradual prevalence of such measures and trade-market measures by fish 
markets against States that do not take their port State duties seriously, the adop-
tion of port State measures will become an international obligation. In order to be-
come a responsible port State, the first step China should take is to establish a le-
gal basis that regulates port access and inspection in accordance with the FAO 
Port State Measures Agreement.  
    China has sufficient capabilities to adopt and implement port State measures 
against IUU fishing. China has officially conducted port State control over foreign 
vessels in nine ports since 1 July 1990 and has been a member of the Tokyo 
Memorandum of Understanding since April 1994. The Ministry of Transport is-
sued the revised Vessel Safety Inspection Rules on 30 November 2009. The Rules 
are the legal basis for China’s vessel safety inspection. Currently, China’s port 
State control has made a considerable progress. For example, in 2012 China’s port 
State inspection accounted for 26.9 per cent of the total inspection in the Asia-
Pacific region and China’s detention rate was 1.6 times above the average deten-
tion rate in the area.975 It can be seen that China has the capabilities to conduct port 
State control. Port State measures against IUU fishing particularly are aimed at 
vessels that are used or equipped to be used or intended to be used for fishing or 
fishing related activities. Article 2 of the Vessel Safety Inspection Rules expressly 
indicates that the Rules are not applicable to fishery vessels, so maritime safety 
authorities are not responsible for the port State control over fishery vessels. If 
China establishes port State measures against IUU fishing, the authorities of port 
control and inspection may be bestowed upon fisheries bureaus. 
Therefore, adding compulsory port inspection of fishing facilities, catches, fish-
ing methods and other relevant factors that can prove IUU fishing is recommend-
ed. Considering that China has the largest number of fishing vessels in the world, 
                                                          
973 Art. 5 of the Vessel Safety Inspection Rules of PRC, which was adopted at 
the tenth executive meeting of the Ministry of Transport on 29 October 2009 and 
hereby promulgated and entered into force as of 1 March 2010, No. 15, 2009 (in 
Chinese). 
974 Li P, Zeng Q (2013) Study on the current situation and trends of Port State 
Control (in Chinese). China Maritime Safety (1), p. 35. 
975 Tokyo MOU (2012) Annual report of port State control in the Asia-Pacific 
region 2012. http://www.tokyo-mou.org/doc/ANN12-r.pdf. Accessed 31 January 
2014, figure 2 and Annex 2. 
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it is not realistic to inspect all fishing vessels. Therefore, China can learn from the 
EU to inspect a certain percentage of vessels, in accordance with the requirements 
of Article 12 of the FAO Port State Measures Agreement. Yet China still provides 
port service to vessels that have engaged in IUU fishing. A revision of the Fisher-
ies Law of the PRC to expressly prohibit such vessels from port service is strongly 
recommended.976 
 
 
 
4.5 China as a market State 
 
China is the largest fish processor and exporter in the world. Its major target mar-
kets are the EU, the US and Japan.977 China’s fish exports consist of re-exports of 
processed fish, aquaculture products, catches of distant water fisheries and catches 
in China’s waters. This session mainly discusses China’s seafood traceability sys-
tem and the significant role it plays in combating IUU fishing on global markets. 
 
 
 
4.5.1 China’s own seafood traceability system 
 
When importing raw fish materials to China, there are two documents related to 
traceability required by China Customs: the Certificate of Origin and the Health 
Certificate. A Certificate of Origin determines the tariff rates but does not provide 
sufficient information on catch-related activities to be used to verify compliance 
with applicable regulations. A Health Certificate records information on the name 
of a fishing vessel and the location of the catch and is to ensure food safety rather 
than to combat IUU fishing, It does not contain information of the vessel registra-
tion number, the specific location of the catch nor the amount or species of fish 
caught, which could be found in a catch certificate.978  
                                                          
976 Xu (2009), p. 27. 
977 Clarke S (2009) Understanding China’s fish trade and traceability systems -  
a TRAFFIC East Asia report. Available via TRAFFIC. 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rj
a&ved=0CC8QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.traffic.org%2Ffisheries-
re-
ports%2Ftraffic_pub_fisheries9.pdf&ei=w29UUoeeNOWI0AWhlYCoAg&usg=A
FQjCNHWjRcEEX7A-oRI4adwWg-y8lD0dw. Accessed 9 October 2013, p. 13. 
978 Clarke (2009), p. 53. 
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    Two agencies are responsible for regulating the import and export of fish and 
fisheries products in China: the General Administration of Customs of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (General Administration of China Customs) and the Gen-
eral Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China. The two agencies promulgated the Public Announcement 
on the Implementation of the Customs Clearance Form Online Verification as An-
nouncement No. 68 on 26 November 2007.979 The implementation of the Public 
Announcement shows that China has the capability to track online its import sea-
food, processing and re-export. The key issues of tracing the provenance of catch-
es in China are which authorities are responsible for verifying catch certificates 
and how China’s current traceability system coordinates with different catch certi-
fication systems required by China’s target markets. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is at present the only credible global eco-
labelling program in fisheries. Products that originate from an MSC-certified fish-
ery meet sustainability criteria and are legally caught. However, the MSC program 
is voluntary so that China has not imposed any obligation to implement this pro-
gram. This is mainly because such scheme is unable to significantly promote the 
demand for sustainably certified products in developing countries.980 The follow-
ing sections mainly focus on China’s market State measures. 
 
 
 
4.5.2 China’s coordination with catch certification systems of ma-
jor RFMOs 
 
In order to meet the requirements of the ICCAT, the CCAMLR and the IOTC per-
taining to catch documentation schemes, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Gen-
eral Administration of China Customs issued the Joint Declaration No 1389 on 
Utilizing Customs Clearance of Legally Caught Fish for Certain Importing Fisher-
ies Species on 1 June 2010. 981  Since then the Customs Clearance of Legally 
                                                          
979 General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
of the People’s Republic of China (200 ) The Public Announcement on the Im-
plementation of the Customs Clearance Form Online Verification as Announce-
ment No. 68 (in Chinese), entered into force on 1 January 2008. 
http://www.aqsiq.gov.cn/zwgk/jlgg/jlgkzh/200711/t20071128_55748.html. Ac-
cessed 11 October 2013. 
980 Blackmore E (2014) Sustainable fisheries certification. Available via Inter-
national Institute for Environment and Development. 
http://pubs.iied.org/17204IIED.html. Accessed 18 February 2014. 
981 The Ministry of Agriculture and the General Administration of China Cus-
toms (2010) Joint Declaration No 1389 in 2010 on Utilizing Customs Clearance of 
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Caught Fish issued by the Ministry of Agriculture has become a necessary condi-
tion for importing certain species, including bluefin tuna, toothfish, sword fish and 
bigeye tuna. In addition, the Joint Declaration No 1389 also requires that when 
applying for the Customs Clearance of Legally Caught Fish, the applicant must 
submit the original catch certificate issued under the authority of the flag State of 
the fishing vessel. In cases where fish products are processed in a country or a re-
gion other than the flag State, the applicant is required to submit to the Ministry of 
Agriculture a copy of the catch certificate issued under the authority of the flag 
State of the fishing vessel and the original re-export certificate issued under the 
authority of the State or region where the processing plant is located. 
 
 
 
4.5.3 China’s coordination with catch certification systems of its 
major markets – taking the EU as an example 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, cooperation among major fish markets against IUU 
fishing has been prevalent in recent years. China’s major target market, such as 
the EU, the US and Japan, have already implemented trade-market measures 
against IUU-caught fish and fish products. China has also actively consulted with 
the EU and the US as to the conservation and management of marine living re-
sources and combating IUU fishing. This section takes the coordination between 
China and the EU as an example to elaborate on how China has been affected by 
market measures and on China’s attitude towards State cooperation in combating 
IUU fishing. 
    According to the EU’s requirements of Catch Documentation Schemes, fish or 
fish products exported from China to the EU market must be accompanied by val-
idated catch certificates or statements of the processing plant. In order to fulfil 
these requirements, the Fisheries Bureau of China has since 1 January 2010 been 
responsible for attesting and validating the information contained in catch certifi-
cates, assisting competent authorities of EU Member States to verify catch certifi-
cates982 and endorsing statements of the processing plant. When issuing catch cer-
                                                                                                                                     
Legally Caught Fish for Certain Importing Fisheries Species (in Chinese).  Avail-
able via General Administration of China Customs. 
http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab399/info230537.htm. Accessed 1 
June 2010. 
982 European Commission (2013) Information on States and their competent au-
thorities notified under Article 20 (1) and (2) of IUU Regulation No 1005/2008 of 
29 September 2008. Available via European Commission Fisheries. 
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/illegal_fishing/info/flag_state_notifications.pdf. 
Accessed 18 March 2013. 
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tificates, the Fisheries Bureau mainly pays attention to examining vessel names 
and fishing authorization. When issuing statements of the processing plant, the 
Fisheries Bureau focuses on attesting catch certificates issued by States of raw ma-
terials.983 It also checks whether the concerned fishing vessels undermine relevant 
international conservation and management measures.984  
Additionally, the Fisheries Bureau has commissioned the CAPPMA and the 
CDWFA to preliminarily examine catch certificates and statements of the pro-
cessing plant on issues of coordination, contact, receiving and sending documents 
and other relevant information. In order to ensure all seafood exported to the EU 
has been caught in a manner in accordance with international conservation and 
management measures as well as with the EU IUU Regulation, the CAPPMA and 
the CDWFA jointly established an industrial standard – the Management 
Measures on Certification regarding Marine Fisheries Products Exported to the 
EU.985  On the one hand, the CDWFA is responsible for catches of distant water 
fisheries approved by the Ministry of Agriculture, fisheries products processed by 
processing plants belonging to distant water fisheries enterprises, fisheries prod-
ucts conserved and managed by RFMOs that China has participated in or is nego-
tiating with, fish or fisheries products processed by domestic processing plants for 
foreign enterprises and managed by relevant RFMOs, as well as salmon products 
with imported materials or foreign supplied materials.986 On the other hand, the 
CAPPMA is also responsible for parts of inshore catches and fisheries processing 
products with imported materials or foreign supplied materials, which represents 
almost 90 per cent of the fish quantity being exported to the EU.987 In 2011 the 
CAPPMA examined, verified and issued certification for 29,045 batches (498,400 
                                                          
983 General Office of Ministry of Agriculture (2009) Notice of General Office 
of Ministry of Agriculture on Issuing Catch Certification for Marine Fisheries 
Products Exported to the EU (in Chinese), issued on 26 November 2009. Availa-
ble via China Fisheries Administration Website. 
http://www.cnfm.gov.cn/tzggyzj/200912/t20091201_2647889.htm. Accessed 1 
December 2009. 
984 General Office of Ministry of Agriculture (2009) Notice of General Office 
of Ministry of Agriculture on Issuing Catch Certification for Marine Fisheries 
Products Exported to the EU (in Chinese), issued on 26 November 2009. Availa-
ble via China Fisheries Administration Website. 
http://www.cnfm.gov.cn/tzggyzj/200912/t20091201_2647889.htm. Accessed 1 
December 2009. 
985  Entered into force on 1 January 2010. Via CAPPMA. 
www.cappma.org/images/news/200911261720437445.pdf . Accessed 26 Novem-
ber 2009.  
986  The Management Measures on Certification regarding Marine Fisheries 
Products Exported to the EU, Art. 5. 
987 The data is offered by Mr. He Cui, the Executive Vice President of the 
CAPPMA. 
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tons) of fisheries products, including 9,334 batches (122,000 tons) from inshore 
catches and 19,711 batches (376,400 tons) with imported materials or foreign sup-
plied materials.988 More than three quarters of fisheries products exported to the 
EU that were recorded by the CAPPMA can be seen not be caught under China’s 
national jurisdiction. The examination and verification of the statements by the 
processing plants is vital to the seafood exportation to the EU. 
Having the largest number of fish processing plants in the world, China is 
obliged by the EU IUU Regulation to take its market duties against importing IUU 
fishing seriously if China wants to continue the export of fisheries products to the 
EU. For example, because Russia did not notify in advance its competent authori-
ties to the European Commission according to the EU IUU Regulation, the EU 
prohibited the import of fish products with materials from Russia from 15 January 
2010. Russia then notified its competent authorities to the EU and the EU reinstat-
ed the import of fish and fisheries products from Russia from 20 February 2010.989 
Russia is the largest seafood supplier of China, so the EU’s prohibition indirectly 
affected China. The import of fish and fisheries products from Russia, fish prod-
ucts processed in China but with materials from Russia caught between 1 January 
2010 and 19 February 2010 could not enter the EU’s market. Therefore, China’s 
authorities have to pay high attention to verifying catch certificates validated by 
other states. 
The CDWFA is responsible for the validation of catch certificates for fish 
caught by Chinese distant water fishing vessels and exported to the EU. A neces-
sary condition is that such vessels must be recorded by the EU.990 Additionally, the 
CDWFA is responsible for monitoring such vessels through Vessel Monitoring 
Systems. Only fish caught by Chinese distant water fishing vessels that have been 
permitted to leave China’s national jurisdiction by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
have been monitored by a Vessel Monitoring System can be issued validated catch 
certificates.991 
Since the EU IUU Regulation came into force, the DG Mare of the EU has been 
“assisting Chinese authorities in streamlining their monitoring into a single, inte-
grated traceability system; developing their own domestic formal catch certifica-
tion and documentation system; and advising them on how to comply with the new 
                                                          
988 The data are offered by Mr. He Cui, the Executive Vice President of the 
CAPPMA. 
989 The Department of International Cooperation of Fisheries Bureau of the 
Ministry of Agriculture (2010) Russian fisheries products caught after 20 February 
2010 can export to the EU (in Chinese). Via CAPPMA. 
http://www.cappma.org/hangyexinxi_article.php?big_class_id=9&small_class_id
=56&article_id=3086. Accessed 24 February 2010. 
990  The Management Measures on Certification regarding Marine Fisheries 
Products Exported to the EU, Art. 11. 
991 Telephone Communication with Baoshan Huang, Vice President of the Chi-
na Distant Water Fisheries Association. 
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legislation.”992 In 2011, the EU checked the implementation of its EU IUU Regu-
lation in China two times. The EU indicated that information in several catch cer-
tificates validated by Chinese authorities were still incorrect. The Ministry of Ag-
riculture in China promised that China would improve the validation and 
confirmed that EU Member States may refuse those catch certificates. Additional-
ly, the EU suggested that the Chinese government should be more involved in the 
traceability of fish from the moment of catch to the final processing. The EU also 
advised China to take up more flag State duties.993 Since the EU IUU Regulation 
entered into force, China’s seafood export to the EU has been increased.994 The 
EU IUU Regulation has indeed helped China to pay attention to the provenance of 
fish but has not much influenced China’s fish export. 
 
 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
  
The Chinese legal system and fisheries administration system are both highly cen-
tralized, so there is hierarchy in the legislation made by different lawmaking insti-
tutions. In the field of fisheries, most fisheries legislation has been adopted or 
promulgated by the State Council and the Ministry of Agriculture, which are both 
lawmaking institutions and administrative bodies at the same time, which results 
in “departmentalism”. A recent restructuring of fisheries administrative bodies re-
flects China’s intention to strengthen enforcement at sea.  
Although China has actively participated in negotiations for major legally bind-
ing fisheries agreements against IUU fishing, China has not ratified any of them 
except for the UNCLOS. China maintains these attitudes because: these agree-
ments have not achieved wide acceptance at global level; some have controversial 
provisions that are contrary to principles established by the UNCLOS; while some 
entail many more obligations than rights. Nevertheless, China has adopted and 
transposed certain measures that have been put forward by those agreements and 
international non-legally binding instruments to combat illegal fishing into its na-
tional legislation, such as the Fisheries Law, fisheries administrative rules and 
                                                          
992 X (2009) Spotlight on China as EU issues new rules to protect fish stocks. 
Available via EU-China News. http://newsletter.eu-in-
china.com/newsletters/200908/012_en.html. Accessed August 2009. 
993 China Aquatic Products Processing and Marketing Association (2011) The 
EU checked on IUU fishing in China for two times in 2011 (in Chinese). China 
Seafood Trade (11). 
994 Between 2009 and 2011, China’s seafood export to the EU was 491,000 
tons, 550,700 tons and 574,600 tons respectively. 
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regulations adopted by the State Council as well as fisheries rules issued by the 
Ministry of Agriculture. 
 Due to conflicts between China and its neighbouring countries, coastal sover-
eignty and sovereign rights have become China’s priority. Fisheries agreements 
based on resolved boundary delimitation between China and its neighbouring 
States are more effective than those based on unresolved boundary delimitation. 
So China urgently needs to find ways for fisheries to cooperate while boundary is-
sues are being resolved. China also promotes the development of distant water 
fisheries to alleviate the pressure on coastal fisheries. China pays more attention to 
obtaining fishing quotas than to being limited by the flag State duties of the Fish 
Stocks Agreement and the FAO Compliance Agreement. However, this does not 
mean that China is not a responsible distant fishing country. China has required 
Chinese fishermen and fishing vessels to comply with international and regional 
management and conservation measures. However, the implementation of such 
measures in waters that lack coastal State control is still weak, such as the illegal 
fishing conducted by Chinese fishing vessels in West African waters.  
China currently does not have any law or regulation that provides for port State 
measures against IUU fishing. This is mainly because port State measures in this 
respect have largely not been implemented and China’s priorities are not on com-
bating IUU fishing. However, China has sufficient capabilities and should adopt 
port State measures against IUU fishing as a responsible port State in order to 
avoid possible trade-market measures taken by other States. Revising the Fisheries 
Law of the PRC is recommended so that it expressly prohibits IUU fishing vessels 
from accessing China’s ports and requires a certain percentage of vessels to be in-
spected as the EU does. 
China has its own traceability systems, but they are insufficient to serve as catch 
certificates. China has developed specific schemes to suit requirements of certain 
RFMOs and its major fish markets, such as the EU. Although improvements are 
still needed, the EU is generally satisfied with China’s implementation. 
China has taken its duties to combat IUU fishing as a flag, coastal and market 
State although it has not ratified most international legally-binding instruments in 
this respect. As a major fishing State and the biggest fish processing State, China 
should revise its Fisheries Law and adopt implementing legislation to strengthen 
the combat of IUU fishing in order to be a responsible State.  
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
A complex international legal regime for combating IUU fishing has been estab-
lished. The UNCLOS, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and FAO agreements and 
political instruments comprehensively address the issue of IUU fishing. Except for 
measures of RFMOs, the international framework provides four major State 
measures for State enforcement, including flag State measures, coastal State du-
ties, port State measures and trade-related measures. Through a comparison of the 
laws and practice of the EU and China, this thesis evaluated the adequacy of the 
international legal regime for combating IUU fishing. The EU and China are dif-
ferent in their respective levels of development, marine interests, legal regimes 
and administrative systems. The elaborate comparison between these two different 
systems provided useful insights into an improved international regime for the 
combat of IUU fishing. 
This concluding chapter offers a comparison of the legal regimes to combat 
IUU fishing in the EU and China, as well as an assessment of the successes and 
challenges of their implementation and enforcement.  
 
 
 
5.1 Comparison between the EU and China 
 
5.1.1 Decision-making and enforcement system  
 
The EU has maintained a good balance in the distribution of decision-making 
power and implementing power among its different institutions. However, a disa-
greement over decision-making between the European Council and the European 
Parliament has delayed the adoption of a new Common Fisheries Policy. The 
EU’s exclusive competence and shared competence with its Member States in the 
field of fisheries have indeed been extended in practice.  
China’s legal system is highly centralized. At national level, administrative bod-
ies also have power to make rules, regulations and other implementing legislation. 
The State Council and the Ministry of Agriculture are both law-making institu-
tions and fisheries administrative bodies in China. So they can both enact legisla-
tion as soon as there is a need for in the fisheries administration, which enhances 
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the efficiency of legislation. On the other hand, avoiding the abuse of power and 
the problem of departmentalism are worries.  
In cases where Member States do not comply with EU legislation, the European 
Commission can resort to legal remedies. As an independent institution, the ECJ 
plays a significant role in treaty interpretation and the European integration pro-
cess. The ECJ also promotes coordination in legislation between the EU and 
Member States. Although in China the Supreme People’s Court may request the 
Standing Committee of the NPC to examine whether a local regulation contradicts 
the Constitution, laws or administrative regulations, the Supreme People’s Court is 
not independent as the ECJ is. As the human resources of the Standing Committee 
of the NPC is limited, it is impossible for them to examine all contradictions in 
legislation. A judicial reform is desirable to allow for an independent judicature in 
China. 
 
 
 
5.1.2 Decision-making in the development of international fisher-
ies law and implementation 
 
The EU and China have both actively participated in the development of post-
UNCLOS fisheries law, which shows their willingness to conserve marine fisher-
ies resources and ensure sustainable fisheries. However, the EU and China have 
taken different attitudes towards the implementation and enforcement of interna-
tional fisheries law.  
    The EU is a pioneer in the combat of IUU fishing at international level. The EU 
has exclusive competence in the area of the conservation of marine biological re-
sources under the CFP. This encourages the EU to actively conclude international 
fisheries agreements, whether legally-binding or not, regional conventions and bi-
lateral fisheries agreements. In certain areas, the EU has adopted measures that are 
more stringent than international standards. The EU has adopted port State 
measures even though the Port States Measures Agreement has not yet entered in-
to force. Additionally, the EU has also implemented trade-market measures that 
are provided by IPOA-IUU, which is the implementation of soft law.  
China has taken a hesitating attitude towards concluding international fisheries 
legislation. Unlike the EU, China does not need to share its competence in con-
cluding international fisheries agreements with its local governments. Since the 
UNCLOS entered into force, boundary delimitation and fisheries conflicts have 
been crucial problems between China and its neighbouring countries. Although 
China has participated in all negotiations that contributed to the conclusion of 
post-UNCLOS fisheries agreements, China shows a negative attitude towards the 
ratification of such agreements. In the case of dispute settlement, China prefers 
political negotiation to international adjudication. Compared with legally-binding 
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law, political instruments are more acceptable to China. Additionally, China takes 
a wait-and-see attitude towards international fisheries agreements that have not yet 
entered into force. 
 
 
 
5.1.3 Contrasting interests of the EU and China 
 
The EU is a strong supporter of conserving marine fisheries resources by under-
taking certain measures beyond those provided by international fisheries legisla-
tion. By contrast, as a developing country, China’s priority is to develop a fisher-
ies industry rather than to combat IUU fishing.  
The CFP allows fishing activities in EEZs of EU Member States to be under the 
general control of the European Commission, which coordinates not only Member 
States’ fisheries but also fisheries relationships with EU’s neighbouring countries. 
After years of reducing vessels and fishing fleet capacity, the EU has reduced fish-
ing pressure in Community waters to a certain extent. Additionally, certain Mem-
ber States are major distant-water-fishing countries that have started distant water 
fisheries very early. In order to assure the quotas regulated by RFMOs, the EU al-
so has a strong focus on regional conservation of marine fisheries resources. Due 
to the reduction of catches in Community waters, an increasing domestic demand 
of fish and fisheries products fuels the EU’s fish import, while a large number of 
illegal catches that have gained a competitive price advantage on the EU market. 
Therefore, the EU is ambitious to combat IUU fishing, in particular through port 
State and trade-market measures. 
China used to have a large number of fishing vessels and fishermen. Since the 
UNCLOS entered into force and China’s neighbouring States established EEZ re-
gimes, many Chinese vessels have had to leave their traditional fishing grounds. 
Together with unresolved boundary issues, IUU fishing in the China Sea usually 
triggers fisheries conflicts or even diplomatic conflicts, which sometimes makes 
the matter too sensitive to achieve cooperation in the field of fisheries. Therefore, 
China’s priority in the China Sea is the protection of its sovereignty and sovereign 
rights. China has learned from developed countries to promote distant water fish-
eries. Although China has the largest number of distant-water-fishing vessels in 
the world, its production capacity and industrial scale is still much smaller than 
those of developed countries. In addition, China has participated in specific 
RFMOs in order to get quotas. In this case, economic development and employ-
ment are more important for China than sustainable fishing. A phenomenon to be 
noticed is that China imitates the behaviour of developed countries even when 
they are not acting responsibly. Only when developed States make some progress 
in combating IUU fishing, will China be more willing to be bound by international 
fisheries law. Moreover, trade-market measures, such as international certification 
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schemes, are unable to promote the demand for sustainably certified products in 
developing countries, so such schemes are not desirable to China. 
 
 
 
5.1.4 Dispute settlement 
 
Although neither the EU nor China have made an official declaration to choose 
the means of settlement concerning the interpretation or application of the 
UNCLOS, they have shown different attitudes in practice. The EU has been posi-
tively disposed towards the ITLOS when fisheries disputes have happened be-
tween EU Member States and third countries. However, in disputes between EU 
Member States and on matters falling within EU competence and largely regulated 
by EU measures, procedures of dispute settlement provided by the EU Treaty take 
precedence over those provided by the UNCLOS.  
China consistently and expressly maintains that conflicts should be resolved 
through friendly consultation and direct negotiation between the countries con-
cerned, instead of resorting to international litigation. The recent dispute with the 
Philippines shows that China is in a passive position due to lack of experience in 
legal litigation. Therefore, China should take a more active attitude towards inter-
national litigation in fisheries disputes, in particular prompt release, which is a less 
sensitive issue than boundary conflicts, in order to gain more experience in inter-
national litigation. 
 
 
 
5.1.5 Effectiveness of the EU’s enforcement 
 
The EU has established a comprehensive regime in accordance with international 
law to fight against IUU fishing. Only with sufficient interaction of different State 
measures and cooperation with other States can IUU fishing be held in check.  
    In cases where port State measures or trade-market measures exist, IUU fishing 
has been much well addressed. The EU applies stricter port State measures than 
the FAO Port State Measures Agreement does. However, there are still gaps in 
implementation, such as transhipment at sea between third countries’ fishing ves-
sels outside Community waters, insufficient inspection at certain big EU ports, 
lack of preventing unnecessary inspection delays and a system of compensation 
and compliant procedures if unnecessary delays occur. This is what is needed to 
improve future implementation. 
The EU’s trade-market measures have achieved a remarkable success. They are 
mainly in accordance with international law. The Catch Certification Scheme and 
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the Community IUU vessel list have been coordinated with most schemes of 
RFMOs in which the EU participates. The EU’s Catch Certification Scheme has 
prohibited a large number of IUU catches from entering the EU market, although 
it has been weakened to a certain extent by flag State fraud. The EU’s Community 
IUU vessel list plays a significant role by threatening to sanction identified ves-
sels. The EU has ambitiously implemented the list of non-cooperating third coun-
tries, which forced certain third countries to address IUU fishing. In addition, the 
EU has established its own traceability of seafood products from catcher to retail-
er.  
The EU is a pioneer in the combat of IUU fishing. On the one hand, the EU has 
actively cooperated with third countries to verify their compliance with the EU’s 
requirements in combating IUU fishing. On the other hand, the EU aims to create 
a wide network of certain major seafood markets. The EU’s practice can encour-
age international principles and rules that have been transposed into EU legislation 
to become accepted by more States, so that those principles and rules could be-
come international customary law through repeated practice. 
    If there is no sufficient coastal State control, however, merely relying on flag 
State duties results in a failure to combat IUU fishing. The most obvious example 
is in West Africa. Even though the EU has established comprehensive legislation 
to combat IUU fishing, European vessels are still illegally fishing there. This is 
why the EU has started to fight more actively illegal fishing in West Africa, main-
ly through port State and trade-market measures.  
    The sanctions the EU has imposed on IUU fishing are fairly sufficient. With re-
gard to serious infringements, criminal and administrative sanctions may be im-
posed on legal and natural persons. 
 
 
 
5.1.6 China and its challenges of addressing IUU fishing 
 
On the whole China has complied with international fisheries law to a certain ex-
tent. China’s major problem is how to achieve fisheries cooperation in boundary 
dispute areas. Illegal fishing is often used as a trigger for boundary conflicts. In 
such waters, arrest, detention and punishment of fishing vessels and crew caused 
by IUU fishing may lead to diplomatic conflicts too. In this case, opposing views 
can only make disputes more serious. Although certain coastal States take strin-
gent unilateral sanctions, IUU fishing cannot be resolved fundamentally. Mobility 
of fisheries resources requires cooperation among States. Although the situation in 
the China Sea is complicated, multilateral cooperation is also suggested as a solu-
tion to address fisheries conflicts.  
Generally speaking, China’s distant water fisheries are conducted in accordance 
with international fisheries law. However, problems still exist in waters without 
sufficient coastal State control, such as in West African waters. In this case, China 
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mimics the behaviour of developed countries, and developed countries imitate 
each other’s behaviour, which both contribute to serious IUU fishing. Except 
when applying other State measures, the priority should be given to improving the 
capabilities of coastal developing States to control their waters and ports. 
As sovereignty and sovereign rights are China’s priorities, port State measures 
and trade-market measures are less developed. In practice, port State measures 
against IUU fishing are absent in China even though it has sufficient capability to 
adopt port State measures. As a responsible port State, China should consider 
building a legal regime for port State control. 
China’s own traceability system is not sufficient to certify the legality of catch-
es. Although China is not proactive in adopting trade-market measures to address 
IUU fishing, it has adjusted its fish trade to the requirements of its major target 
markets and of the RFMOs in which China participates.  
The sanctions China has imposed on IUU fishing are relatively light. China’s 
administrative and criminal sanctions may be applied to both natural persons and 
legal persons. Yet sanctions have only been imposed on fishing activities. With 
regard to other IUU fishing-related activities, such as selling IUU catches, no spe-
cific legal responsibilities have been codified. A suggestion is proposed to set 
down maximum fines according to the value of IUU catches and thereby make 
IUU fishing trade illegal. In addition, China’s implementing rules, measures and 
provisions in the field of fisheries need to be made consistent with the Fisheries 
Law of the PRC.  
 
Apparently the EU and China are facing different challenges to deal with IUU 
fishing, due to their different political systems, development levels and priorities. 
Nevertheless, both of them have made efforts to establish regimes to address IUU 
fishing issues, and to comply with their international obligations. 
 
 
 
5.2 Significance of findings  
 
On the basis of the international legal framework for the combat of IUU fishing, 
this research has studied the implementation of a legal framework by the EU and 
China in the context of their respective differences. The conclusions reached are 
important not only for the international legal regime for addressing IUU fishing 
but also for EU-China legal studies. In the individual contexts of the EU and Chi-
na, the research has provided important contributions to the field. 
    Combating IUU fishing is an international concern that involves both developed 
and developing countries in the decision-making on issues of IUU fishing. Even 
though China is a developing country, its development level and capabilities have 
exceeded those of many developing countries.  
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However, national interests play a major role in implementing international law. 
Diverging national interests have determined the different attitudes of the EU and 
China towards various State measures against IUU fishing. However, these States 
measures interact with each other rather than function independently. Therefore, 
even though a State has not implemented certain State measures, it can still be 
constrained under the international legal regime. 
    The regulation of fishing in the EU has been studied by previous scholars. This 
research is aimed at the current EU regime to deal with IUU fishing in order to ex-
amine the merits and deficiencies. It has also provided insight into the EU’s efforts 
to establish a legitimate and comprehensive regime for combating IUU fishing 
over the past two decades, in particular its implementation and enforcement in re-
cent years. 
    There was limited previous research on the implementation of Chinese fisheries 
law and limited academic concern for the issue of IUU fishing. Even though the 
information of the Chinese legal regime and its administrative systems is not suf-
ficiently transparent, this research has made an important contribution not only to 
an understanding of the Chinese legal regime and administrative systems for the 
combat of IUU fishing but has also provided insight into the implementation of in-
ternational law in the domestic Chinese context as well as recommendations to-
wards possible future improvement. 
    There are a few publications that have discussed State implementation of com-
bating IUU fishing. An empirical perspective and a comparison between the EU 
and China has provided added value to the current research, particularly building 
up future legal regimes for the combat of IUU fishing in China or in other devel-
oping countries facing similar challenges. The EU-China fisheries relationship al-
so gives insights into the challenges China is facing. 
     From the EU and Chinese fisheries policy, it can be learned that if there is a 
lack of coastal State control, the most ambitious States cannot effectively enforce 
their flag State measures in combating IUU fishing. The future development of in-
ternational fisheries law should be focused on the improvement of port State 
measures and trade-related measures. Currently these measures do not have effec-
tive legally binding force. Therefore, States should be encouraged to sign and rati-
fy the FAO Port State Measures Agreement, so the Agreement can enter into 
force. Additionally, trade-related measures against IUU fishing should become le-
gally-binding and measures should be standardised.  
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5.3 Limitations of this research and recommendations for future 
research 
 
 
The EU’s legal regime for combating IUU fishing has been discussed in this re-
search, which proves to be a dynamic interaction between the EU and its Member 
States. Although the research has included a few cases that show enforcement by 
Member States, it would be helpful to research in depth the enforcement of certain 
major fishing Member States and port Member States, in order to verify the legit-
imacy of EU’s measures against IUU fishing.  
    The author has based her research mainly on desk work and field research. At-
tending international meetings, interviewing and communicating with key persons, 
and her beginning of an internship at the ITLOS have been particularly beneficial 
to the thesis. Further field research could be done towards some Chinese compe-
tent authorities relevant to combating IUU fishing, such as bureaus of fisheries 
administration responsible for different Chinese sea areas. 
    During the research, the author has found that port State and trade-market 
measures play a significant role in combating IUU fishing, in particular measures 
taken by major fish markets, such as the US. The US has not ratified the 
UNCLOS, even though it is very ambitious in combating IUU fishing. Therefore, 
research towards the enforcement of sanctions towards IUU fishing by the US or 
other States may suggest an alternative implementation of international law and 
would allow an assessment as to whether conclusions reached here are applicable 
in other regions in the world. 
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